{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/cost-of-compliance",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:cost-of-compliance",
 "name": "Cost of compliance",
 "termCode": "cost-of-compliance",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0009-0008-7840-1847"
 },
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/cost-of-compliance.md",
 "sha256": "991e0246585a96dec500b15a9d50755a727cfb258d4370ec3bb4b60b4aac06c7",
 "additionalProperty": [
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 2
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 2
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2014",
    "2026"
   ]
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-030",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-030",
   "text": "Governance reform delivered through non and deferred prosecution agreements is comparatively cheap for corporations because it adversely affects only a small number of board and management positions.",
   "abstract": "N/DPA-related governance re- form is relatively \"cheap\" for corporations because comparatively few board and management positions are adversely affected.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/7596939-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:7596939-012",
   "text": "What breaks the compliance incentive is the possibility that a suspension never ends, not uncertainty about how long it lasts; a mean-preserving spread in a finite duration weakly lowers the cost of compliance.",
   "abstract": "Should intelligent agents have legal rights? This Article sets that question aside and asks a smaller one that matters more in practice. An intelligent agent that earns a reputation record has something to lose.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Should an Intelligent Agent Have Legal Rights? (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7596939",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Proposition 4",
    "risk-neutral agent",
    "mean of the finite duration held fixed"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "aa3ba2287a9f0fa2529e1c92bd6c509cdc4697fafe2de73d11877c44e592f39c",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'cost-of-compliance'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}