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  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-013",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-013",
   "text": "Although implementing dynamic elements in regulatory structures remains uncertain, promising regulatory tools with dynamic elements already exist, including contingent capital securities, corporate integrity agreements, and deferred prosecution agreements.",
   "abstract": "Although the implementation of dynamic elements in regulatory structures is uncertain, some promising regulatory tools with dynamic elements already exist, including contingent capital securities, corporate integrity agreements, and deferred prosecution agreements.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "existing instruments serve as building blocks rather than new institutions"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-064",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-064",
   "text": "Corporate integrity agreements improve corporate governance because the ease of reopened prosecution, increased government scrutiny, and the potential for crippling penalties improve boards' and managements' knowledge of pertinent issues in the institution and its monitoring.",
   "abstract": "The ease of prosecution, the increased scrutiny by the government, and the potential for crippling penalties can improve boards' and managements' knowledge of pertinent issues in the institution and its monitoring. CIAs can, thus, improve corporate governance.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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   "text": "The threat of heightened scrutiny under a deferred prosecution or corporate integrity agreement optimizes incentives because increased government monitoring attaches only after a first time offense, giving institutions a reason to comply and self-regulate in order to avoid it.",
   "abstract": "The threat of heightened scrutiny for institutions subject to a DPA/CIA may help optimize incentives because financial institutions would be subjected to increased monitoring by government regulators only after a first time offense had occurred.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
   "datePublished": "2013",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-003",
   "text": "The decades long academic debate over improving fiduciary duty doctrine has overlooked Corporate Integrity Agreements entirely, even though the debate is otherwise framed as a choice between expanding and curtailing the doctrine.",
   "abstract": "The academic debate on options for improvement of the fiduciary duty doctrine has ignored the possible role of Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-004",
   "text": "Corporate Integrity Agreements are a hybrid instrument: they are compliance programs funded by health care companies but administratively enforced by the government, that is, contracts between health care companies and the federal government carrying costly mandatory compliance measures and penalties.",
   "abstract": "CIAs are administratively-enforced compliance programs funded by health care companies but enforced by the government. In other words, they are contracts between health care companies and the federal government and can involve costly mandatory compliance measures and penalties.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-005",
   "text": "Because directors contractually agree to increase compliance through an open door policy for the government, CIAs substantially raise the liability risk for companies whose directors did not act in accordance with their fiduciary responsibilities.",
   "abstract": "Because the directors contractually agree to increase compliance by way of an open door policy for the government,10 CIAs can substantially increase the risk of liability for companies whose directors did not act in accordance with their fiduciary responsibilities.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-007",
   "text": "The contractual obligations contained in CIAs can enhance directors' default fiduciary duties, expanding the duty of care for directors of health care corporations beyond the legal standard set by Caremark and Stone v. Ritter.",
   "abstract": "The contractual obligations in CIAs can enhance directors' fiduciary default duties, expanding the duty of care for directors of health care corporations beyond the legal standard under Caremark and Ritter.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
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    "directors of health care corporations operating under an executed CIA"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-011",
   "text": "Noncompliance with a CIA carries serious penalties, because the OIG may prosecute the company or seek its exclusion from federal health care programs.",
   "abstract": "Upon noncompliance with the terms of a CIA, the OIG can prosecute the company or seek its exclusion from federal health care programs.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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   "scope_conditions": [
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-013",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-013",
   "text": "Certification requirements that compel directors and officers to certify compliance with a CIA's provisions lower the procedural and enforcement hurdles for pursuing increased sanctions against noncompliant companies.",
   "abstract": "Certification requirements in CIAs, which require directors and officers to certify compliance with the CIA's provisions, can lower procedural and enforcement hurdles.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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   "is_failure_mode": false,
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  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-015",
   "text": "CIAs often become the benchmark for expected conduct in a subsequent civil or criminal trial, which distinguishes them from ordinary contractual arrangements between companies and the government.",
   "abstract": "CIAs often become the standard for expected conduct in a civil or criminal trial.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "litigation following execution of a CIA"
   ],
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  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-016",
   "text": "Once a CIA has been executed it is much easier for the government to reopen a case than to pursue a new one, and this ease of further prosecution, combined with increased OIG scrutiny and the threat of crippling penalties, substantially affects board knowledge, monitoring, and management.",
   "abstract": "Once a CIA has been executed, it is much easier for the government to reopen a case than to pursue a new one.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-018",
   "text": "If the government finds problems on inspection it can escalate beyond the CIA's own substantive provisions to criminal prosecution, fines, additional CIAs, and exclusion from federally funded health care programs.",
   "abstract": "These penalties include criminal prosecution, fines, additional CIAs, and exclusion from federally funded health care programs.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-019",
   "text": "CIAs reach into the day to day compliance operations of corporations by elevating the chief compliance officer, typically mandating the appointment of a CCO who reports directly to the CEO rather than to the general counsel or chief financial officer and who has direct access to the board.",
