{ "@context": "https://schema.org", "@type": "DefinedTerm", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/corporate-governance", "identifier": "kaal:entity:corporate-governance", "name": "Corporate governance", "termCode": "corporate-governance", "inDefinedTermSet": { "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json" }, "author": { "@type": "Person", "name": "Wulf A. Kaal", "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X" }, "dateModified": "2026-07-29", "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/corporate-governance.md", "sha256": "f76b9b916956176d92a060f07e7ff068c7ee38984d20c1581be3d2bd45b56cb3", "additionalProperty": [ { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "status", "value": "derived" }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "claim_count", "value": 102 }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "work_count", "value": 26 }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "year_span", "value": [ "2010", "2025" ] }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "non_current_claims", "value": 0 } ], "subjectOf": [ { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1664809-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:1664809-038", "text": "European boards of directors and company lawyers should follow the Morrison decision and the section 7216 legislative process closely, prepare for the resulting changes, and ask Congress to reconsider section 7216.", "abstract": "European Boards of Directors and company lawyers should fol- low upcoming events closely and prepare themselves for these impending changes. They should also ask Congress to reconsider", "citation": "Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Law – Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for (2010). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664809", "datePublished": "2010", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "pending outcome of Morrison v. NAB and of section 7216" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d5c8c30f969f8eb613bfa1fe6888a7cfa1a452e1027bcda0489618ceac62c20", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-029", "identifier": "kaal:claim:1765901-029", "text": "Expanded SEC enforcement under the Dodd-Frank provision runs a serious risk of being perceived as an encroachment on the corporate governance of foreign companies.", "abstract": "There is serious risk that such SEC enforcement actions would be perceived to encroach upon the corporate governance of foreign companies", "citation": "Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901", "datePublished": "2011", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "expanded extraterritorial enforcement by the SEC or DOJ" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "7b08b8a15f7d72b4eeed41be2d17c20428cb4727269077a6575c5d22e31ecdc5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-014", "identifier": "kaal:claim:1908473-014", "text": "The incentive effects of corporate governance controls may not operate in systemically important financial institutions, because managers and owners who anticipate a bailout commitment adjust their risk preferences upward.", "abstract": "the incentives originating from corporate governance controls may not work in SIFIs. SIFIs are often considered too big to fail and may be bailed out.108 If that is the case, SIFI principals-managers-owners may anticipate a bailout commitment and adjust their risk preferences upwards.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473", "datePublished": "2011", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "Applies to institutions considered too big to fail" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-004", "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-004", "text": "Because both European regulatory initiatives and the United States academic debate concentrate on the technical design features of contingent capital securities, the possible corporate governance applications of those securities are mostly ignored.", "abstract": "Regulatory initiatives in Europe and the academic debate in the United States focus on improving the technical design fea- tures of contingent capital securities. Given the importance of technical design features, possible applications of CCS for corpo- rate governance are mostly ignored.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "state of the debate as of 2012 in Europe and the United States" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-005", "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-005", "text": "Combined with other corporate governance mechanisms, contingent capital securities function as an internal, institution specific mechanism that could fill the void left by regulators' apparent inability to supervise financial institutions effectively.", "abstract": "Com- bined with other corporate governance mechanisms, CCSs, as an internal institution-specific mechanism, could help fill a void left by regulators' seeming inability to supervise financial institutions effectively.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "where CCS are used alongside, not instead of, other corporate governance mechanisms" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-010", "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-010", "text": "The threat of dilution of stock holdings, combined with the threat of loss on conversion, reduces the pressure shareholders place on the management of systemically important financial institutions to take higher risks.", "abstract": "The threat of dilution of stock holdings in combination with a threat of loss due to conversion could help reduce shareholder pressure on SIFI management to take higher risks.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "where conversion dilutes existing common shareholders" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-014", "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-014", "text": "Contingent capital by itself, without additional measures and supplemental corporate governance improvements, may not prevent firm failure; its real potential unfolds only when it supplements other corporate governance improvements.", "abstract": "In sum, contingent capital without additional measures and supplemental corporate governance improvements may not pre- vent firm failure.115 The real potential of contingent capital could unfold if it would be used to supplement other corporate govern- ance improvements.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "where contingent capital is deployed as a standalone regulatory tool" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-016", "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-016", "text": "If a market evolves in which contingent capital designs appear to provide sufficient protection against systemic risk and contagion, decision makers may come to rely on the design of those securities and neglect their own role as monitors.", "abstract": "it seems theoretically possible that decision makers could rely on the design of CCS and neglect their role as monitors.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "speculative", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "theoretical possibility flagged by the author", "presupposes CCS designs that appear protective" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-018", "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-018", "text": "Regular corporate governance controls may not work in systemically important financial institutions, because those institutions are considered too big to fail and their leaders, anticipating a bailout commitment, are incentivized to shift their risk preferences upwards.", "abstract": "the regular corporate governance controls may not work in SIFIs. SIFIs are often considered too big to fail and may be bailed out. If that is the case, SIFI leaders may anticipate a bail-out com- mitment and may be incentivized to shift their risk preferences upwards.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "where the institution is treated as too big to fail and a bailout is anticipated" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-021", "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-021", "text": "Where institutions hold each other's contingent capital and share similar risk profiles, they will be hesitant after conversion to vote for necessary organizational changes at a competitor or otherwise exercise their voting rights, because they are similarly exposed and may face reciprocal voting power.", "abstract": "With sim- ilar risk profiles and CCS positions in similarly exposed entities, SIFIs could be hesitant to vote for necessary organizational changes or otherwise exercise their voting rights on a competitor after conversion of CCS into equity.