{ "@context": "https://schema.org", "@type": "DefinedTerm", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/dao", "identifier": "kaal:entity:dao", "name": "Dao", "termCode": "dao", "inDefinedTermSet": { "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json" }, "author": { "@type": "Person", "name": "Wulf A. Kaal", "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X" }, "dateModified": "2026-07-29", "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/dao.md", "sha256": "b7657cb6e3cb0a512a62b233211013b74587e21547956352be2c5462e71f1868", "additionalProperty": [ { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "status", "value": "derived" }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "claim_count", "value": 161 }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "work_count", "value": 31 }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "year_span", "value": [ "2017", "2026" ] }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "non_current_claims", "value": 0 } ], "subjectOf": [ { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-035", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2922176-035", "text": "Fundamental flaws in the DAO's code allowed hackers to move one third of contributed funds to a subsidiary account, ending that initiative, but the flaws were in the implementation and do not defeat the DAO vision, which developers continue to rebuild.", "abstract": "The initial DAO did not end well, but DAO enthusiasts and coders are developing new structures to address the flaws of the existing DAO infrastructure. Fundamental flaws in the DAO code made it possible for hackers to transfer one third of the total contributed funds to a subsidiary account.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "the original DAO, launched May 2016 on Ethereum" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "fa4e986917d437cb1504281e7b986be2698e9507d8feaf426c9d7d1754ca882c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-036", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2922176-036", "text": "In a decentralized autonomous organization a series of smart contracts grants token holders voting rights, so the blockchain-based smart contract performs the function that articles of incorporation or bylaws perform in a conventional company.", "abstract": "A series of smart contracts granted token holders voting rights. In this respect, the blockchain-based smart contract mimics the role of articles of incorporation or bylaws.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "the original DAO structure, running on the Ethereum public blockchain" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "fa4e986917d437cb1504281e7b986be2698e9507d8feaf426c9d7d1754ca882c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2939127-030", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2939127-030", "text": "Fundamental flaws in the DAO's code let hackers move one third of its total funds to a subsidiary account, and that hack together with further technological limitations destroyed the DAO initiative.", "abstract": "Alas, things went terribly wrong with the DAO. Fundamental flaws in the DAO code enabled hackers to transfer one-third of the total funds to a subsidiary account.92 This hack in combination with additional technological limitations brought down the DAO initiative.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939127", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "the DAO as launched in May 2016 on Ethereum" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "abcef529c7200261c59eec43018375b3b26e3186239fb9d002bacc298dba26ff", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2939127-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2939127-031", "text": "Because a series of smart contracts granted DAO token holders voting rights, the blockchain based smart contracts performed the function of articles of association or corporate bylaws, in an organization that had no directors, managers, or employees.", "abstract": "Because a series of smart contracts granted DAO token holders voting rights, the blockchain-based smart contracts imitated the role of articles of association or bylaws.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939127", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized autonomous organizations structured like the DAO" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "abcef529c7200261c59eec43018375b3b26e3186239fb9d002bacc298dba26ff", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2939127-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2939127-032", "text": "Open legal questions about the DAO, including which regime governs token issuance, minority token holder protection, taxation, the binding force of DAO smart contracts, ownership of intellectual property, and conflict resolution, must be answered before future DAO structures can operate seamlessly.", "abstract": "Open legal issues pertaining to the DAO need to be addressed before future DAO setups can operate seamlessly.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939127", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "future decentralized autonomous organization setups" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "abcef529c7200261c59eec43018375b3b26e3186239fb9d002bacc298dba26ff", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998033-007", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998033-007", "text": "The DAO failed because of fundamental flaws in its own code, which allowed hackers to move one third of its funds to a subsidiary account, showing that governance built entirely on smart contracts inherits the defects of its code.", "abstract": "Alas, things went terribly wrong with the DAO. Fundamental flaws in the DAO code enabled hackers to transfer one third of the total funds to a subsidiary account.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to organizations whose governance and asset control rest entirely on open source smart contract code" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "aafb1be3c25cd33da477d759df9ca2f856f0a8fe133d6396da2e75d0af573dbd", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3071378-012", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3071378-012", "text": "The DAO failed because its code had not yet been perfected: hackers took a third of the DAO tokens and transferred them to another account, and that hack together with other technological limitations led to the demise of the DAO.", "abstract": "Unfortunately, the code had not yet been perfected and hackers were able to take a third of the DAO tokens and transfer them into another account. This hack and other technological limitations, led to the demise of the DAO.58", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071378", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "The DAO, launched May 2016 on Ethereum" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "125f01674d13b6bb0310c4be7a20ff538dccbc36ecf352770b3c580028387edd", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3071378-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3071378-033", "text": "People who work for a DAO are free from existing corporate hierarchies and their possible discriminatory effects because they are not subject to a supervisor, boss, or CEO.", "abstract": "People who work for a DAO are free from existing corporate hierarchies and their possible discriminatory effects. People who work for a DAO would not be subject to a supervisor, boss, or CEO.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071378", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO structures with no directors, managers, or employees" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "125f01674d13b6bb0310c4be7a20ff538dccbc36ecf352770b3c580028387edd", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3071378-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3071378-034", "text": "Disenfranchised communities will increasingly be able to afford the buy-in to a DAO, and increasing access to DAOs eradicates a possible income based or wealth based bias, since participation requires purchasing a coin or token.", "abstract": "Disenfranchised communities will increasingly be able to afford the buy-in into a DAO. The increasing access to DAOs eradicates a possible income based or wealth based bias because participants in the DAO are required to buy into the DAO.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071378", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO membership conditioned on acquiring a token" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "125f01674d13b6bb0310c4be7a20ff538dccbc36ecf352770b3c580028387edd", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3071378-035", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3071378-035", "text": "Because the total supply of DAO tokens is pre-determined in code, dilution by central administrators such as government officials or self-interested or biased executives is impossible.", "abstract": "because the total supply of tokens is pre-determined in the DAO code, dilution by central administrators such as government officials or self- interested or biased executives/supervisors/CEOs is impossible, which further illustrates the power of blockchain structures such as the DAO.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071378", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAOs with a fixed token supply fixed in open source code" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "125f01674d13b6bb0310c4be7a20ff538dccbc36ecf352770b3c580028387edd", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3071378-036", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3071378-036", "text": "In a DAO, disenfranchised community members cannot be judged by race or cultural biases because performance in an anonymized proposal voting scheme is the only basis for assessment and payment.", "abstract": "this means they will not and cannot be judged by race or cultural biases. Instead, their performance in an anonymized proposal voting scheme is the only basis for assessment and payment.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071378", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "anonymized proposal voting and token-based remuneration" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "125f01674d13b6bb0310c4be7a20ff538dccbc36ecf352770b3c580028387edd", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3071378-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3071378-037", "text": "Reputational penalties for non-performance in a DAO are entirely free from racial implications because token holders are unlikely to even know each other.", "abstract": "Crucially, non- performance reputational penalties are entirely free from racial implications as the token holders are unlikely to even know each other.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071378", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "pseudonymous token holder communities" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "125f01674d13b6bb0310c4be7a20ff538dccbc36ecf352770b3c580028387edd", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3071378-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3071378-038", "text": "Unlike traditional hierarchical organizations where face-time and unproductive meetings are the norm, the self-governing DAO token optimizer avoids corporate hierarchy inefficiencies and the bad outcomes that come from top-down direction.", "abstract": "Unlike in traditional hierarchical organization where face-time and unproductive meetings are the norm, the self-governing DAO token optimizer avoids any such corporate hierarchy inefficiencies and frees herself from top-down inefficiencies and bad outcomes.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071378", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "self-governing DAO structures without supervisors" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "125f01674d13b6bb0310c4be7a20ff538dccbc36ecf352770b3c580028387edd", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3071378-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3071378-039", "text": "The value to effort focus of DAO work flows makes racial and cultural biases much less pronounced and protects disenfranchised communities.", "abstract": "At the same time, the value to effort focus of work flows makes racial and cultural biases much less pronounced and protects disenfranchised communities.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071378", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO work flows organized around value contribution" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "125f01674d13b6bb0310c4be7a20ff538dccbc36ecf352770b3c580028387edd", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3071378-040", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3071378-040", "text": "Equality is a natural byproduct of the blockchain-driven evolution of the crypto economy, because the trust enhancing consensus model, smart contracting in anonymous networks, and DAOs together allow a more equal society to evolve.", "abstract": "Equality is a natural byproduct of the blockchain-driven evolution of the crypto economy. Blockchain's trust enhancing consensus model, smart contracting in anonymous networks, and DAOs allow for the evolution of a more equal society.