# Corruption

`kaal:entity:corruption`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 45 claims that carry the concept tag `corruption`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

45 claims across 18 works, 2018 to 2025.

**2018**

- [3266953-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3266953-011) [empirical/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Nobody has yet created a reputation engine that is genuinely resistant to Sybil attack and that cannot be corrupted regardless of the economics at stake, despite the many platforms that capture reputation.
  > Yet, nobody has created a truly Sybil-attack resistant reputation engine that cannot be corrupted, regardless of the economics at stake.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953

**2019**

- [3396522-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-017) [mechanism/argued] -- Conducting commerce on public blockchains counteracts corruption because every transaction becomes publicly visible and traceable to both consumers and the government, removing the untraceability that corrupt dealing requires.
  > The transparency and traceability of public blockchain transactions in business and commerce counteracts corruption. Using public blockchains in commerce makes every and all transactions publicly visible and traceable for consumers and the government alike.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522
- [3396522-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-018) [mechanism/argued] -- Stability drives a causal chain in commerce: the more stable a cryptocurrency, the more it proliferates, and the more stable cryptocurrencies proliferate in commerce, the less able corruption is to destroy economic growth, making the degree of currency stability negatively correlated with corruption.
  > The more stable a cryptocurrency is, the more likely it is to proliferate.137 In turn, the more proliferation of stable cryptocurrencies occurs in commerce, the less likely it is for corruption to destroy economic growth.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522
- [3402701-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-036) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The Folk Theorems of game theory prove that no protocol, however complex or well engineered, can eliminate corruption, understood as behavior that profits a minority at the greater expense of the majority.
  > Finally, we repeat the idea that the Folk Theorems of game theory prove that it is impossible to create protocols, no matter how complex or well- engineered, which can eliminate corruption
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701
- [3402701-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-037) [design/argued] *(failure mode)* -- No static set of rules can prevent the corruption that will eventually cause any stability design to fail, but a changing rule set administered by nimble governance can prevent that failure if enough resources reward anti-corruption effort.
  > No static set of rules can prevent the corruption that will eventually lead to the failure of any stability design. But a changing set of rules can prevent such failure
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701
- [3406323-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-017) [empirical/evidenced] -- The poor and those with less access to institutions bear a disproportionate share of the costs of using cash.
  > Several studies demonstrate that the poor and those with less access to institutions bear a disproportionate share of these costs of using cash.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323
- [3406323-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-038) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Without a core common ethical denominator, decentralized systems cannot last: they lose coherence, become attackable, and can be corrupted, leading to suboptimal societal outcomes.
  > Without a core common ethical denominator, decentralized systems cannot last, they lose coherence, become attackable, and can be corrupted, leading to suboptimal societal outcomes.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323
- [3441904-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-016) [design/argued] -- Fungible cryptocurrencies are by their nature a corruptive element because decision makers can be influenced by power that grows with the size of fungible holdings; decentralized decision making therefore requires non fungible payout metrics combined with an indirect fungible payout structure.
  > Decentralized decision making necessitates non-fungible payouts metrics combined with an indirect fungible payout structure.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904
- [3441904-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-017) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- If curators and contractors are paid from a fungible currency source without a direct or indirect penalty for underperformance, such as lower token scores, DAO contractors and workers may be corrupted by external sources.
  > If curators' and contractors' payment come from a fungible currency source without a direct or indirect penalty for underperformance, such as lower token scores, DAO contractors and workers may be corrupted by external sources.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904
- [3441904-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-019) [condition/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Corruption is possible whenever actors in a governance design can be identified, and every historical instantiation of institutional governance design involving identifiable humans was afflicted by corruption sooner or later.
  > Corruption is possible if actors can be identified. Every instantiation of institutional governance design involving identifiable humans was afflicted by corruption sooner or later.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904
- [3441904-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-023) [mechanism/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- In delegated proof of stake protocols the significant block validation power of elected nodes leads to corruption, because those nodes are incentivized to bribe voters to be elected as delegates in exchange for some of the newly inflated tokens.
  > That power leads to corruption. Block validation nodes in delegated proof of stake protocols are incentivized to bribe voters to be elected as delegates in exchange for some of the newly inflated tokens.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904
- [3441904-041](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-041) [mechanism/argued] -- Reputation based staking removes the corruptive elements of fungible tokens from voting because third parties are less likely to be able to take over a non fungible asset that is organically grown and maintained through actual expertise in the DAO subject matter.
  > The corruptive elements of fungible assets/tokens are removed because third parties are less likely able to take over a non-fungible assets, such as reputation, that is organically grown and maintained through actual expertise in a given DAO subject matter.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