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "where SIFIs hold similar risk profiles and CCS positions in similarly exposed entities", "especially where cross holdings are reciprocal" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-022", "text": "Absent cross holdings, the opposite conflict arises: institutions holding a competitor's converted contingent capital could be tempted to exercise their voting rights against the interests of that competitor.", "abstract": "Without CCS cross holdings, SIFIs could be tempted to exercise their voting rights against the interests of the competitor if a con- version to equity should have been triggered.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "where a SIFI holds a competitor's CCS without a reciprocal position", "after a conversion to equity has been triggered" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-024", "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-024", "text": "The combination of demonstrated investor interest and an underdeveloped regulatory structure in the United States presents a unique opportunity to experiment with contingent capital designs and with their application to the corporate governance of systemically important financial institutions.", "abstract": "The combination of investor interest and an underdeveloped regulatory structure in the United States, pertaining to this market segment, could present a unique opportunity to experiment with contingent capital designs and their possible application in corpo- rate governance of SIFIs.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "United States market conditions as of 2012", "structurally different debt and equity markets from Europe" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-032", "text": "A contingent capital design that increases voting rights on conversion allows systemically important institutions to lower risk taking implicitly and to achieve an indirect, institution specific form of corporate governance reform through increased checks and balances.", "abstract": "With a design that increases voting rights, SI- FIs could implicitly lower risk-taking and allow for a form of in- direct and institution- specific corporate governance reform, i.e., increased checks and balances.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "where CCS are issued with a voting rights increase upon conversion", "issuance may be voluntary or mandatory" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-034", "text": "Management incentives for risk control are heightened upon conversion, especially where management knows that holders of converted contingent capital would command a majority vote, with or without institutional shareholders.", "abstract": "More importantly, management incen- tives for risk control could be heightened upon conversion, espe- cially if management knows that CCS holders would have a ma- jority vote upon conversion (with or without institutional shareholders).", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "depends on the volume of CCS issuance, which determines the influence of CCS holders" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-001", "text": "Early European initiatives to put contingent convertible bonds into executive pay lack governance-improving designs; contingent convertible bonds with an early conversion trigger should be used in executive compensation instead.", "abstract": "Early initiatives by European SIFIs to include contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation packages lack governance-improving designs. This Article suggests the use of contingent convertible bonds with an early conversion trigger in executive compensation.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "systemically important financial institutions", "executive compensation packages" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-003", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-003", "text": "Contingent convertible bonds placed in executive compensation serve a different purpose than those sold to investors: the point is not capital infusion during a crisis but governance-improving design that optimizes management incentives.", "abstract": "bonds issued to investors, the emphasis for contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation is not on a capital infusion when the Systematically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) is in a crisis,13 but rather on governance-improving designs to help optimize management's incentives.14", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "contingent convertible bonds held by executives rather than outside investors" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-004", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-004", "text": "The conversion feature of contingent convertible bonds affects corporate governance in a SIFI only if issuance volumes are sufficient and design features are adequate, because the governance effect runs through the threat of dilution of existing equity positions.", "abstract": "If sufficient volumes of contingent convertible bond issuances are combined with adequate design features, the conversion feature of contingent convertible bonds and the threat of dilution of equity positions in SIFIs could affect corporate governance in SIFIs.108", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "sufficient volume of contingent convertible bond issuance", "adequate design features" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-005", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-005", "text": "Market solutions and private ordering alone are unlikely to produce contingent capital designs that improve corporate governance in SIFIs, because privately negotiated sales so far have not produced governance-sensitive designs.", "abstract": "It is doubtful if market solutions and private ordering alone will produce contingent capital designs that help improve corporate governance in SIFIs.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "market for contingent convertible bonds still in its infancy" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-008", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-008", "text": "Adding contingent convertible bonds with an early trigger to executive compensation packages creates a corporate governance mechanism that addresses the inability of contractual control rights to constrain executive opportunism.", "abstract": "Adding contingent convertible bonds with an early trigger to executive compensation packages can create a corporate governance mechanism that helps address these shortcomings.128", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-011", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-011", "text": "A contingent capital award to executives without a conversion feature yields only limited governance improvement and only limited incentive to lower risk-taking; in its current form it operates as a mere compensation supplement.", "abstract": "Barclays's issuance of contingent convertible bonds without a conversion feature to its executives shows limited governance improvements. Without a conversion to equity, Barclays provides only limited incentives for its executives to lower risk-taking.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "contingent capital awards without conversion into equity" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-021", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-021", "text": "The impending threat of dilution from a possible conversion of investor-held contingent convertible bonds can motivate existing shareholders to become actively involved in the governance of the entity.", "abstract": "The impending threat of dilution for existing shareholders due to the possible conversion of the contingent convertible bonds held by investors may motivate existing shareholders to get actively involved in the governance of the entity.181", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "investors also hold contingent convertible bonds subject to a later trigger" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-038", "text": "Trigger designs that work well in institutions with the traditional mix of debt-holders and shareholders may be suboptimal once executives themselves hold contingent convertible bonds.", "abstract": "Trigger designs that may work well in financial institutions with the traditional mix of debt- holders and shareholders may be suboptimal if executives also hold debt instruments in the form of contingent convertible bonds.275", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "executives hold debt instruments in the form of contingent convertible bonds" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-040", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-040", "text": "An early trigger design for contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation enables earlier signaling of default risk, increases incentives for creditors and shareholders to monitor, and increases executives' incentives to lower risk-taking.", "abstract": "Contingent convertible bonds with an early trigger design enable earlier signaling of default risk; they provide increased incentives for monitoring by creditors and shareholders as well as incentives for executives to lower their risk-taking.282", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160", "datePublished": "2012", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-005", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-005", "text": "Since 2002 United States corporate governance has been substantially upgraded twice in response to crises, following more than seventy years of comparative regulatory inactivity, a concentration of regulatory activity in a short timespan that is itself striking.", "abstract": "Since 2002, corporate governance in the United States has been, not just once but twice, substantially upgraded in response to crises, after more than seventy years of comparative regulatory inactivity.