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071378", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "continued evolution of the crypto economy" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "125f01674d13b6bb0310c4be7a20ff538dccbc36ecf352770b3c580028387edd", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227933-029", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3227933-029", "text": "The design premise of the DAO was that because people do not always follow rules even when the rules are well designed, it is better to use computer code to manage an organization.", "abstract": "The DAO intended to automate governance and was based on the idea that since \"people\" don't always follow the rules (even if the rules are well-designed), it is better to use computer code to manage an organization.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why 'Blockchain' Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227933", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "organizations aiming to automate governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "a9e9660c4dc25a2202f1da4e762f5885256e05f68c53ca51942f5833a7a4c108", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227933-030", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3227933-030", "text": "The DAO showed that a corporate-type organization can operate with no physical address, no directors, no managers and no employees, with its governance structure built entirely from software, code and smart contracts running on Ethereum.", "abstract": "Indeed, the DAO didn't have any directors, managers or employees. The governance structure was built with software, code and smart contracts that ran on the public decentralized blockchain platform, Ethereum.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why 'Blockchain' Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227933", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "the DAO, 2016" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "a9e9660c4dc25a2202f1da4e762f5885256e05f68c53ca51942f5833a7a4c108", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227933-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3227933-031", "text": "The DAO raised more than 150 million dollars from approximately 10,000 investors through a crowdfunding campaign in May 2016, with DAO Tokens designed to be fully transferable and tradable on peer-to-peer exchanges like shares in a listed corporation.", "abstract": "The DAO raised more than $150 million from approximately 10,000 \"investors.\" Like shares in a traditional listed corporation, DAO Tokens were designed to be fully transferable and tradable on \"peer-to-peer\" exchanges.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why 'Blockchain' Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227933", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "the DAO token sale, May 2016" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "a9e9660c4dc25a2202f1da4e762f5885256e05f68c53ca51942f5833a7a4c108", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227933-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3227933-032", "text": "In a DAO, blockchain-based smart contracts granting token holders voting rights perform the function that articles of association or bylaws perform in a conventional corporation.", "abstract": "A series of smart contracts granted the holders of the tokens voting rights. In this respect, the blockchain-based smart contract mimicked the role of articles of association or bylaws.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why 'Blockchain' Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227933", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "a9e9660c4dc25a2202f1da4e762f5885256e05f68c53ca51942f5833a7a4c108", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227933-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3227933-033", "text": "A DAO inhibits rent-seeking and delivers transparency because its governance protocols are open source, so weaknesses are constantly tested and revised in the open rather than hidden inside a managerial hierarchy.", "abstract": "Such an organization inhibits \"rent-seeking\" and offers transparency. And they are secure. For instance, the governance protocols used in a DAO are open source and weaknesses are constantly tested and revised.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why 'Blockchain' Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227933", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "open source governance protocols" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "a9e9660c4dc25a2202f1da4e762f5885256e05f68c53ca51942f5833a7a4c108", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227933-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3227933-034", "text": "DAOs will replace many organizations that lack their incentive structures and efficiencies, and because DAOs are cheap and straightforward to clone, their proliferation will increase competition while their distributed and anonymous nature prevents natural and political monopolies.", "abstract": "When we look at the strengths and advantages, we can conclude that DAOs will replace many organizations that lack these incentives and efficiencies. Moreover, DAOs are cheap and straightforward to \"clone,\" which will potentially lead to more competition.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why 'Blockchain' Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227933", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "a9e9660c4dc25a2202f1da4e762f5885256e05f68c53ca51942f5833a7a4c108", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-028", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-028", "text": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations have begun to challenge the core belief that governance necessitates agency, because blockchain enables the removal of agents as intermediaries through code, peer-to-peer connectivity, crowds, and collaboration.", "abstract": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have started to challenge the core believe that governance necessitates agency.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-029", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-029", "text": "The first DAO had no physical address, no jurisdiction able to claim control over it, no directors, managers, or employees, so all the core control mechanisms typically employed by principals in agency relationships were entirely removed.", "abstract": "Indeed, it had no directors, managers or employees. In essence, all the core control mechanisms typically employed by principals in agency relationships were entirely removed in the DAO.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "the first DAO, launched May 2016 on Ethereum" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-030", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-030", "text": "Fundamental flaws in the DAO code enabled hackers to transfer one third of total funds to a subsidiary account, and that hack combined with additional technological limitations brought down the first DAO initiative.", "abstract": "This hack in combination with additional technological limitations brought down the first DAO initiative.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "the first DAO, 2016" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-031", "text": "The unifying interest of DAO token holders in raising token value means they will voluntarily perform optimization tasks, because doing so is directly in their own interest.", "abstract": "the DAO token holders will desire to perform such optimization tasks as it is in their very interest to do so to help increase the value of the DAO tokens.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO structures where members hold tokens whose value tracks the organization" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-032", "text": "Once an optimization proponent has made a deal with the DAO, the deal is recorded in the blockchain and the proponent must deliver on the proposal or the contract is cancelled, which enforces performance without a supervisor.", "abstract": "once the optimization proponent has made a deal with the DAO, it's in the blockchain and the proponent is required to deliver on the proposal or her contract is cancelled.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO proposal and voting structures" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-033", "text": "Non-performance reputational penalties in a DAO are entirely free from racial or cultural biases, because the token holders imposing them are unlikely to even know each other.", "abstract": "Crucially, non-performance reputational penalties are entirely free from racial or cultural biases and associated implications as the token holders are unlikely to even know each other.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAOs where token holders are pseudonymous and mutually unknown" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-034", "text": "Because the DAO structure functions without supervisors, token holders who conclude they cannot add value on a task can move to more productive endeavors without incurring the penalties that would exist in a traditional hierarchical corporate structure.", "abstract": "because the DAO structure functions without supervisors, DAO token holders who decide they cannot add value on a given task can move to more productive endeavors that better utilize their skills without any penalties", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO structures without supervisors" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-035", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-035", "text": "Because of the value to effort focus of work flows in the DAO structure, supervision of management and the imposition of legal duties on management are less needed, since there are fewer or no supervisors, so the fiduciary duties on which the traditional regulatory infrastructure relies become less necessary.", "abstract": "Because of the value to effort focus of work flows in the DAO structure, supervision of management and imposition of legal duties on management is less needed because there are fewer or no supervisors.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO structures with few or no supervisors" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-039", "text": "Blockchain-based corporate governance solutions in DAOs require evolutionary blockchain governance protocols, and socially optimal hard-forking rules cannot suffice.", "abstract": "Blockchain-based corporate governance solutions in DAOs require evolutionary blockchain governance protocols. Socially optimal hard- forking rules cannot suffice.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO-based governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-027", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3396522-027", "text": "Monetary policy for stable cryptocurrencies should combine hardcoded transparent rules with protocols enabling decentralized autonomous organizations, with decentralized but fully transparent policy DAOs functioning as the policy makers for what cannot be hardcoded.", "abstract": "monetary policy for cryptocurrencies can additionally be supported by protocols enabling decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs).152 Decentralized but fully transparent policy DAOs can help function as policy makers.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "depends on DAO governance designs that address expertise and incentive problems" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ef5031b16aa53476ed618f0bdf92601cd4affb893692c701134bd9cba3ea8acf", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-035", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3396522-035", "text": "Because stable cryptocurrencies are free of the real world pressures that constrain emerging market currencies, they may be able to experiment with solutions that overcome the currency trilemma, attaining a fixed exchange rate, free capital movement, and an independent monetary policy at once.", "abstract": "lack of real-world pressures that afflict emerging market currencies may enable stable cryptocurrency projects to experiment with solutions that can help overcome the trilemma.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "speculative", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "hinges on DAO governance protocols that deliver full decentralization and independence" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ef5031b16aa53476ed618f0bdf92601cd4affb893692c701134bd9cba3ea8acf", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-007", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3406323-007", "text": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations challenge the core belief that governance necessitates agency, because a DAO can operate a governance structure built entirely on software, code, and smart contracts.", "abstract": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have started to challenge the core believe that governance necessitates agency.