{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/counterparty-monitoring",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:counterparty-monitoring",
 "name": "Counterparty monitoring",
 "termCode": "counterparty-monitoring",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/counterparty-monitoring.md",
 "sha256": "9a11cd1bd2fb4812227a0e413d81c5f09af54026f1664c38ae1bc73ec8309d79",
 "additionalProperty": [
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   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 2
  },
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   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 2
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2016",
    "2016"
   ]
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   "value": 0
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 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-028",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2714974-028",
   "text": "Direct regulation of hedge fund leverage increases moral hazard costs, because lenders and counterparties relax their own vigilance once they rely on government rules to constrain fund risk taking.",
   "abstract": "Direct regulation could also increase moral hazard costs as lenders and counterparties may relax their vigilance in reliance on the government rules.",
   "citation": "Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies where government rules substitute for private monitoring"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7764601d3ed5bb056b58949e8411eff9dfb9855f143719062030c980c5fa801b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2748096-013",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2748096-013",
   "text": "Hedge funds' risk management practices are typically evolved enough to constitute a major barrier to systemic shocks, and their trading counterparties and lenders further help prevent losses large enough to disrupt the financial system.",
   "abstract": "Hedge funds' risk management practices are typically so evolved that they constitute a major barrier to systemic shocks. Hedge funds' counterparties in trades and lenders to hedge funds can also help prevent large losses that could disrupt the financial system.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy A. Krause, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748096",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "assumes counterparties and lenders actively monitor fund exposures"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "8f30260f2c1db728b45c4f3b9b7c64358cf9d3217277bc3c63a910c32f87b508",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'counterparty-monitoring'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}