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "United States corporate governance regime", "period since 2002" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-058", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-058", "text": "Managers are incentivized to manage their institutions so as to avoid contingent capital triggers, and that incentive itself can optimize the governance of financial institutions.", "abstract": "Managers are incentivized to manage their respective entities to avoid CoCo triggers, which can help optimize governance of financial institutions.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "CoCos are outstanding with credible trigger terms" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-061", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-061", "text": "Prosecutors negotiating deferred prosecution agreements may lack the expertise needed to negotiate high level corporate governance changes such as personnel changes and internal corporate and compliance procedures.", "abstract": "While prosecutors may not have the necessary expertise to negotiate high level corporate governance changes, such as personnel changes and internal corporate and compliance procedures", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "deferred prosecution agreements negotiated by prosecutors" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-064", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-064", "text": "Corporate integrity agreements improve corporate governance because the ease of reopened prosecution, increased government scrutiny, and the potential for crippling penalties improve boards' and managements' knowledge of pertinent issues in the institution and its monitoring.", "abstract": "The ease of prosecution, the increased scrutiny by the government, and the potential for crippling penalties can improve boards' and managements' knowledge of pertinent issues in the institution and its monitoring. CIAs can, thus, improve corporate governance.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "institution operating under a corporate integrity agreement" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-006", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-006", "text": "Although CIAs sit outside the formal legal framework that defines fiduciary duties, they belong to the penumbra of extra legal forces that clarifies what is expected of directors.", "abstract": "While CIAs are outside the traditional legal framework that formally defines fiduciary duties, they fit into the penumbra of extra-legal forces11 that helps to clarify the expectations for directors.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "fiduciary duty law understood as supplemented by extra legal forces" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-001", "text": "The nearly insurmountable standard for liability in oversight cases in the United States undermines the signalling of the expected standard of conduct, and this could have long-term implications for American corporate law.", "abstract": "The nearly insurmountable standard for liability in oversight cases and its effect on signalling the expected standard of conduct could have long-term implications for corporate law in the United States.", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "United States, Delaware corporate law", "oversight or duty to monitor claims" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-002", "text": "Stable rules may not suffice to make directors' oversight role more robust, so contractual and quasi law forms of dynamic governance are a promising supplement for improving the duty of oversight.", "abstract": "After outlining why stable rules may not suffice to make directors' oversight role more robust, the author provides some initial thoughts on how contractual and quasi law forms of dynamic governance could help improve the duty of oversight.", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "United States corporate governance", "duty of oversight" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-003", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-003", "text": "Without a workable duty of oversight, corporate directors who seek to comply with the oversight duty lack meaningful guidance about the conduct expected of them.", "abstract": "Without a workable duty of oversight, corporate directors seeking to comply with the oversight duty lack meaningful guidance as to the expected conduct.", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "doctrine of oversight remains immature and incoherent" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-010", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-010", "text": "Directors who are inadequately informed about the expected standard of conduct will underestimate their personal liability exposure and engage in riskier behavior than is desirable for the company itself.", "abstract": "Inadequately informed directors may underestimate their personal liability exposure and engage in more risky behavior than is desirable for the company itself.", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "directors depend on counsel for fiduciary duty guidance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-019", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-019", "text": "Delaware's signalling of expected conduct could be dramatically improved by adopting a moderate rather than near insurmountable standard for liability in cases involving breaches of the duty of oversight.", "abstract": "signaling of expected conduct29 could be dramatically improved with a moderate standard for liability in cases involving breaches of the duty of oversight.", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "United States, Delaware corporate law", "breaches of the duty of oversight" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-022", "text": "Increased liability is no panacea and cannot alone adequately address the central shortcomings of the duty of oversight and of corporate governance in the United States, because heightened liability does not give part-time outside directors the capacity to monitor complex corporations.", "abstract": "Increased liability is no panacea and cannot, alone adequately address the central shortcomings of the duty of oversight and corporate governance in the United States that Professor Fairfax identifies.", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "large and increasingly complex corporations", "directors serving part time as outsiders" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-024", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-024", "text": "The author endorses the conclusion that attempts to enhance oversight in the United States may fail and that emphasizing improved oversight as a means of enhancing corporate governance could be ill-advised.", "abstract": "This weighs in favour of Professor Fairfax's conclusion that attempts to enhance oversight in the United States may fail and an emphasis on emphasizing improving oversight as a means of enhancing corporate governance could be ill-advised.", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "United States corporate governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-025", "text": "The common denominator between the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, and other reform proposals is a top down regulatory approach of direct regulatory intervention with stable and supposedly optimal rules.", "abstract": "a noteworthy common denominator between SOX and Dodd-Frank and other reform proposals is the use of a top down regulatory approach, i.e. direct regulatory intervention with stable and supposedly optimal rules.", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "United States corporate governance reform since 2002" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-027", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-027", "text": "Governance adjustments are often enacted merely to address the problem perceived in the given market environment and the then existing economic conditions, without regard to possible future developments.", "abstract": "Governance adjustments are often enacted merely to address the then perceived problem in the given market environment and in the then existing economic