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAOs instantiated on public blockchain platforms such as Ethereum" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "6293780b57a1ae1de17ec00f99cc94295d4f72ea4d08b17a5c08c44772b221db", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3406323-039", "text": "A DAO's profit distribution weights across present workers, past workers, protocol designers, and governance designers should match the DAO's current values, since a greater share for new workers attracts new workers, a greater share for older workers signals long term stability, and a greater share for protocol designers attracts innovation.", "abstract": "A greater share for new workers will attract new workers, a greater share for the older workers will signal long-term stability, while a greater share for the protocol designers will attract more innovation.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "algorithmic token design in a DAO" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "6293780b57a1ae1de17ec00f99cc94295d4f72ea4d08b17a5c08c44772b221db", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-008", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3411897-008", "text": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations challenge the core belief that governance necessitates agency, attacking organizational design at a fundamental level rather than merely reforming it.", "abstract": "While it is still difficult to imagine a world without governance structures facilitated by agency constructs, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have started to challenge the core believe that governance necessitates agency.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to DAOs built on smart contracting platforms such as Ethereum" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "82f0aea026b3e3a526ec51bc073b3b864dc06cd9083ff9c54c550037045edaa9", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-009", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3411897-009", "text": "The first DAO removed, in essence, all of the core control mechanisms that principals typically employ in agency relationships, having no directors, no managers, and no employees.", "abstract": "Indeed, it had no directors, managers or employees. In essence, all the core control mechanisms typically employed by principals in agency relationships were entirely removed in the DAO.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "refers to the DAO launched in May 2016 on Ethereum" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "82f0aea026b3e3a526ec51bc073b3b864dc06cd9083ff9c54c550037045edaa9", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3411897-022", "text": "DAOs are in their infancy and cannot currently overcome core governance problems while maintaining a decentralized structure; the two objectives are, as of 2019, in tension.", "abstract": "DAOs are in their infancy and cannot currently overcome core governance problems while maintaining a decentralized structure.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "state of DAO technology as of 2019" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "82f0aea026b3e3a526ec51bc073b3b864dc06cd9083ff9c54c550037045edaa9", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-004", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-004", "text": "DAOs are unlikely to disrupt existing corporate structures in the foreseeable future because the blockchain industry is still in its infancy and core decentralized infrastructure elements will remain lacking.", "abstract": "Because the blockchain industry is still in its infancy and core decentralized infrastructure elements will remain lacking for the foreseeable future, DAOs are less likely to disrupt existing corporate structures and the associated governance solutions in the foreseeable future.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "near term horizon", "current state of decentralized infrastructure" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-005", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-005", "text": "Forking a chain is an insufficient governance mechanism, and even attempts to create socially optimal chain forking rules cannot suffice as a substitute for evolutionary blockchain governance protocols.", "abstract": "Existing blockchain governance still mainly consist of forking a given chain. Even attempts to create socially optimal chain forking rules cannot suffice.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "existing blockchain governance that relies on forks" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-009", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-009", "text": "DAOs can be more productive than hierarchical organizations because their information allocation and feedback effects allow them to distribute the optimal amount of power to the optimal talent at the optimal point in time.", "abstract": "DAOs can be more productive in comparison with hierarchical organizations because the information allocation and feedback effects allow them to distribute the optimal amount of power to the optimal talent at the optimal point in time.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO designs in which each member is given autonomous power" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-010", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-010", "text": "Dynamic power organization in a DAO succeeds only if the decentralized governance structure motivates token holders to collaborate productively by fairly rewarding development, work, and the policing of any diminishments.", "abstract": "The successful implementation of such dynamic power organization requires a decentralized governance structure that motivates DAO token holders to collaborate productively, by fairly rewarding development, work, and the policing of any diminishments.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO designs that distribute autonomous power to members" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-013", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-013", "text": "Unlike corporate governance systems, the decentralized nexus of incomplete smart contracts has no supply of majoritarian default rules to fill its gaps, and corporate law's default rules are largely incompatible because they are based on natural language.", "abstract": "Unlike existing corporate governance systems, however, the decentralized nexus of incomplete smart contracts does not have a supply of majoritarian default rules that could fill incomplete code-based smart contracts.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "blockchain based entities organized through smart contracts" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-015", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-015", "text": "Curators were the core point of centralization in the original 2016 DAO because the smart contract could not on its own distinguish real from fake proposals, leaving curators with approval and vote prioritization power before any community vote.", "abstract": "Because the smart contract on its own could not distinguish real from fake proposals, the curators had approval power and vote prioritization power over contractor proposals before the proposals were put up to a DAO community vote.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "the original 2016 DAO curator whitelist design" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-017", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-017", "text": "If curators and contractors are paid from a fungible currency source without a direct or indirect penalty for underperformance, such as lower token scores, DAO contractors and workers may be corrupted by external sources.", "abstract": "If curators' and contractors' payment come from a fungible currency source without a direct or indirect penalty for underperformance, such as lower token scores, DAO contractors and workers may be corrupted by external sources.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "fungible payment without an underperformance penalty" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-018", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-018", "text": "Participants must be incentivized to improve their own utility while simultaneously benefiting the institution over the long run; without that duality of incentivization, rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents will attempt to game the governance design.", "abstract": "Without that duality of incentivization, rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents will attempt to game the governance design.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "all blockchain governance structures, especially on chain governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-020", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-020", "text": "Fiduciary duties are less relevant in DAOs because the disciplining effect of such duties on management conduct is less needed where centralized management is minimal and there are fewer or no supervisors.", "abstract": "The disciplining effect of fiduciary duties on management's conduct is less needed because centralized management is minimal in DAOs.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO structures with minimal centralized management" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-030", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-030", "text": "The speed of smart contracting and associated DAO revisions will render regulations aimed at morphing decentralized systems obsolete before static centralized regulations are even finalized.", "abstract": "The speed of smart contracting and the associated DAO revisions will make regulations pertaining to morphing and evolving decentralized systems obsolete before static centralized regulations are finalized.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "formal centralized rulemaking processes", "rapidly morphing decentralized systems" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-037", "text": "A decentralized on chain precedent system makes reputation based DAO governance dynamic: a post or template that is increasingly referenced gains non fungible reputation weight and associated fungible salaries, while unused precedent dissipates over time.", "abstract": "As a post/template on the blockchain gets increasingly referenced by the DAO members and other users, it increases in non-fungible reputation weight and associated fungible salaries.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO designs with a weighted directed acyclic graph and public on chain posts" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-039", "text": "Community driven audits work in DAOs and rarely in centralized systems because the users of the system typically know best how to assess other members, whereas centralized incentive design does not enable incorruptible internal controls.", "abstract": "The decentralized nature of DAOs enhances efficiency of coordination because the users of the system, e.g. DAO members, typically know best how to assess other users / DAO members.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO governance equipped with an effective incentive design" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-043", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-043", "text": "Reputation based DAO governance turns a zero sum game into a positive sum game, because members are given incentives to build lasting non fungible value through a long term record of productive cooperation that improves the DAO.", "abstract": "DAO members have incentives to create lasting non-fungible value for the institution by developing a long-term non-fungible record of productive cooperation that in effect improves the DAO.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO designs using non fungible reputation rather than fungible rewards" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-045", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-045", "text": "Non performance reputational penalties in a DAO are free from racial and cultural biases because the token holders are unlikely to even know each other and work toward the common goal of optimizing the DAO and its token value.", "abstract": "Crucially, non-performance reputational penalties are entirely free from racial or cultural biases and associated implications as the token holders are unlikely to even know each other.