**2020**

- [3652481-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-020) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- DAO designs at the beginning of the 2020s did not effectively master the duality of incentives that a workable DAO governance design requires.
  > DAO designs at the beginning of the 2020s did not effectively master this duality.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481
- [3652481-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-021) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The identity of actors in a DAO governance design typically creates corruptive elements, and merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.
  > Similarly, the identity of actors in a DAO governance design creates typically corruptive elements. Merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481
- [3652481-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-031) [mechanism/argued] -- Reputation based staking removes the corruptive elements of fungible tokens because a third party is less likely to be able to take over a non fungible asset such as reputation that was organically grown and maintained through actual expertise in the DAO's subject matter.
  > The corruptive elements of fungible assets/tokens are removed because third parties are less likely able to take over a non-fungible asset, such as reputation, that is organically grown and maintained through actual expertise in a given DAO subject matter.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481
- [3709041-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Vote delegation inevitably reintroduces corruption into a microdemocratic system, because representatives may seek to bribe or purchase votes to gain power, so delegation necessitates a policing system.
  > Yet, the delegation of voting power inevitably allows corruptive element back into the system as certain representatives may wish to bribe or purchase votes to provide them with more power in the system.
  Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041

**2021**

- [3782192-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-011) [definitional/asserted] -- Corruption is defined as a minority subgroup collecting the power or wealth of an organization for its own benefit at the expense of the larger group.
  > Corruption happens when a minority subgroup collects the power or wealth of an or- ganization for its own benefit at the expense of the larger group.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192
- [3782192-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-012) [mechanism/argued] -- The more rigid an organization's structure, the more susceptible it is to corruption; at the chaos stage there is no protocol rigidity and therefore no opportunity for corruption, because with no group goal there is nothing to subvert.
  > The more rigid the structure, the more susceptible the organization is to corruption. There is no protocol rigidity at the chaos stage, so there is no opportunity for corrup- tion—since there is no group goal there is no opportunity to subvert it.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192
- [3782192-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Corruption is technically inevitable in any hierarchy, because it is impossible to create a perfectly efficient organization in practice and there is friction in every real system.
  > Corruption is technically inevitable in any hierarchy, since it is impossible to create a perfectly efficient organization in practice—there is friction in every real system.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192
- [3782192-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-015) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- As members constantly probe the edge of acceptable behavior, policing the rules becomes more expensive, the rules become divorced from the shared goals, and relationships become brittle and formal instead of warm and loose.
  > As members constantly probe the edge of acceptable behavior, policing the rules becomes more expensive. The rules become divorced from the shared goals. Relationships become brittle and formal instead of warm and loose.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192
- [3782192-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-016) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- No static set of logical rules can ever succeed in preventing corruption, which is the ultimate problem with relying on letter of the law governance instead of spirit of the law governance.
  > The ultimate problem with relying on letter-of-the-law governance over spirit-of-the- law governance is that no static set of logical rules can ever succeed in preventing corruption.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192
- [3782192-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-017) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The Folk Theorems of game theory prove that any rules that can be formally set down can be subverted: strategies always exist that follow the rules and still allow a minority player to profit at the expense of the majority.
  > The Folk Theorems of Game Theory (explained in Chapter ^) prove the point that any rules that can be formally set down can be subverted. Strategies al- ways exist which follow the rules and yet allow a minority player to profit at the ex- pense of the majority.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192
- [3782192-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-021) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Rigidity generates corruption: because a rigid organization ignores new information incompatible with its structure, the unexploited value creates an opportunity for an individual to capture it for personal advantage rather than for the group.
  > And so, an opportunity is born for an individual to exploit this opportunity for personal advantage since the organization was too rigid to take advantage of the opportunity collectively in pursuit of their shared goals.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192
- [3782193-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-002) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Rigid hierarchies are unstable and inevitably fall, eroded either by internal corruption or by novel external challenges that the hierarchy is not flexible enough to adapt to. These are the second and third destabilizing factors, alongside majority discontent.