conditions, without regard to possible future developments.", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "crisis driven governance reform" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-029", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-029", "text": "The economic conditions and the corresponding requirements for optimal and stable rules are constantly evolving, so rules fixed at one moment lose their fit over time.", "abstract": "However, the economic conditions and the corresponding requirements for optimal and stable rules are constantly evolving.", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "evolving market environments" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-035", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-035", "text": "Using court decisions and stable rules to make the oversight role more robust could be insufficient, whereas contractual and quasi law forms of dynamic governance could help improve the duty of oversight.", "abstract": "Using court decisions and stable rules to make \"the oversight role more robust to ensure that directors pay greater attention to their monitoring responsibilities\" 49 could be insufficient. By contrast, contractual and quasi law forms of dynamic governance could help improve the duty of oversight.", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "directors are outsiders working part time", "increasing complexity of modern corporations" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-037", "text": "More research is needed to understand how dynamic forms of governance could help improve fiduciary duties and corporate governance.", "abstract": "More research may be needed to understand how dynamic forms of governance could help improve fiduciary duties and corporate governance.", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "speculative", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-001", "text": "The increasing use of non prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements has allowed federal prosecutors to expand their traditional role incrementally, marking a shift in prosecutorial culture away from an ex post focus on punishment toward an ex ante emphasis on compliance.", "abstract": "has enabled federal prosecutors to incrementally expand their traditional role, exemplifying a shift in prosecutorial culture from an ex-post focus on punish- ment to an ex-ante emphasis on compliance.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-002", "text": "Prior scholarship on the corporate governance effects of non and deferred prosecution agreements rests largely on anecdotal evidence and individual case studies rather than on systematic evidence, which is why its conclusions about those effects are unreliable.", "abstract": "The evaluation of issues pertaining to the effect of N/DPAs on corporate governance in prior studies is largely based on anecdotal evidence and valuable case studies.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-003", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-003", "text": "Because the population of executed non and deferred prosecution agreements is now large, their real trends and real governance impact are quantifiable and measurable, so policy makers can be given evidence based guidance rather than conjecture.", "abstract": "given the large number of N/DPAs, the real trends and the real impact of N/DPAs are quantifiable and measurable, giving real guidance to policy makers.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "requires access to publicly available executed N/DPAs in sufficient number" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-011", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-011", "text": "Coding of all publicly available non and deferred prosecution agreements executed between 1993 and 2013 shows that 97.41 percent of them, or 264 of 271 agreements, contained relevant corporate governance changes.", "abstract": "we show that 97.41 percent [N=264] of the public N/DPAs from 1993–2013 con- tained relevant corporate governance changes.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "publicly available N/DPAs only", "sample period 1993 to 2013" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-013", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-013", "text": "In 63.47 percent of the coded non and deferred prosecution agreements the agreement itself referenced preemptive remedial measures the corporation had instituted before the agreement was executed.", "abstract": "We found that 63.47 percent of the N/DPAs in the sample contained references to preemptive remedial measures instituted before the execution of the N/DPA.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "counts only measures referenced within the text of an executed N/DPA" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-017", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-017", "text": "Business change provisions in non and deferred prosecution agreements can go as far as requiring the entity to fundamentally change its business model or to shut down entire business units.", "abstract": "N/DPA mandated business changes identified in this study could require the respective entity to fundamen- tally change its business model or shut down entire business units, among other possible business changes.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-019", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-019", "text": "Although 45 percent of sampled agreements required improved communication and training, only 11 percent required the entity to create the position of chief compliance officer, so the most structural compliance remedy is the rarest.", "abstract": "Only 11 percent of the N/DPAs in our sample required the creation of a chief compliance officer.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-021", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-021", "text": "The increasing execution of non and deferred prosecution agreements since 2002 has raised the overall regulatory burden borne by the corporate entities subject to them.", "abstract": "since 2002 the increasing execution of N/DPAs has heightened the overall regu- latory burden for corporate entities that are subject to N/DPAs.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to entities that are subject to an N/DPA" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-022", "text": "If leading corporations in an industry are bound by substantially similar agreements, the government's privileged access to information and its continuing oversight beyond the agreement term can make business and governance practices in that industry change lastingly.", "abstract": "Given the government's privileged access to information and continuing government oversight, even after the N/DPA term expires, business and governance practices in that industry could encounter lasting change.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "requires the DOJ to target one industry with substantially similar or overlapping N/DPA terms" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-023", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-023", "text": "Because the board changes mandated by non and deferred prosecution agreements consist largely of additional reporting obligations and committee reform rather than removal of officers or directors, those reforms alone may not create sufficient incentives for boards and management to improve governance and avoid execution of an agreement.", "abstract": "These reforms alone may not create sufficient incentives for boards and management to improve governance and avoid N/DPA execution.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-024", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-024", "text": "The threat of bad press, reputational harm, legal costs, stock price declines, and the cost of implementing mandated governance changes can partly substitute for the weak direct incentives, pushing boards and management to optimize governance and keep the entity out of an agreement.", "abstract": "the cost of implementing N/DPA governance changes can help counteract lack- ing incentives for boards and management to optimize governance and protect the entity from entering into a N/DPA.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-025", "text": "Because 63.47 percent of the sampled agreements were executed even after the corporation had already instituted preemptive remedial measures, the current quantity, quality, comprehensiveness, and effectiveness of those preemptive measures may be insufficient to prevent an agreement.", "abstract": "execution of N/DPAs after the institution of pre- emptive remedial measures (63.47 percent of the N/DPAs in the sample), the current quantity, quality, comprehensiveness, and effectiveness of preemptive remedial measures may be insufficient.