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "ideal typical DAO governance designs with anonymized proposal voting" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-046", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-046", "text": "DAO incentives are intrinsic rather than extrinsic: the core common denominator for all DAO token members is the unifying desire to optimize the DAO structure and reputation token value, whereas hierarchical organizations rely predominantly on extrinsic structures such as wages.", "abstract": "Most hierarchical organizations rely predominantly on extrinsic incentive structures, through wages etc. By contrast, the core common denominator for all DAO token members is the unifying desire to optimize the DAO structure and the DAO reputation token value.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "ideal typical DAO governance design parameters" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782192-037", "text": "The autonomous element of a DAO comes from its governance system being programmed through smart contracts, which makes a DAO ultimately democratic rather than relying on a benevolent dictator to correct course during black swan events.", "abstract": "The autonomous aspect of a DAO stems from its programmed governance system through smart contracts. A DAO is ultimately democratic, instead of having a benev- olent dictator behind the scenes to efficiently correct course during black swan events.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized autonomous organizations governed by smart contracts" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7eafd56cb8a8bd15b64cf58216bb655f939bdcc296387e362fd9191976d67ae", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-008", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-008", "text": "Modern Western democracies, which the authors treat as the largest DAOs ever assembled, show that a network whose members hold diverse values can be united by protocol centralization, and that the destabilizing effect of that protocol centralization can be ameliorated by power decentralization through dynamic governance design.", "abstract": "Analyzing modern Western democracies, the largest DAOs ever as- sembled, shows networks of members with diverse values can be united with proto- col centralization, and its destabilizing effect can be ameliorated by power- decentralization through dynamic design of governance.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "networks uniting members with diverse values", "requires dynamic design of governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-014", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-014", "text": "An ideal DAO with open membership for anonymous members from any culture can maintain harmony only if its members share a transcendental value, work toward a common purpose even if that purpose is simply profit, and share fairly in the spoils of the work.", "abstract": "An ideal DAO has an open membership policy for any anonymous person from any culture on the planet. How can they maintain harmony? They must share a tran- scendental value, work toward a common purpose (even if it's simply profit), and share fairly in the spoils of the work.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAOs with open, anonymous, cross-cultural membership" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-039", "text": "The authors stipulate that functioning democracies are decentralized autonomous organizations: the United States government is a DAO, as are Norway, Mauritius, Uruguay, and South Korea, and every functioning democracy is more akin to a DAO than to a centralized corporation.", "abstract": "The United States government is a decentralized organization, a DAO. Norway is a DAO—the best DAO according to the democracy index.38 Mauritius, Uruguay, and South Korea are also DAOs. Every functioning democracy is more akin to a DAO than to a centralized corporation.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "functioning democracies" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782198-034", "text": "A decentralized banking DAO built on top of the Bitcoin ledger could charge a smaller fee to hold minor transactions temporarily and bundle them into a single larger Bitcoin transaction on the eternal blockchain.", "abstract": "A good idea for a DAO is a decentralized banking system built on top of the Bitcoin ledger that charges a smaller fee for temporarily storing minor trans- actions.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "speculative", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "proposed as a response to the permanent expense of on chain transactions" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7e1378e3eed06cace6534e7792a7307d607d18bc6beb4ac45896476280728e4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-040", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782198-040", "text": "Truly successful DAOs do not yet exist, but once the architecture of a single DAO succeeds it will be quickly cloned and adapted to every imaginable economic and social organization.", "abstract": "Truly successful DAOs don't exist, yet. Once the architecture of a single DAO is successful, however, it will be quickly cloned and adapted to every imaginable economic and social organization.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "stated as of the book's writing" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7e1378e3eed06cace6534e7792a7307d607d18bc6beb4ac45896476280728e4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782201-022", "text": "The killer app for the decentralized economy is the DAO, a company governed autonomously by smart contracts and organized without any single permanent governing authority or concentrated ownership, whose existence would justify the other decentralized overhead tools.", "abstract": "We are still waiting for a single application, a killer app for WebZ. What will be the killer app for the decentralized economy? The answer is a DAO.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "bedf7bcfbb7a9b0112b5848cb0d941b1d41f330dafeee0143a30ff5e8aa53700", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782201-031", "text": "Centralized company formation is supported by an enormous infrastructure amounting to all of civilization, so the entire environment of the decentralized economy must be built before it can support its first truly successful DAO.", "abstract": "The entire environment of the decentral- ized economy needs to be built before it can support its first truly successful DAO.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "bedf7bcfbb7a9b0112b5848cb0d941b1d41f330dafeee0143a30ff5e8aa53700", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782201-037", "text": "Without decentralized versions of the services that overhead institutions provide, including justice, media, banking, underwriting, and insurance, DAOs will not be able to compete with centralized companies.", "abstract": "The imagined future decentralized economy is missing almost all of the functions these institutions provide. Without decentralized versions of these services, DAOs will not be able to compete with centralized companies.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "bedf7bcfbb7a9b0112b5848cb0d941b1d41f330dafeee0143a30ff5e8aa53700", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782220-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782220-002", "text": "Because a single global society is emerging in which everyone is densely interconnected, the more efficient and stable arrangement is power decentralization giving individuals and subgroup DAOs autonomous power, not a single power-centralized hierarchy controlling the whole.", "abstract": "the better, more efficient, more stable state of this global society is an organi- zation that is power decentralized, giving individuals and subgroup DAOs more auton- omous power to contribute to the health and wealth and happiness of all.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Transcendental Unifying Values for Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782220", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "globally interconnected society" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "f0bf1e80c6da60a6f8ba20630562bdf1dab171ccb5267f497dc0b815113cde99", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782220-036", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782220-036", "text": "Decentralization requires every member to participate in constructing the organization's values, since a decentralized network is only as strong as its members and the environment it exists in.", "abstract": "Decentralization requires every member to participate in the construction of those values. A decentralized network is only as strong as its members and the envi- ronment it exists in.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Transcendental Unifying Values for Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782220", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized networks" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "f0bf1e80c6da60a6f8ba20630562bdf1dab171ccb5267f497dc0b815113cde99", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782220-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782220-038", "text": "The strength of a decentralized organization is measured by summing the power of each member in their individual autonomy, modified by the group's ability to organize and effect its goals in the larger society.", "abstract": "The strength of a decentralized organization is measured by sum- ming the power of each member in their individual autonomy, but this is modified by the ability of the group to organize and effect its goals in the larger society.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Transcendental Unifying Values for Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782220", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized organizations" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "f0bf1e80c6da60a6f8ba20630562bdf1dab171ccb5267f497dc0b815113cde99", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-015", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808852-015", "text": "Decentralized autonomous organizations epitomize organizational decentralization because the first DAO, built purely on code and smart contracts with no incorporation, physical address, or headquarters, entirely removed all traditional control mechanisms employed by principals in agency relationships.", "abstract": "Launched in May 2016, the first DAO was set up as an organization based purely on code and smart contracts. It did not have a conventional corporate structure, no incorporation, and had no physical address or headquarter.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "describes the first DAO launched in May 2016" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "31e91158fdeefebc2f0be54ebf89751f7cdd4c89ecea932888f5ba9be6b1caba", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-016", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808852-016", "text": "The DAO focus on enhancing the value of fungible tokens can produce short termism and can cause ethical and governance issues to be ignored, even as it frees non-performance reputational penalties from racial and cultural bias.", "abstract": "Yet, the focus on the value enhancement of fungible tokens can lead to short termism and may ignore ethical and governance issues.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies where DAO membership is organized around fungible token value" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "31e91158fdeefebc2f0be54ebf89751f7cdd4c89ecea932888f5ba9be6b1caba", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-019", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808852-019", "text": "At the beginning of the 2020s no forum existed that could support truly decentralized software development with a sufficient incentive design.", "abstract": "At the beginning of the 2020s, no forum existed that could support truly decentralized software development with a sufficient incentive design.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "as of the beginning of the 2020s" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "31e91158fdeefebc2f0be54ebf89751f7cdd4c89ecea932888f5ba9be6b1caba", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-042", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808852-042", "text": "The crypto movement illustrates the feedback effects between types of decentralization: its political philosophy could not be instantiated without technological decentralization in the form of cryptocurrencies, the combination created new markets, and the movement then created new organizational forms in DAOs.", "abstract": "The particular political philosophy could not be instantiated without a form of technological decentralization, that is cryptocurrencies, which the movement believed to be immune from governmental control.