entity · derived
Dao design
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying dao-design. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 3396542-003 : The authors propose that insurance underwriting be operated by a Decentralized Autonomous Organization in which cryptocurrency tokens function as claims on the future cash flows of the underwriting bu
- 3396542-004 : The reputation tokens of the underwriting DAO are separate and distinct from the cash currency that insureds use to pay premia; the two must not be conflated.
- 3396542-005 : Tokens in the proposed DAO function as reputation because an agent's proportional token holdings will grow over time only if that agent follows sound and successful underwriting practices.
- 3396542-007 : Insurance premia are treated as revenue of the entire DAO rather than of the underwriters who wrote the policy, and are shared among DAO participants; consequently the value of a token is a function o
- 3396542-008 : Because newly minted reward tokens go only to agents who stake tokens on policies, passive holders are diluted over time, which pushes agents toward active underwriting while still permitting passive
- 3396542-009 : The design requires underwriters to stake or encumber tokens against each policy they underwrite, and those encumbered tokens serve to secure the underwriters' promises.
- 3396542-010 : The number of tokens an underwriter must encumber is set by a preset formula whose objective is to make the value of the encumbered tokens sufficient to meet any claim arising at any point in the poli
- 3396542-011 : If underwriters decline to reclaim their encumbered tokens, that breach is resolved by selling the encumbered tokens, plus additional freshly minted tokens as needed, in an auction open to current DAO
- 3396542-012 : A breach by the underwriters of a policy does not amount to a default by the DAO, and under normal market conditions a well designed DAO should experience very few breaches if any.
- 3396542-013 : A breach occurs only when the underwriters concerned believe that the value of their encumbered tokens is less than the payment they would have to make in order to reclaim those tokens.
- 3396542-014 : Breach by underwriters will in general happen only after a dramatic shift in the DAO's future prospects, such as a sharp decrease in expected future revenues or a sharp increase in expected payments o
- 3396542-016 : Unlike prior token research, the purpose of issuing tokens here is not only to raise capital but also to give owners the opportunity and incentive to develop the DAO's business.
- 3396542-017 : The value of a token is not uniform across tokens: it depends on whether the token is currently encumbered and, for encumbered tokens, the sooner the token is expected to be released from encumbrance
- 3396542-018 : The DAO design requires that the value of the tokens staked on a set of policies be large enough to cover the maximum possible liability on those policies, which in turn imposes a minimum condition on
- 3396542-019 : Because the total supply of tokens grows at a constant rate each period, the value of individual tokens depreciates over time.
- 3396542-021 : The DAO is insolvent when the present value of expected cash flows from new policies falls below the expected cash outflow on currently outstanding policies, and in that state the value of a token is
- 3396542-022 : A sufficiently large negative shock to the number of policies issued per period drives the value of the DAO negative and renders the DAO insolvent, so falling new business volume is a principal insolv
- 3396542-024 : In the DAO structure, provided an adequate token encumbrance system is in place, each agent is individually responsible for the payouts on the policies that agent underwrote, so the burden of holding
- 3396542-026 : The burden of maintaining sufficient liquidity to meet claims does not rest on the DAO but on the individual underwriters that make it up.
- 3396542-031 : In the proposed design, bad business decisions by one underwriter need not impact other underwriters or the DAO, because losses from underestimating the insured risk fall purely on that underwriter so
- 3396542-033 : The design's innovative features stem from tokens serving several purposes at once: as reward for risk taking and as a substitute for both reputation and capital.
- 3396542-034 : Trust requirements in the DAO are minimized by appropriately designed economic incentives rather than by intermediary reputation or regulation.
- 3396542-035 : The governance rules of the DAO can be set up so as to ensure that minority token holders are appropriately protected.
- 3396542-038 : What the authors call a breach on a particular insurance contract does not necessarily imply any losses for the consumer, so underwriter breach and consumer harm are decoupled in this design.