  > Rigid hierarchies are unstable and inevitably fall, eroded from internal corruption or novel external challenges that the hierarchy is not flexible enough to adapt to. These are the second and third factors that explain why centralized organizations are unstable.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193
- [3782193-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-003) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- In a rigid competitive hierarchy governed by secular laws, internal corruption arises because each member's optimal strategy is to push the written rules to their limit, while externally any change in the problems the group faces can find the hierarchy unready.
  > Rigid competitive hierar- chies with secular laws face internal corruption as members' optimal strategy is to push the rules to the limit. From the outside, any change in the problems the group faces can find the hierarchy unready to face the new challenge.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193
- [3782201-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-017) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Human middlemen have an incentive not to entirely eliminate the corruption they are paid to overcome, which is one reason they become falsely identified with the friction itself.
  > These middlemen are paid to overcome these corruptions and frictions. Unfortunately, they have an incentive to not entirely eliminate the corrup- tion.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201
- [3782201-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-019) [design/argued] -- The correct goal is not to eliminate the middlemen but to automate them, because unlike human middlemen automated middlemen can be designed so that they do not contribute to the corruption they were built to fight.
  > Automating these middlemen functions makes them more efficient, like the chemical catalysts in a cell. Unlike human middlemen, automated middlemen can be designed so that they don't contribute to the corruption they were designed to fight.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201
- [3782205-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-007) [mechanism/asserted] -- Core institutions are perceived as leaching from the economy only because of corruption, and well designed systems eliminate those economic frictions.
  > It is only corruption that leads them to be perceived as leaching from the economy. Well-designed systems eliminate those economic fric- tions.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205
- [3782205-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-016) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- If an organization's goal is to maintain decentralization, its tools must be used deliberately to prevent the natural concentration of power that occurs when economic inefficiencies create pockets of corruption where rent-seeking actors accumulate.
  > If, however, the goal of the organization is to maintain decentralization (assuming that is preferable), then these tools must be used wisely to prevent the natural concentration of power that occurs when inefficiencies in the economy allow pockets of corruption to accumulate rent-seeking actors.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205
- [3782205-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-019) [design/asserted] -- The executive policing functions of business and government should be automated through smart contracts in order to prevent corruption.
  > The executive policing functions of our business and government should be auto- mated to prevent corruption.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205
- [3782214-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-002) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Corruption has arisen in every organizational circumstance in recorded history, including the least extreme case of identified members of a single culture interacting face to face with deep community ties, so governance design cannot assume corruption can be eliminated.
  > Throughout history, however, people have repeatedly failed to organize effectively, and corruption has arisen in every circumstance, even without anonymity, in the less extreme situation involving identified members of the same culture under face-to-face circumstances with deep community ties.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214
- [3782214-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-012) [definitional/asserted] -- The authors stipulate corruption in an organization as any action that benefits a minority at the greater expense of the group, and locate its source in power that is distributed inappropriately as measured by efficiency.
  > We broadly define corruption in an organization as any action that benefits a mi- nority at the greater expense of the group. Corruption arises when power is distrib- uted inappropriately as measured by efficiency.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214
- [3782214-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Recording every action on a blockchain does not by itself defeat corruption, because more information does not ensure more productive collaboration; members must additionally be motivated to behave correctly and to police corrupt behavior.
  > Just because we can cite every action from a company on a blockchain, however, does not mean we have conquered corruption. More information does not ensure more productive collaboration.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214
- [3782214-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-020) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The very explicit rules that unify a diverse group destabilize it over the longer term, because internal corruption and external change render a fixed rule structure ineffective or inefficient.
  > However, these unifying rules further destabilize the group in the long-term, be- cause of internal corruption and external changes that make the rule structure inef- fective or inefficient.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214
- [3782214-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-037) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Without the ability to hold representatives to account, representatives are not incentivized to vote for outcomes reflecting their constituency's wishes and needs, but instead promote agendas that serve their personal interests and preserve their own power.