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "describes the crypto movement of the late 2010s" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "31e91158fdeefebc2f0be54ebf89751f7cdd4c89ecea932888f5ba9be6b1caba", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-022", "text": "The novelty of reputation as capital lies in the decentralized and democratized capital allocation functionality enabled by the DAO design.", "abstract": "The novelty of \"Reputation as Capital\" lies in the decentralized and democratized capital allocation functionality enabled by the DAO design.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "a VC DAO built on reputation tokens" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-024", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-024", "text": "Reputation tokens are separate and distinct from the fiat currency or other fungible tokens used to pay for investments in portfolio companies.", "abstract": "It is important to note that the reputation tokens are separate and distinct from the fiat currency or other fungible tokens that may be used to pay for investments in portfolio companies.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "the reputation as capital DAO design" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-025", "text": "Only reputation token holders are allowed to participate in the portfolio selection process, which materializes through reputation staking on investment proposals.", "abstract": "First and foremost, only reputation token holders are allowed to participate in the portfolio selection process which materializes by way of reputation staking on investment proposals.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "the reputation as capital DAO design" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-026", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-026", "text": "Reputation tokens serve as claims on the future cash flows generated by the DAO, with cash flows in fungible cryptocurrencies paid in proportion to each member's non fungible reputation token holding.", "abstract": "Second, reputation tokens serve as claims on the future cash flows generated by the DAO. The cashflows in the form of fungible cryptocurrencies are paid in proportion to each DAO members' non-fungible reputation token holding.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "a DAO that distributes returns as reputation salaries" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-027", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-027", "text": "The value of the reputation tokens is a function of the return on investment of the DAO.", "abstract": "Accordingly, the value of the reputation tokens is a function of the ROI of the DAO.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "a DAO that treats ROI as DAO revenue shared as reputation salary" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-030", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-030", "text": "The basic VC DAO model mixes fungible cryptocurrency investment with minted non fungible reputation, and this duality prevents the full benefits that are generated when non fungible reputation is staked alone on deals.", "abstract": "Rather, the VC DAO GP invests both fungible cryptocurrency from a pool as well as non-fungible and minted reputation on the portfolio companies. This duality does not allow for the full benefits that are generated if non-fungible reputation is staked alone on the deals.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "early phase VC DAO models that combine capital and reputation staking" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-032", "text": "In the hybrid VC DAO model eighty percent of returns are allocated to investors pro rata as ROI and twenty percent of returns are allocated to the reputation salary pool.", "abstract": "80% of returns are allocated to investors pro rata as ROI. 20% of returns are allocated to the reputation salary pool.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "the hybrid VC DAO model with a traditional legal structure" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-035", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-035", "text": "The hybrid smart contracting model is defective because VCs are partially incentivized to fund and stake only the best deals while staking on less optimal deals that the market mostly funds, which undermines their long term reputation accumulation.", "abstract": "The problem with this model is that VCs are incentivized partially to fund and stake only on the best deals and stake on the less optimal deals that are mostly funded by the market. This undermines their long-term reputation accumulation", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "models where VCs can stake reputation without proportionate capital commitment" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-037", "text": "A better system emphasizes reputation by prohibiting capital investment into portfolio companies after an initial minting of reputation in proportion to incoming capital.", "abstract": "A better system would avoid this scenario by emphasizing the reputation in the system by prohibiting capital investment into portfolio companies after an initial minting of reputation in proportion to incoming capital.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "the incentive optimized reputation model with smart contracts" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3981021-002", "text": "Decentralized autonomous organizations combine feedback loops and transparency features with community governance, and that combination addresses the shortcomings of charitable organizations in centralized structures.", "abstract": "DAOs combine unique feedback loops and transparency features with community governance that address the existing shortcomings of charitable organizations in centralized structures.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO structured charitable organizations" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-012", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3981021-012", "text": "DAOs are truly global borderless entities that coordinate agency relationships and limit liabilities via smart contracts, which is what positions them to address the identified flaws in the charitable giving process.", "abstract": "DAOs have the potential to address the above identified flaws in the charitable giving process. DAOs are truly global borderless entities that coordinate agency relationships and limit liabilities via smart contracts.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAOs operating through smart contracts" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-016", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3981021-016", "text": "The public commenting function on the forum lets the CHARITYxDAO internalize information from the edges of the charity ecosystem that would otherwise have no agency in any charitable organization, and that new information further increases the accountability of the DAO.", "abstract": "The public commenting function on the forum helps the CHARITYxDAO internalize information form the edges of the charity ecosystem that otherwise would have no agency in any charitable organization. This new information from the edges of the charity ecosystem further increases the", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO with an open public forum tied to governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-017", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3981021-017", "text": "Forum comments let existing voting associates identify the most competent commenters and invite them to apply for membership by providing work for a grant, creating constant onboarding feedback effects that cannot exist in traditional centralized charitable organizations.", "abstract": "This helps increase the quality of talent that is onboarded into the CHARITYxDAO VA pool and creates constant onboarding feedback effects. Such feedback effects cannot exist in traditional centralized charitable organizations.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO charities with open forums and grant based onboarding" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-020", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3981021-020", "text": "In contrast to existing legacy structures that incentivize delay and hoarding, and depending on the respective DAO design, DAOs are incentivized to release the endowed assets immediately once the work for the donation has been finished.", "abstract": "In contrast to the existing legacy structures, and depending on the respective DAO design, DAOs are incentivized to immediately release the endowed assets if and when the work for the donation has been finished.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO designs where community governance sets release policies" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3995709-026", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3995709-026", "text": "Decentralized code review underwriting makes the code review market more efficient because it democratizes the functions of code review and frees untapped sources of power and knowledge.", "abstract": "Decentralized code review underwriting democratizes the functions of code reviews. This makes the code review market more efficient because it frees untapped sources of power and knowledge.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How DAOs Optimize Open-Source Code Reviews and Create Open-Source Standards (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995709", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized underwriting of code reviews" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "6d77dbfb15ee86080bfde0b98089180cabafeb6defdf0f05eaaeb3cb99871e89", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3995709-027", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3995709-027", "text": "The CRDAO drives code review prices down through a bidding process and provides open access to anyone who qualifies rather than only members of the code review cartel.", "abstract": "The CRDAO provides a decentralized community-driven code review process that utilizes a bidding process on code reviews to drive prices down. It provides open access for code reviews from anyone who qualifies – not just members of the code review cartel.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How DAOs Optimize Open-Source Code Reviews and Create Open-Source Standards (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995709", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "a functioning code review DAO with decentralized governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "6d77dbfb15ee86080bfde0b98089180cabafeb6defdf0f05eaaeb3cb99871e89", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3995709-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3995709-039", "text": "CRDAO community engagement is the mechanism that minimizes issues of lacking crowd controls, lowers the time requirements and prices of code reviews, increases developer participation, and increases overall feedback.", "abstract": "The code review process of the CRDAO revolves around CRDAO community engagement which minimizes issues of lack of crowd controls, lowers time requirements for code reviews, lowers prices of code reviews, increases developer participation, and increases overall feedback.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How DAOs Optimize Open-Source Code Reviews and Create Open-Source Standards (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995709", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "an operating CRDAO community" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "6d77dbfb15ee86080bfde0b98089180cabafeb6defdf0f05eaaeb3cb99871e89", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-003", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-003", "text": "The foundation model for token issuance is a core form of centralized top-down governance, and most ICO projects were governed by a small group of individuals rather than by the community at large or a DAO.", "abstract": "The foundation model for token issuance is a core form of centralized top-down governance in the context of token offerings.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "ICO era token issuance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e0925afde0c42a16cd5310983789fae3eb3d1f121e2954a72afa64191d00fe37", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-022", "text": "The more decentralized the governance of a fair launch protocol, the less likely the project will be seen as treating public users unfairly, which makes a decentralized autonomous organization design advisable for fair launch projects.", "abstract": "The more decentralized the governance of a fair launch protocol, the less likely the project will be seen as not treating the public users unfairly. In this context, it may be advisable for fair launch projects to be launched in a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) design.