- 3652481-011 : DAO developers are themselves subject to path dependencies that undermine the evolution of decentralized DAO designs, because the communication structures of the developing organization invariably sha
- 3782201-023 : The re entrancy programming bug was not the 2016 DAO's most serious problem; the system would eventually have failed more spectacularly because it was designed poorly on other levels.
- 3782201-024 : Because voting power in the 2016 DAO could be purchased, the exact cost of destroying it was calculable, and had it lasted longer than a month someone would eventually have amassed the money to arbitr
- 3782203-002 : Building effective and efficient DAOs requires three things together: a secure and meaningful reputation system, maximum bureaucratic transparency through a dynamic governance structure, and coherent
- 3782203-008 : Impossibility results establish that no static set of rules can eternally sustain a DAO, which is why DAOs must be set up to run with a dynamic set of rules from the very beginning.
- 3782203-031 : Charging admission to a DAO disincentivizes defection because the sunk cost of joining makes cheating expensive when rejoining would require paying again, a mechanism the authors identify as costly si
- 3782203-036 : Paying contributors in reputation tokens rather than fees, and then distributing all fees as a periodic reputation weighted salary, defeats the sockpuppet attack because splitting a holding across man
- 3782203-039 : Because the Folk Theorems rule out a perfect reward system, the design goal for a DAO should be reduced to making it easier for members to help the group than to hurt it, with members themselves incen
- 3782203-040 : Sharing all fees with all members eliminates the incentive to review a product favorably because its sponsor paid a large fee, since a single expert reviewer cannot be cheaply bribed when the fee is d
- 3782205-024 : A sophisticated governance system is required for a decentralized organization to adjust effectively to market changes and to maintain stability.
- 3782210-039 : Reputation is not merely an option for a DAO that holds power or value; it is absolutely essential, and for DAOs built to make money ideology alone is not enough to maintain long-term stability.
- 3782210-042 : Self-executing, self-regulating smart contracts between anonymous parties in an open system create a near perfect zero-sum situation unless the DAO also includes reputation.
- 3782217-003 : The choice of historiography is a design choice about the architecture of higher order information storage, and because deciding what is true is the judicial function, historiography is effectively th
- 3782217-004 : Any reliance by a DAO on a centralized feature creates a centralized point of failure that threatens the survival of the organization and renders the system technically centralized despite its decentr
- 3782217-010 : An oracle DAO must filter its network so that the average member is correct at least slightly more often than incorrect; once that filter holds, larger and more decentralized networks converge on the
- 3782217-039 : Long run stability of a decentralized organization requires the momentum gained from a clear history, but momentum is not sufficient: if the system is not moving toward a healthy and productive goal i
- 3782217-040 : The most important aspect of a decentralized organization, and the feature that ultimately determines its long term success, is the group's set of transcendental values.
- 3782220-005 : A maximally effective set of unifying values integrates opposing values rather than choosing between them, because the purpose of unification is to bring together individuals holding different perspec
- 3782220-018 : A perfectly democratic society would require complete transparency even though most societies draw the line well short of it, so a DAO should specify explicitly where it places the boundary between bu
- 3799320-018 : A DAO needs a legal wrapper to represent it, because a DAO cannot by itself rent an office or sign a contract that can only happen on paper.
- 3808852-017 : DAO developers are subject to path dependencies that undermine the evolution of decentralized DAO designs, because the communication structures of the organizations that design systems invariably shap
- 3949098-004 : Kaal stipulates the core proposition of reputation as capital: once meaningful decentralized reputation is established, reputation can be used to remove the need for a capital base and for capital req
- 3981021-013 : Charitable giving has to be fully transparent and hosted by a group of charity experts who have hands on experience fostering common good outcomes directly, rather than acting as an intermediary or sp
- 3981021-021 : Decentralized evolutionary and dynamic governance forms the foundation of the CHARITYxDAO community values and core beliefs, and decentralized governance is what provides cohesion and longevity in the
- 5887242-008 : Separating internal on-chain governance from external legal relations maximizes decentralization while preserving real-world enforceability, thereby avoiding the fatal centralization that undermined e