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 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/crisis-driven-rulemaking",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:crisis-driven-rulemaking",
 "name": "Crisis driven rulemaking",
 "termCode": "crisis-driven-rulemaking",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-036",
   "text": "Rules, especially in financial regulation, are mostly enacted when it is politically opportune rather than when appropriate information for rulemaking is available.",
   "abstract": "Financial crises throughout history (Rheinhart and Rogoff 2011) have demonstrated that rules are mostly enacted, especially in the context of financial regulation, when it is politically opportune (Coffee 2012), not when appropriate information for rulemaking is available.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "financial regulation in particular"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-038",
   "text": "During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinterested latent groups, temporarily overcoming the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process.",
   "abstract": "During and after crises, however, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing the otherwise disinterested latent groups so as to temporarily overcome the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process (Ostrom 1990).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "during and after crises"
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   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'crisis-driven-rulemaking'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}