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "governance design is transparent and decentralized" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e0925afde0c42a16cd5310983789fae3eb3d1f121e2954a72afa64191d00fe37", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-023", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-023", "text": "If the DAO governing a fair launch is controlled by a handful of people in a foundation setting, decentralized governance metrics are less likely to take hold and the public is correspondingly less likely to benefit from decentralized community governance over the launch.", "abstract": "controlled by a handful of people in a foundation setting, it is less likely that decentralized governance metrics take hold in the DAO. Accordingly, it is less likely that the public can benefit from the decentralized community governance over the fair launch.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO controlled by a small group in a foundation setting" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e0925afde0c42a16cd5310983789fae3eb3d1f121e2954a72afa64191d00fe37", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-024", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-024", "text": "DAO governance built on fungible governance tokens is disfavored and dangerous because governance rights can be bought on open exchanges, whereas non-fungible reputation governance assures the highest levels of decentralization.", "abstract": "DAO governance that revolves around fungible governance tokens is disfavored and dangerous in this context as governance rights can be bought on open exchanges. By contrast, non-fungible reputation governance of the DAO assures highest levels of decentralization.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO governance rights are tradeable on open exchanges" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e0925afde0c42a16cd5310983789fae3eb3d1f121e2954a72afa64191d00fe37", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-027", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-027", "text": "Founders may hold significant influence over DAO votes initially depending on the DAO design, but higher levels of governance decentralization mitigate these centralization effects quickly through the onboarding of new DAO members.", "abstract": "Depending on the DAO design, the founders may have significant influence over the DAO votes initially. However, higher levels of DAO governance decentralization mitigate these centralization effects quickly via the onboarding of new DAO members.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "early stage of DAO formation", "DAO design permits ongoing member onboarding" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e0925afde0c42a16cd5310983789fae3eb3d1f121e2954a72afa64191d00fe37", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-001", "text": "At their worst, DAOs produce ponzi schemes and rug pulls, and these failures damage the credibility and future of web3 as a whole, not just the individual project.", "abstract": "At their worst, DAOs result in ponzi schemes and rug pulls that undermine the future of web3 and associated upgrades for humanity.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-002", "text": "Poorly executed DAOs exhibit a recognizable cluster of pathologies, including siphoned coins, distracted and robo voters, centralization, DAO washing by founders, and absent decentralized governance, and these pathologies drive mid-term and long-term DAO failure.", "abstract": "Several of the identifiable downsides include: siphoned coins, distracted and robo voters, centralization, DAO washing by founders, lack of decentralized governance, and other pitfalls that could end up in mid-term and long-term DAO failure.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-006", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-006", "text": "The author contests the myth that DAOs are generally run by scammers: many DAOs and users have indeed fallen victim to rug pulls, but most of those rug pulls trace to the absence of decentralized governance in fundraiser DAOs rather than to DAOs as such.", "abstract": "While it is true that many DAOs and DAO users have fallen victim to the infamous rug-pulls, most of these rug pulls are associated with the lack of decentralized governance in fundraiser DAOs.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to fundraiser DAOs lacking decentralized governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-015", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-015", "text": "Governance in most DAOs is severely underdeveloped, which leaves a minority of stakeholders defining governance, and that minority control in turn produces mediocre and poorly developed proposals.", "abstract": "Governance is severely underdeveloped in most DAOs which results typically in a minority of stakeholders that define governance. This, in turn, often result in mediocre and poorly-developed proposals.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "DAOs still in early governance experimentation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-016", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-016", "text": "The author rejects the claim that DAOs are ungovernable: the shortcomings are real, but ongoing experimentation with DAO governance designs is gradually identifying workable decentralized governance solutions.", "abstract": "While these shortcomings in the DAO ecosystem are real, the experimentation with DAO governance designs is gradually identifying workable decentralized governance solutions for the DAO ecosystem.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-024", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-024", "text": "Anonymous decentralized networks can encourage troll behavior because participants feel safe attacking others without retribution, and in a DAO that trolling destabilizes the organization and creates friction between members and the DAO.", "abstract": "In the DAO context, trolling behavior destabilizes the organization and causes friction between members and the DAO.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "anonymous participation without reputational stake" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-001", "text": "The paper's empirical basis is a dataset of DAOs selected by the assets held in their treasuries, drawn from across different industries.", "abstract": "The paper provides a dataset (N=[65]) analysis for the DAOs in the dataset selected by assets in DAO treasury across different industries.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-002", "text": "Each DAO in the dataset was given a score between zero and ten by the analyzing teams on each of six factors: Decentralization, Work to Earn, Attack Resistance, Regulatory Compliance, Governance, and Organizational Communication.", "abstract": "The six factors considered are: Decentralization, Work to Earn, Attack Resistance, Regulatory Compliance, Governance, and Organizational Communication. Each DAO was given a score between zero (0) and ten (10) by the analyzing teams", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "scores assigned by the analyzing teams" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-003", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-003", "text": "DAOs in the dataset score well below average on implementing true decentralization, averaging 3.78 out of 10, with the highest score being CRDAO at 8 out of 10 and several DAOs scoring 1 out of 10.", "abstract": "Based on our observations of the data, the maximum score was CRDAO at 8/10 while there were a few DAOs that scored 1/10. Across the board, DAOs are well below average at implementing true decentralization practices in their organizations with a 3.78 out of 10.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "dataset of DAOs scored by the authors' teams" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-004", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-004", "text": "The decentralized power structure is supposed to encourage cooperation, free information flow, and decision-making that escapes top-down hierarchy, but with few exceptions the current state of DAOs does not deliver this.", "abstract": "efficiency to organizations. The current state of DAOs, with a few exceptions, doesn't seem to do this.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "current state of the DAO market at time of study" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-005", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-005", "text": "Work to earn is the strongest of the six scored categories, yet it still averages only 4.9 out of 10 across the DAOs studied.", "abstract": "Based on the data in the graph above, the work to earn category scored much higher than all other DAO scorecard categories on average with a score of 4.9 out of 10.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-006", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-006", "text": "Attack resistance across the studied DAOs averages 4.05 out of 10, and Charity DAOs perform worst in this category, with the best of them, VitaDAO, scoring 3 out of 10 and the remainder at 2 or less.", "abstract": "Based on the compiled data shown in the graph above, the average score for attack resistance is 4.05 out of 10. Charity DAOs showed the worst performance in this category with the highest, VitaDAO, scoring a 3 out of 10 and the rest at 2 or less.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-007", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-007", "text": "Regulatory compliance is the weakest of all six categories, averaging 3.01 out of 10, and Services DAOs are the only category to outperform that average.", "abstract": "The average score for DAOs in this category is the lowest of any category at 3.01 out of 10. Services DAOs was the sole category of DAOs that outperformed this average score with 4 out of 5 DAOs scoring 5 or greater.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-008", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-008", "text": "The absence of clear regulatory direction from the SEC and state governments helps explain why many DAOs take minimal action to establish regulatory compliance within their organizations.", "abstract": "The nature of DAOs and the lack of clear regulatory direction from the SEC and state governments is relevant in analyzing these scores since many DAOs appear to take minimal action in establishing regulatory compliance within the organizations.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "United States regulatory context" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-009", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-009", "text": "Governance scores across the studied DAOs average 3.81 out of 10, with only a couple of DAOs scoring 7 or higher and the vast majority scoring 5 or less.", "abstract": "The average DAO scores for governance is 3.81 out of 10. With only a couple DAOs scoring 7 or higher, the vast majority of DAOs scored at 5 or less.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-010", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-010", "text": "Organizational communication across the studied DAOs averages 4.29 out of 10.", "abstract": "Based on the data above, the average DAO score in this category is 4.29 out of 10.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-011", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-011", "text": "Information technology has facilitated and arguably necessitated the DAO in the same way that the printing press, navigational instruments, and reliable maritime shipping necessitated and facilitated the joint stock corporation.", "abstract": "technologies such as the printing press, navigational instruments, and reliable maritime shipping necessitated and facilitated the development of the joint-stock corporation, information technology has facilitated and arguably necessitated the DAO.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-012", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-012", "text": "There is no consistent standard for DAO governance, which pushes each DAO to invent its own structure, and because decentralized governance is complex many of those structures fail to become truly decentralized, autonomous, or organized.", "abstract": "There is no consistent standard for DAO governance. This leads many DAOs to develop their own governance structure. However, because of the complex nature of decentralized governance, many DAO governance structures fail to become truly decentralized, autonomous, or organized.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "absence of a governance standard", "novelty of decentralized governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-013", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-013", "text": "Unlike corporate founders, who inherit a known governance template, DAO founders must build a new form of governance from nothing alongside their technology, mission, and values.", "abstract": "want to develop a DAO are not only tasked with developing their tech, mission, and values, but also bear the responsibility of creating a new form of governance out of thin air.