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-026", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-026", "text": "High quality and effective preemptive remedial measures are themselves part of good corporate governance and can help a corporation avoid investigation, prosecution, and the execution of a non or deferred prosecution agreement.", "abstract": "High-quality effective preemptive reme- dial measures are part of good corporate governance and can help avoid inves- tigations and prosecutions and the associated execution of N/DPAs.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-031", "text": "Corporate wrongdoers are unlikely to prefer regulation by prosecution over regulation by legislation because prosecution and execution of an agreement carry large reputational implications.", "abstract": "Because of the large reputational implications of prosecution and N/DPA execution, corporate wrongdoers are unlikely to favor \"regulation by prosecution\" to regulation by legislation.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-034", "text": "Because non and deferred prosecution agreements typically run for a limited term, it remains unclear whether the governance reforms they impose survive in the long term.", "abstract": "Given that N/DPAs typically have a limited duration/term, it re- mains unclear if N/DPA-related governance reforms can be successful in the long- term, i.e., if they \"stick.\"", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies because N/DPAs have a limited duration" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-036", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-036", "text": "The underlying corporate governance problems in United States corporations may be more severe than non and deferred prosecution agreements are capable of adequately addressing.", "abstract": "The underlying corporate governance problems in U.S. corporations could be more severe than N/DPAs can adequately address.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-038", "text": "The cooperation requirements documented in this study are likely to produce an increasing need for corporations and their counsel to anticipate prosecutorial actions in advance.", "abstract": "N/DPA-related cooperation requirements identified in this study may result in an increasing need to anticipate prosecutorial actions.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-039", "text": "The evidence assembled in this study supports the conclusion that non and deferred prosecution agreements can play a legitimate role in addressing corporate governance shortcomings, contrary to the broad legitimacy critique in the literature.", "abstract": "The findings in this study suggest that N/DPAs can play a legitimate role in addressing corporate governance shortcomings.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-040", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-040", "text": "Corporate governance provisions in non and deferred prosecution agreements increased significantly over the decade to 2013, raising prosecutors' influence over corporate governance to unprecedented levels.", "abstract": "find that corporate governance provisions in N/DPAs significantly increased in the last decade, boosting prosecutors' influence over corporate governance to un- precedented levels.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "based on all publicly available N/DPAs from 1993 to 2013" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-020", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-020", "text": "Contrary to the dominant view of corporate governance as a forward looking endeavor, dynamic governance structures are properly categorized as backward looking ex ante forms of corporate governance.", "abstract": "By contrast, in the theoretical framework of dynamic regulation, dynamic gov- ernance structures can be categorized as backward-looking ex-ante forms of corporate governance.", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "within the theoretical framework of dynamic regulation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-021", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-021", "text": "Traditional forward looking corporate governance systems adopt backward looking perspectives only after stable and optimal rules have emerged as suboptimal and require replacement or amendment.", "abstract": "Traditional forward-looking corporate governance systems may take backward-looking perspectives if and when stable and optimal rules emerge as suboptimal, requiring replacement and/or amendment of existing regulatory solutions.", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "traditional stable and presumptively optimal rulemaking infrastructure" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-023", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-023", "text": "Targeted use of governmental contracts allows the government to successfully reform corporate governance not only in individual public corporations but across entire industries.", "abstract": "Empirical evidence suggests that the targeted use of governmental con- tracts allows the government to successfully reform corporate governance in public corporations and entire industries70.", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-024", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-024", "text": "Over 97 percent of the non and deferred prosecution agreements executed in the United States between 1993 and 2013 contained governance changes, including required business changes in 30 percent and board and senior management changes in 38 percent.", "abstract": "Over 97% of the N/DPAs executed in the United States between 1993 and 2013 contained governance changes, including required business changes (30%), board and senior management changes (38%", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "United States N/DPAs executed between 1993 and 2013" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-025", "text": "The governance improvements documented in governmental contracts counteract or at least discount the standard criticisms of them, including unequal bargaining power, the government's lack of governance expertise, and the potential for prosecutorial abuse.", "abstract": "Concerns that may be dis- counted include the unequal bargaining power between the contracting par- ties78, the government's lack of governance expertise and training79, the po- tential for prosecutorial abuse80", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2629451-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2629451-001", "text": "Stock prices respond significantly and predictably in a positive direction to the DOJ press release announcing execution of a non- or deferred prosecution agreement and to the start of the N/DPA term.", "abstract": "We document a significant and predictable positive stock price response to the DOJ press release and the start of the N/DPA term.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, Stock Price Response to Non- and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (2015). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629451", "datePublished": "2015", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "publicly traded U.S. firms that executed N/DPAs between 1993 and 2015", "event windows measured around the DOJ press release date and the start date of the N/DPA term" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "507404d641abb922ab6d8e3a0b032e35ead2befd7b88746d09d178a8fa816957", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2629451-007", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2629451-007", "text": "The combination of a positive market reaction at the start of the N/DPA term and a negative reaction at its end is evidence that the governance changes N/DPAs mandate actually matter to firm value.", "abstract": "We interpret the positive market reaction at the beginning of the N/DPA term and investors' negative reaction at the end of the N/DPA term as evidence that governance changes mandated by N/DPAs matter.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, Stock Price Response to Non- and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (2015). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629451", "datePublished": "2015", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "governance changes become mandatory at the start of the term and unenforceable at its end" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "507404d641abb922ab6d8e3a0b032e35ead2befd7b88746d09d178a8fa816957", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2629451-008", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2629451-008", "text": "Because N/DPAs are contractual arrangements between corporations and the Department of Justice that remedy identified governance shortcomings, it is the DOJ, rather than Congress or the courts, that is changing U.S. corporate governance practice.", "abstract": "As contractual arrangements between a corporation and the Department of Justice (DOJ), intended to remedy identified governance shortcomings, the DOJ – not Congress or the Courts - is changing governance practices in the United States (Garrett 2014, Kaal and Lacine 2014).", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, Stock Price Response to Non- and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (2015). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629451", "datePublished": "2015", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "United States, 1993 to 2015", "governance historically a matter of state law" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "507404d641abb922ab6d8e3a0b032e35ead2befd7b88746d09d178a8fa816957", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2629451-036", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2629451-036", "text": "Despite wide-ranging criticism of N/DPAs on authority, fairness, and expertise grounds, scholars agree that N/DPAs do influence corporate governance.", "abstract": "Despite the broad critique of N/DPAs, consensus exists among scholars that N/DPAs influence corporate governance (Cunningham 2014b, Kaal and Lacine 2014, Coffee 2005, Thompson 2003).", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, Stock Price Response to Non- and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (2015). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629451", "datePublished": "2015", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "scholarly literature on N/DPAs through 2015" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "507404d641abb922ab6d8e3a0b032e35ead2befd7b88746d09d178a8fa816957", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2629451-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2629451-038", "text": "The observed growth in N/DPA execution, especially since 2002, indicates that N/DPAs will continue to shape major U.S. corporations across a range of industries.", "abstract": "The trends observed suggest that N/DPAs will continue to play a role in major U.S. corporations in a variety of industries.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, Stock Price Response to Non- and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (2015). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629451", "datePublished": "2015", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "extrapolated from the 1993 to 2015 time series of 330 executed N/DPAs" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "507404d641abb922ab6d8e3a0b032e35ead2befd7b88746d09d178a8fa816957", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2629451-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2629451-039", "text": "Prior coding of all publicly available N/DPAs from 1993 to 2013 across more than 230 governance categories shows that N/DPAs have a substantial effect on corporate governance.", "abstract": "In the largest study to date, Kaal and Lacine (2014), using a hand-selected dataset comprising all publicly available N/DPAs from 1993-2013 (N=271) in over 230 governance categories, show a substantial effect of N/DPAs on corporate governance.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, Stock Price Response to Non- and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (2015). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629451", "datePublished": "2015", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "N=271 agreements, 1993 to 2013" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "507404d641abb922ab6d8e3a0b032e35ead2befd7b88746d09d178a8fa816957", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2922176-001", "text": "The extent to which a company uses data and algorithms will separate the winning companies of the future from the rest, because algorithmically driven firms gather consumer behavior data and instantaneously feed it back into an improved consumer experience.", "abstract": "The use of data and algorithms will distinguish the successful companies of the future. Algorithmically-driven companies use new and emerging technologies to gather data from their consumers about their behavior and then instantaneously utilize this information to improve the consumer experience.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to companies competing on consumer relevance in digitized, networked markets" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "fa4e986917d437cb1504281e7b986be2698e9507d8feaf426c9d7d1754ca882c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-018", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2922176-018", "text": "Society is moving from a centralized infrastructure to a decentralized, unmediated, and interconnected one, and from vertical hierarchies to horizontal, open, and autonomous networks; this transition, not the short-term versus long-term debate, is the relevant frame for corporate governance.", "abstract": "Society is transitioning from a centralized infrastructure to a decentralized, unmediated, and interconnected infrastructure, from a world of vertical hierarchies to a world of horizontal, open, and autonomous networks.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "driven and accelerated by rapid technological change" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "fa4e986917d437cb1504281e7b986be2698e9507d8feaf426c9d7d1754ca882c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-021", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2922176-021", "text": "Despite the obvious benefits of technology applications in corporate governance, the technological revolution has not yet produced wide acceptance of unmediated or decentralized corporate governance structures and practices.", "abstract": "the technological revolution has not yet precipitated a wide acceptance of more unmediated/decentralized corporate governance structures and practices.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "as of 2017" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "fa4e986917d437cb1504281e7b986be2698e9507d8feaf426c9d7d1754ca882c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-030", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2922176-030", "text": "The monitoring and advising roles of the board are no longer sufficient, and a board confined to those roles is a missed opportunity to obtain unmediated and relevant market feedback on company initiatives.", "abstract": "Successful companies recognize that the monitoring and advising role of the board is no longer sufficient and that the board of directors in many ways may constitute a missed opportunity for receiving feedback on company initiatives, e.g., unmediated and relevant input from the market.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "successful companies already operating beyond the academic monitoring debate" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "fa4e986917d437cb1504281e7b986be2698e9507d8feaf426c9d7d1754ca882c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2922176-034", "text": "Critics who dismiss artificial intelligence on boards as science fiction not worth engaging are wrong: AI on boards is a real prospect, and technologies such as blockchain-based smart contracts will both disrupt corporate governance and supply solutions to it.", "abstract": "Critics who argue that it is pointless to concern oneself with future science-fiction-type prospects are wrong.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "fa4e986917d437cb1504281e7b986be2698e9507d8feaf426c9d7d1754ca882c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2922176-039", "text": "Regulators should nudge companies and their stakeholders toward recognizing the strategic and financial benefits of an unmediated and technology-based approach to corporate governance, rather than mandating further top-down reform.", "abstract": "Regulators should nudge both companies and their stakeholders into recognizing the benefits, both strategic and financial, of adopting an unmediated and technology-based approach to corporate governance.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "fa4e986917d437cb1504281e7b986be2698e9507d8feaf426c9d7d1754ca882c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-040", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2922176-040", "text": "Companies that adopt unmediated and technology-driven governance gain a competitive advantage in attracting talent, raising capital, finding partners, and above all in remaining relevant in hyper-competitive global markets.", "abstract": "Today's successful companies embrace these insights and therefore have a competitive advantage in attracting talent, raising capital, finding suitable partners, and, perhaps most importantly, in remaining relevant in hyper-competitive global markets.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "hyper-competitive global markets shaped by social media, blockchain, DAOs and artificial intelligence" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "fa4e986917d437cb1504281e7b986be2698e9507d8feaf426c9d7d1754ca882c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2939127-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2939127-031", "text": "Because a series of smart contracts granted DAO token holders voting rights, the blockchain based smart contracts performed the function of articles of association or corporate bylaws, in an organization that had no directors, managers, or employees.", "abstract": "Because a series of smart contracts granted DAO token holders voting rights, the blockchain-based smart contracts imitated the role of articles of association or bylaws.