  > Without the ability to hold them to account, representatives are not incentivized to vote for outcomes that reflect the presumptive wishes and needs of their larger constituency, but for promoting the agendas which benefit their per- sonal interests and maintaining their own power.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214
- [3782220-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782220-014) [mechanism/argued] -- Overhead institutions such as insurance and policing act as catalysts supplying the activation energy that guarantees liquidity in both government and private business.
  > Overhead institutions, like insurance or policing, provide the catalyst activation energy to guarantee liquidity in business—both government and private.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Transcendental Unifying Values for Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782220
- [3782220-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782220-031) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- As an organization loses touch with its transcendental values, members use the rules to jockey for position in the hierarchy and corruption erodes the organization's effectiveness.
  > As an organization loses touch with its transcendental values, members use the rules to jockey for position in the hierarchy, and corruption erodes the effective- ness of the organization.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Transcendental Unifying Values for Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782220
- [3782220-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782220-032) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The same ability to learn from others' behavior that unleashes the efficiency of cooperation also gives people untold power to trick others, imagining how to manipulate them and corrupt the organization for individual benefit at the group's expense.
  > This ability to learn from others' behaviors gives us enormous capacity to un- leash the efficiency of cooperation. But it also gives us untold power to trick other
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Transcendental Unifying Values for Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782220
- [3799320-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of a DAO with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt that governance design for their own gain.
  > When fungible assets are used as the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal constituents and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt the governance design of the DAO for their own gain.
  Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320
- [3799320-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-015) [mechanism/argued] -- The identity of actors in a DAO governance design is itself a source of corruption, so merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.
  > Similarly, the identity of actors in a DAO governance design creates typically corruptive elements. Merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.
  Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320
- [3808873-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-011) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Centralization follows an S curve: in the expansion phase the benefits of centralizing power, capital and control rise faster than its costs, but in the decline phase the rising costs of centralization, including corruption, diseconomies of scale and cronyism, can no longer be offset, so centralized systems function less optimally and less efficiently.
  > Because of the increase in the cost of centralization, the benefits of centralization can no longer offset and outweigh the cost. As a result, centralized systems function less optimally and less efficiently.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873
- [3808873-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-038) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt the governance design for their own gain; merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.
  > When fungible assets are used as the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal constituents and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt the governance design of the DAO for their own gain.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873
- [3949098-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-035) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- If the DAOIC is perceived as having a market impact, it could significantly increase corruptive influences from other market players, which in turn increases the likelihood of regulatory intervention, so market neutrality is in the DAOIC's long term interest.
  > Should the DAOIC be perceived as having a market impact, it could significantly increase corruptive influences coming from other market players. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of regulatory interventions.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098
- [3981021-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-029) [mechanism/argued] -- Reputation staking avoids the corruptive effects of fungible token staking because non fungible reputation has to be built organically through merit and time, needs to be earned, and cannot be bought.
  > Second, the reputation staking design avoid the corruptive effects of fungible token staking because non-fungible reputation has to be built organically through merit and time, it needs to be earned and cannot be bought.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021

**2025**

- [5554218-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-021) [mechanism/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Coded automation leads inevitably to corruption of the system and must be supplemented with decentralized governance of the code, which produces preferable outcomes and improved ethics.
  > (arguing that coded automation leads inevitably to corruption of the system and needs to be supplemented with decentralized governance of code, thus leading to preferable outcomes and improved ethics).
  Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218

## Verify

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    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/corruption.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.