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "comparison to incorporation of a traditional corporation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-014", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-014", "text": "Some DAO governance platforms create more risk than they mitigate, and DAOs that are not well governed are doomed to fail.", "abstract": "However, some of these platforms can create more risk than they mitigate. DAOs that are not well-governed are doomed to fail.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "platform provided governance templates" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-015", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-015", "text": "The most significant risk of bad DAO governance is centralization, in which a small group holds a disproportionate share of power or influence and thereby undermines the decentralized nature of the organization.", "abstract": "centralization, where a small group of individuals or entities hold a disproportionate amount of power or influence within the DAO, which can undermine the decentralized nature of the organization.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-016", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-016", "text": "Without clear and effective governance mechanisms, DAO decision-making becomes slow and inefficient, delaying important changes and the resolution of internal issues.", "abstract": "Without clear and effective governance mechanisms, decision-making processes can become slow and inefficient, leading to delays in implementing important changes or addressing issues within the DAO.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-017", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-017", "text": "DAOs without effective governance structures and policies risk violating local laws and regulations, exposing themselves to legal and regulatory consequences.", "abstract": "Furthermore, DAOs that do not have effective governance structures and policies may be at risk of violating local laws and regulations, which can lead to legal and regulatory consequences.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-018", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-018", "text": "One person one vote governance carries the risk of majority tyranny, in which the majority imposes its will on minority groups, and it is unsuited to decisions requiring specialized knowledge.", "abstract": "However, one person one vote governance also has some limitations and challenges, such as the potential for majority tyranny, where the majority can impose their will on minority groups.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "one person one vote model" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-019", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-019", "text": "Quadratic voting remains open to manipulation and strategic voting, and it depends on a robust and transparent voting system to count votes accurately.", "abstract": "However, quadratic voting also has some limitations and challenges, such as the potential for manipulation or strategic voting, and the need for a robust and transparent voting system to ensure that all votes are counted accurately.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "quadratic voting model" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-020", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-020", "text": "Fungible governance tokens expose a DAO to vote buying and other forms of manipulation.", "abstract": "However, fungible governance tokens also have some limitations and challenges, such as the potential for vote buying or other forms of manipulation.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "fungible token based governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-022", "text": "Decentralized organizations carry inherent risks that require establishing a legal entity, and establishing that legal entity inherently contradicts the notion of decentralization.", "abstract": "Third, decentralized organizations themselves come with inherent risks that require establishing a legal entity, which inherently contradicts the notion of decentralization.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized insurance organizations" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-024", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-024", "text": "The full potential of DAOs can be realized only if the challenges of standardized governance mechanisms, scalability, and legal frameworks are resolved.", "abstract": "However, the full potential of DAOs can only be realized through the resolution of challenges such as standardized governance mechanisms, scalability, and legal frameworks.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-025", "text": "Web3 may not yet be ready for a truly decentralized organization: across platforms there is always a promise of decentralization, yet tangible measures prevent that promise from becoming true.", "abstract": "Despite that ideation, it seems Web3 may not be ready for a truly decentralized organization just yet. There is an overarching theme between platforms in which there is always a promise of decentralization, yet tangible measures prevent that from becoming true.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO platforms reviewed in the study" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-026", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-026", "text": "Many DAO platforms accept the idea that they must first build a centralized organization and decentralize later once proper protocols are in place, but this mindset undermines the power and accessibility to ownership that is the foundation of a DAO.", "abstract": "Many platforms seem to agree with the idea that they must first create a centralized organization that will later become decentralized once they implement proper protocols and procedures. This mindset, however, undermines the power and ultimate accessibility to ownership", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "platforms that plan phased decentralization" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-027", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-027", "text": "Meaningful accessibility in a DAO is impossible if voting rights and ownership are merely passive purchasable assets, no different from traditional stock.", "abstract": "accessibility will not be possible if voting rights and ownership are merely passive purchasable assets, not unlike traditional stock today.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "purchasable governance tokens" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-028", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-028", "text": "Where a founder retains access to the smart contract behind the governance token, as with 3OH DAO, an internal attack by that founder would be remarkably easy.", "abstract": "If a DAO could have negative attack resistance, 3OH would be the DAO. With the founder having access to the smart contract, an internal attack by the founder would be remarkably easy.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "founder has not renounced ownership of the token smart contract" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-029", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-029", "text": "Lobby3 was effectively attacked from within: founders maintained heavy control and slowly diverted funds to themselves, producing a very slow rug pull.", "abstract": "Because the founders maintained heavy control and slowly diverted funds to themselves, the DAO suffered from a very slow rug pull.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "founder controlled DAO with wallet size voting" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-030", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-030", "text": "VitaDAO's one token one vote structure leaves it susceptible to the 51 percent or whale attack, a vulnerability made worse because the VITA token is primarily purchasable.", "abstract": "Because Vita uses a one token one vote, they are susceptible to the 51% problem, or \"Whale Attack.\" This problem is further exacerbated because the Vita token is primarily a purchasable token.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "one token one vote with a purchasable token" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-031", "text": "Allocating twenty percent of total token supply to the four person founding team, as Angel Protocol does, means the organization can never become fully decentralized.", "abstract": "will possess 20% of the total tokens in supply. This concentration of tokens in the individuals who created this DANO, will never fully allow Angel Protocol to become fully decentralized.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "founding team holds 20 percent of supply" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-032", "text": "A reputation system that rewards voting with the majority, as Bridge Mutual uses, can be manipulated by users who create multiple wallets and always vote with the majority.", "abstract": "reliance solely on voting outcomes may present some vulnerability, as it could potentially be manipulated by users creating multiple wallets and voting with the majority.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "reputation derived solely from voting outcomes" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-033", "text": "Locking voted tokens for a period after a vote, as Nexus Mutual does for three days, prevents an attacker from using a flashloan to borrow a large amount of wrapped tokens and swing a vote with significant voting weight.", "abstract": "This prevents anyone from using a flashloan to borrow a large amount of wNXM and unwrap the wNXM to NXM to sway a vote with a significant voting weight.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "token weighted voting with freely traded wrapped token" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-036", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-036", "text": "Requiring governance tokens to be earned through contribution rather than purchased, as GDN DAO does, leaves only minimal risk of 51 percent and sock puppet attacks even under a one token one vote structure.", "abstract": "While the voting structure of the DAO is a 1 token = 1 vote, tokens are not available for purchase. All governance tokens must be earned through contributions to the community.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "one token one vote with non purchasable tokens" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-037", "text": "A DAO built on reputation rather than a fungible token, as CRDAO is, makes the 51 percent attack nearly impossible and renders sock puppet attacks technically possible but of little influence.", "abstract": "CRDAO is fairly attack resistant because of its use of reputation. As a result, sock puppet attacks are technically possible, but would have little influence. CRDAO does not appear to have a fungible token, so the 51 percent attack is nearly impossible.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "reputation based governance", "no fungible governance token" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-038", "text": "Kleros has weak attack resistance because juror selection is proportional to staked fungible tokens; staking reputation rather than tokens to select jurors would remedy this.", "abstract": "As such, Kleros has weak attack resistance. This could be changed by utilizing a reputation system to stake rather than tokens in order to select the jurors.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "token staked juror selection" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-039", "text": "Big Green DAO's committee unanimity and closed membership make attacks unlikely, but these same protections come at the expense of the decentralized organization the founders were trying to create.", "abstract": "However, these principles really limit what a DAO is supposed to be so in a way it is secure, but also at the expense of the organization they were trying to create.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "vetted membership and unanimous committee approval" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-040", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-040", "text": "When only a minority of members, such as Audius node operators, can stake or earn weighted votes, the majority of token holders occupy the same powerless position as an ordinary shareholder in a corporation.", "abstract": "The downside of their structure is that only a minority of users are able to use staking or weighted tokens for voting. Thus, a majority of token holders remain in the same position as any general shareholder of a corporation relative to their power.