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939127", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized autonomous organizations structured like the DAO" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "abcef529c7200261c59eec43018375b3b26e3186239fb9d002bacc298dba26ff", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-018", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-018", "text": "The conversion feature of contingent capital securities has the potential to change the control dynamic, the distribution of power, and the dependencies within systemically important financial institutions.", "abstract": "The conversion feature of CCS has the potential to change the control dynamic, power, and dependencies within systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "systemically important financial institutions with outstanding contingent capital securities", "conversion is actually triggered" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-022", "text": "The threat of dilution of stock holdings, combined with the threat of loss upon conversion, could help reduce the pressure shareholders place on management of systemically important financial institutions to take increasing risks.", "abstract": "The threat of dilution of stock holdings, in combination with a threat of loss due to conversion could help reduce shareholder pressure on SIFI management to take increasing risks.48", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "conversion dilutes existing common shareholders", "shareholders anticipate the dilution ex ante" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-019", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3067615-019", "text": "Token holders, unlike shareholders in the traditional corporate infrastructure, cannot vote for or against directors or nominate directors, so ordinary ICO investors have no governance channel and simply must trust the promoters and their business intent.", "abstract": "Further limitations for token holders that amount to significant risk factors include token holders' inability, unlike shareholders in the traditional infrastructure, to vote for or against directors or to nominate directors.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "typical ICO token structures", "ordinary investors as distinct from institutional pre-sale investors" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "164ce15b9eb1e8847ebcb073f5b23a96b4974ad0308d77469a9455d4a1ebeb38", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3117224-005", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3117224-005", "text": "Unlike shareholders in traditional corporate structures who can vote for or nominate directors, ICO investors have no control whatsoever over promoters.", "abstract": "Unlike shareholders in the traditional corporate infrastructure who are able vote for or against directors or to nominate directors, ICO investors have not control over the promoters whatsoever.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings The Top 25 Jurisdictions and Their Comparative Regulatory Responses (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3117224", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "83e9ccb9219a217d9fcfc5c098b897229ee7cf85623bee3ae22d2e986548466b", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227933-009", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3227933-009", "text": "In the most successful firms governance is no longer about hierarchy or control; it is about creating a flat, open and inclusive ecosystem that leverages the talents of all stakeholders in the company's network.", "abstract": "In the best and most successful firms, governance is no longer about hierarchy or control. Instead, the focus is on creating a flat, open and inclusive organizational environment or \"eco-system\" that leverages the talents of all stakeholders in that company's network.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why 'Blockchain' Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227933", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "successful platform-style firms" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "a9e9660c4dc25a2202f1da4e762f5885256e05f68c53ca51942f5833a7a4c108", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227967-017", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3227967-017", "text": "Many new innovation driven firms that replaced hierarchy with a best-idea-wins culture have struggled to maintain that governance model and to fulfill their initial promise.", "abstract": "Significantly, however, many such \"new\" firms have often struggled to maintain this new governance model and fulfill their initial promise.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in a Digital Age Why 'Coding for Lawyers' Matters (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227967", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "fast growth technology companies with few assets and employees" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "f6e13b956f864ab32ec3305d095a35a127770327d75b3688f785cefc437d369f", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227967-023", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3227967-023", "text": "A decentralized autonomous organization is merely computer code with no directors, managers or employees, its governance structure built with software, code and smart contracts running on a public decentralized blockchain platform.", "abstract": "DAOs are \"merely\" computer code. They don't have any directors, managers or employees. The governance structure is built with and on software, code and smart contracts that ran on a public decentralized blockchain platform (in most cases Ethereum).", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in a Digital Age Why 'Coding for Lawyers' Matters (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227967", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAOs built on public platforms, in most cases Ethereum" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "f6e13b956f864ab32ec3305d095a35a127770327d75b3688f785cefc437d369f", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-001", "text": "As a foundational technology, blockchain technology builds the infrastructure for decentralized networked governance, which over time creates an environment in which the internal and external monitoring mechanisms previously necessitated by agency problems in corporate governance can be removed.", "abstract": "As a foundational technology, blockchain technology creates the infrastructure for decentralized networked governance that, over time, creates the environment that enables the removal of internal and external monitoring mechanisms previously necessitated by agency problems in corporate governance.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "over a multi-decade time horizon", "requires the supporting infrastructure components to be built" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-002", "text": "Blockchain technology produces a substantial increase in the efficiency of the agency relationship and lowers agency costs by orders of magnitude.", "abstract": "Blockchain technology facilitates a substantial increase in efficiency in the agency relationship and lowers agency costs in orders of magnitude.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-003", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-003", "text": "The core agency conflicts that emanate from the separation of ownership by shareholder principals and control by manager agents cannot be fully addressed by the existing theoretical and legal framework, because monitoring agents is inevitably costly and transaction costs abound.", "abstract": "However, the core agency conflicts emanating from the separation of ownership (shareholder principal) and control (manager agent) cannot be fully addressed by the existing theoretical and legal framework.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "under the existing theoretical and legal framework for corporate governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-006", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-006", "text": "Applying blockchain to corporate governance requires the relevant authorities, who most likely understand the governance use case but not the technology, to reach consensus on how and when to implement it.", "abstract": "in the corporate governance context it requires the authorities, who most likely understand the use case and not the technology, to come to a consensus on how and when to implement such technology for that governance use case.