   "abstract": "The CCO is responsible for implementing the CIA and must generally report directly to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), not to the General Counsel or Chief Financial Officer (CFO).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "regulated entities operating under a comprehensive CIA"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-020",
   "text": "By prescribing the number of board meetings devoted to compliance review and requiring specific board resolutions, CIA provisions let the government contractually determine how and when a board will interact.",
   "abstract": "In effect, these provisions allow the government to contractually determine how and when a board will interact.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "CIAs containing board specific provisions, as in the Allergan, Pfizer, and AstraZeneca agreements"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-021",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-021",
   "text": "Certification requirements push directors to demand more detailed reports from corporate officers and to take a greater role in overseeing compliance with both the CIA and federal regulations.",
   "abstract": "The certification requirements can lead directors to require more detailed reports from the corporate officers and take a greater role in overseeing the company's compliance with both the CIA and federal regulations.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "boards subject to CIA certification requirements"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-023",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-023",
   "text": "The additional CIA requirements, and especially the self-reporting provisions, force companies to spend additional resources and at times to alter their day to day operations after signing.",
   "abstract": "All of these additional requirements, especially the self-reporting provisions, require companies to",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "companies operating under a CIA"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-024",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-024",
   "text": "Although CIAs are not laws, they go beyond aspirational governance standards because they set forth concrete governance rules that more clearly define the duties to be informed, to exercise oversight, and to maintain effective reporting systems, thereby requiring a higher standard of care.",
   "abstract": "Although CIAs are not laws, they do go beyond aspirational governance standards. CIAs set forth concrete governance rules that expand the fiduciary duties of directors.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "directors of companies operating under a CIA"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-025",
   "text": "Unlike private contracts, CIAs are not the product of genuine bargaining choice: companies execute them to avoid further prosecution and exclusion from Medicaid and Medicare, so that once the government decides a CIA is warranted, a company that wishes to remain in its industry has its hands tied.",
   "abstract": "If the government decides a CIA is warranted, the company's hands are tied if it wants to continue to operate within its industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "health care companies dependent on federal health care program participation"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-027",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-027",
   "text": "Boards are consistently held not liable for their companies' illegal marketing efforts even though federal law prohibits off-label marketing, but a board that certifies compliance with a CIA is certifying that the company properly monitors its sales teams' promotional activities, so CIAs contractually expand the applicable legal standard.",
   "abstract": "However, boards that certify compliance with a CIA are certifying that the company is properly monitoring the promotional activities of its sales teams. Through such certifications, CIAs contractually expand the applicable legal standards for boards.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "off-label marketing cases",
    "boards subject to CIA certification requirements"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-031",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-031",
   "text": "Courts treat companies that executed a CIA differently from other companies, and are increasingly recognizing the role of CIAs and their implications for directors' fiduciary duties.",
   "abstract": "Courts, however, treat companies that executed a CIA differently. Courts are increasingly recognizing the role of CIAs and their implications for directors' fiduciary duties.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "derivative litigation involving companies operating under a CIA"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-032",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-032",
   "text": "When a company operates under a CIA, the judicial distinction between the law and aspirational corporate governance becomes less clear.",
   "abstract": "However, when a company is operating under a CIA, the distinction between the law and aspirational governance is less clear.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "companies operating under a CIA"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-035",
   "text": "Courts assume that the boards of companies that executed a CIA have more knowledge and can exercise more control, and therefore hold those directors to a heightened fiduciary duty, rejecting directors' claims of ignorance because executing a CIA or a CIA like agreement means directors do know or should know about the noncompliance.",
   "abstract": "To summarize, courts assume that the boards of companies that executed a CIA have more knowledge and can exercise more control and should thus act with a heightened fiduciary duty. Directors are held to a higher standard if the company executed a CIA.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "companies that executed a CIA or a comparable agreement such as a voluntary compliance plan"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-039",
   "text": "As a unique hybrid category, CIAs transcend both the law of fiduciary duties and aspirational corporate governance, and courts may come to interpret CIAs and other hybrid forms such as deferred prosecution agreements as expanding the basic legal duty of care.",
   "abstract": "Given the characteristics of CIAs and courts' increasing recognition of CIAs and VCPs, courts may interpret CIAs and other hybrid forms, such as deferred prosecution agreements, as expanding the basic legal duty of care.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "continued judicial recognition of CIAs and voluntary compliance plans"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-036",
   "text": "Corporate Integrity Agreements are one form of dynamic governance that may be able to temporarily increase fiduciary duties as a form of quasi law.",
   "abstract": "Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs), for instance, could be one form of dynamic governance that may be able to temporarily increase fiduciary duties as a form of quasi law.",
   "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "corporations subject to a Corporate Integrity Agreement"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "24 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'corporate-integrity-agreements'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}