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "corporate governance implementations within existing centralized structures" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-013", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-013", "text": "Shareholder activism reform by itself has been unable to sufficiently improve the corporate governance system.", "abstract": "activism reform by itself has been unable to sufficiently improve the corporate governance system.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-014", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-014", "text": "Government-sponsored organizational experimentation that enables new business models and new organizational structures is desirable and may be one of the few ways to facilitate the needed corporate governance reform.", "abstract": "organizational experimentation that enables new business models and new organizational structures is desirable and valuable and may be one of the few ways to facilitate the much needed corporate governance reform.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-015", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-015", "text": "The continued popularity of existing corporate governance mechanisms may be a product of path dependencies created by the historical evolution of internal and external monitoring mechanisms, rather than of their effectiveness.", "abstract": "The popularity of existing mechanisms to address the agency problems in corporate governance may be related to path dependencies created by the evolution of internal and external monitoring mechanisms in corporate governance", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-027", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-027", "text": "The removal of checks and balances, agent monitoring, audit requirements, disclosure regimes, market pressure, and executive compensation schemes produces a qualitative shift in efficiency in the agency relationship and in corporate governance overall.", "abstract": "The removal of checks and balances in corporate governance, monitoring of agents, audit requirements, disclosure regimes, market pressure, executive agent compensation schemes, among many others, provides a qualitative shift in efficiency in the agency relationship", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-005", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3411897-005", "text": "General Electric's decentralization under Jack Welch worked because each business unit was made fully accountable through its own profit and loss statement and market price internal transactions, which removed inefficiencies and drove up market value.", "abstract": "Welch's method enabled each business unit to be run efficiently and profitably, while allowing unit heads significant flexibility and independence. GE's market value skyrocketed as a result of its decentralization of business units.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "pre and post internet era corporate reorganization", "no new technological innovation required" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "82f0aea026b3e3a526ec51bc073b3b864dc06cd9083ff9c54c550037045edaa9", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-001", "text": "The core underlying agency problems of corporate governance cannot be fully resolved within the existing theoretical and legal infrastructure, despite decades of governance experiments and extensive rule revisions.", "abstract": "Despite decades of governance experiments and extensive rule revisions, the existing scope of agency problems suggest that the core underlying agency problems cannot fully be resolved within the existing theoretical and legal infrastructure.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "existing corporate law and theory of the firm infrastructure" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-002", "text": "Shareholder activism reform, taken by itself, has been unable to sufficiently improve the corporate governance system.", "abstract": "Shareholder activism reform by itself has been unable to sufficiently improve the corporate governance system.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "United States corporate governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-004", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-004", "text": "DAOs are unlikely to disrupt existing corporate structures in the foreseeable future because the blockchain industry is still in its infancy and core decentralized infrastructure elements will remain lacking.", "abstract": "Because the blockchain industry is still in its infancy and core decentralized infrastructure elements will remain lacking for the foreseeable future, DAOs are less likely to disrupt existing corporate structures and the associated governance solutions in the foreseeable future.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "near term horizon", "current state of decentralized infrastructure" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-008", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782201-008", "text": "Blockchain based guarantees remove agency costs because principals become less essential for monitoring agents, which addresses the inherent agency problems in modern finance and corporate governance.", "abstract": "Blockchain-based guarantees remove agency costs because principals are less essen- tial for monitoring agents, which addresses the inherent agency problems in modern finance and corporate governance.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "where contracts execute only when all parameters are fulfilled and verified by a majority of miners or nodes" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "bedf7bcfbb7a9b0112b5848cb0d941b1d41f330dafeee0143a30ff5e8aa53700", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-010", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808852-010", "text": "Agency theory and the existing legal framework have failed to resolve the core agency conflict arising from the separation of ownership and control, so peaceable and productive coordination of human behavior remains wanting.", "abstract": "Theory and practice have not successfully addressed the outstanding issues. For example, the core agency conflicts emanating from the separation of ownership (shareholder principal) and control (manager agent) cannot be fully addressed by the existing theoretical and legal framework.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to limited liability entities and their constituents" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "31e91158fdeefebc2f0be54ebf89751f7cdd4c89ecea932888f5ba9be6b1caba", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-003", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808859-003", "text": "Firms that fare worst under disruptive innovation share a myopic short-term focus on shareholder value maximization, because emphasis on share price and financial metrics obscures the question of whether the firm remains relevant.", "abstract": "Less successful companies often share a myopic and short-term focus on shareholder value maximization that has led to an unhealthy emphasis on firm share price, market valuations, and financial metrics that obscure issues of relevancy.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "listed companies in particular" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "304ad25d43b5ecea3158e3a2ca04e6e1e3bd2958e2134e2dcefbfedf3b6f3ab7", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-035", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808867-035", "text": "Blockchain based guarantees remove agency costs because principals are less required to institute oversight and monitoring of agents, which addresses inherent agency problems in modern finance and corporate governance.", "abstract": "Blockchain-based guarantees remove agency costs because principals are less required to institute oversight and monitoring of agents which addresses the inherent agency problems in modern finance and corporate governance.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "contracts whose parameters are verified by a majority of miners or nodes" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "eeccf6d0587bd278a96ce6ac8ec5003e26d161c245f6c94b4144d84f374802eb", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5583610-003", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5583610-003", "text": "Liquid Equity Rewards is defined as a blockchain enabled system that grants verified holders of stock or tokenized equity time-weighted, utility-only rewards rather than financial yield.", "abstract": "A blockchain-enabled system called Liquid Equity Rewards (LER) provides verified holders of stocks or tokenized assets with time-weighted, utility-only rewards.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5583610", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d73609d95ddb1573acc2a9e7af617fbe6283d6e591deb6317f6d5d804517c62", "status": "current" } ], "description": "102 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'corporate-governance'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition." }