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "tiered voting where staking is restricted to node operators" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4685567-021", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4685567-021", "text": "Retroactive public goods funding via results oracles in DAO format fails at the governance layer: even where the core resource distribution concept works, the project remains exposed to decentralized governance attack vectors because the governance design lacks attack resistance.", "abstract": "The key downside of these types of oracles in DAO format are decentralized governance attack vectors. In other wods, even if the core concept of resource distribution works well enough, the overall projet is typically subject to the downsides that derive from lack of attack resistance", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4685567", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "results oracle operating as a DAO", "retroactive public goods funding designs" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "87fb1be89d2661967ed2b0b673fe26448ded3bc3119b122177a4fc13ae5c085c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4796714-021", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4796714-021", "text": "Until the known attack vectors on decentralized autonomous organizations are solved, DAO based AI governance solutions remain suboptimal; these include Sybil attacks, tyranny of the majority, Arrow's impossibility theorem, sockpuppet attacks, and tragedy of the commons.", "abstract": "Without solving these attack vectors, DAO related AI governance solutions remain suboptimal.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "describes DAOs as set up and governed in the majority of cases in 2024", "conditional on the attack vectors remaining unsolved" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "59fa63bae179e8f9b6b8efbdf90cee28400276512a1b04f9f579a48641305c93", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4796714-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4796714-022", "text": "AI powered DAOs that autonomously generate revenue are especially hard to regulate or dismantle, because the same blockchain security features that protect the organization also make it difficult to intervene once it is operational.", "abstract": "Furthermore, AI-powered DAOs that autonomously generate revenue pose unique challenges in regulation and potential dismantling, as the inherent security features of blockchain technology make it difficult to intervene or alter these entities once they are operational.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to autonomously revenue generating AI DAOs", "arises from blockchain immutability and security guarantees" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "59fa63bae179e8f9b6b8efbdf90cee28400276512a1b04f9f579a48641305c93", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4796714-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4796714-033", "text": "In the proposed system the DAO's forum is an on-chain collection of uniquely identified posts that may cite earlier contributions, and this citation structure is what forms the Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph on which the governance model rests.", "abstract": "The DAO operates a forum as an on-chain collection of posts, each uniquely identified and possibly citing previous contributions. This forum forms a Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph (WDAG), facilitating organized discussion and citation among participants.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "stipulated for the proposed DAO based governance system", "posts are on-chain and citations are directional" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "59fa63bae179e8f9b6b8efbdf90cee28400276512a1b04f9f579a48641305c93", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4796714-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4796714-034", "text": "Routing proposals through the Forum and then through Validation Pool review is what allows the input parameters and learning data of AI systems to be governed by expert community consensus, because only vetted and consensus backed data and parameters reach AI development.", "abstract": "This process involves submitting proposals to the Forum and undergoing Validation Pool review, ensuring that only vetted and consensus-backed data and parameters are utilized in AI development.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "requires an operating DAO with reputation tokens and validation pools", "applies to input parameters and training data selection" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "59fa63bae179e8f9b6b8efbdf90cee28400276512a1b04f9f579a48641305c93", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900880-035", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4900880-035", "text": "DAOs supply a more flexible and dynamic governance model than hierarchy because they permit real time evolutionary adjustment of governance rules and decentralized decision making.", "abstract": "In contrast, DAOs offer a more flexible and dynamic approach to governance, allowing for real-time evolutionary and dynamic adjustments and decentralized decision-making.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and the Future of Work (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900880", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "64ea6e8b7cfb3d9a83801eba54f9b87182b842a963273ddab7f2d5305639db73", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900880-036", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4900880-036", "text": "DAO accountability comes from the recording mechanism itself: because all transactions and decisions are written to an immutable blockchain that every stakeholder can inspect, no single actor can easily manipulate or obscure organizational activity.", "abstract": "All transactions and decisions are recorded on an immutable blockchain, accessible to all stakeholders. This transparency ensures accountability by making it difficult for any single actor to manipulate or obscure organizational activities.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and the Future of Work (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900880", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "64ea6e8b7cfb3d9a83801eba54f9b87182b842a963273ddab7f2d5305639db73", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900880-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4900880-037", "text": "Encoding compliance and operational procedures in smart contracts removes discretionary human steps from execution, which minimizes human error and bias and raises the reliability and integrity of economic interactions.", "abstract": "By automating compliance and operational procedures through smart contracts, DAOs can minimize human error and bias, thereby enhancing the reliability and integrity of economic interactions.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and the Future of Work (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900880", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "64ea6e8b7cfb3d9a83801eba54f9b87182b842a963273ddab7f2d5305639db73", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900880-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4900880-038", "text": "Compensation inside a DAO can be programmed to pay out automatically against predefined criteria such as task completion, performance metrics, or contribution, which cuts administrative overhead and makes distribution timely and consistent.", "abstract": "Compensation can be programmed to be distributed automatically based on predefined criteria, such as task completion, performance metrics, or contribution to the organization. This automation reduces administrative overhead and ensures timely and fair distribution of rewards.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and the Future of Work (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900880", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "64ea6e8b7cfb3d9a83801eba54f9b87182b842a963273ddab7f2d5305639db73", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900880-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4900880-039", "text": "Combining quantum computing with blockchain and DAO frameworks makes a governance model possible that is simultaneously transparent, decentralized, and adaptive, supporting efficient and fair resource distribution and continuous innovation.", "abstract": "By integrating quantum computing with blockchain and DAO frameworks, a new era of transparent, decentralized, and adaptive governance is possible.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and the Future of Work (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900880", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "64ea6e8b7cfb3d9a83801eba54f9b87182b842a963273ddab7f2d5305639db73", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4941807-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4941807-025", "text": "Kaal proposes that a more decentralized Web3 model of AI governance can address the failures of the federated model by distributing governance more equitably across network participants, so that no single entity dominates decision making.", "abstract": "A more decentralized web3 model of AI governance as proposed here could ostensibly address these challenges in a federated AI governance model by distributing governance more equitably across network participants.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance Via Web3 Reputation System (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4941807", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "where governance rights are distributed across network participants" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ab66c1e99a88da1fa36b0c6b536df5184231fe6aa427f3dd53287a4e0ac79853", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4941807-028", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4941807-028", "text": "Kaal's proposed answer to the decentralized governance needs of AI is to implement Decentralized Autonomous Organizations that govern AI through expert community consensus.", "abstract": "One promising way to address the decentralized governance needs of AI pertains to the implementation of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) for the governance of AI through expert community consensus.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance Via Web3 Reputation System (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4941807", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "where an expert community can be assembled and its consensus recorded on chain" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ab66c1e99a88da1fa36b0c6b536df5184231fe6aa427f3dd53287a4e0ac79853", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4941807-029", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4941807-029", "text": "In the proposed system the DAO forum is an on chain collection of uniquely identified posts that may cite prior contributions, and because citation is directional and non circular the forum itself forms a Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph.", "abstract": "The DAO operates a forum as an on-chain collection of posts, each uniquely identified and possibly citing previous contributions. This forum forms a Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph (WDAG), facilitating organized discussion and citation among participants.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance Via Web3 Reputation System (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4941807", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "where forum posts are stored on chain with citation links" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ab66c1e99a88da1fa36b0c6b536df5184231fe6aa427f3dd53287a4e0ac79853", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4941807-030", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4941807-030", "text": "Validation Pools are the consensus mechanism of the proposed system: an author's stakes are pooled to evaluate a specific forum post, and the outcome of the pool can mint new reputation tokens that reflect community consensus on that contribution.", "abstract": "Validation Pool (VP) form a crucial mechanism where an author's stakes are pooled to evaluate specific posts within the forum. The outcome of a VP can lead to the minting of new REP tokens, reflecting the consensus on a given issue or contribution.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance Via Web3 Reputation System (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4941807", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "where participants stake against specific forum posts" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ab66c1e99a88da1fa36b0c6b536df5184231fe6aa427f3dd53287a4e0ac79853", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4941807-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4941807-032", "text": "Because on chain operations are costly, the proposed system should consolidate off chain activity into on chain posts through roll ups, which is what makes the design efficient.", "abstract": "Given the cost of on-chain operations, a strategy involving off-chain activities consolidated into on- chain posts (roll-ups) creates efficiency.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance Via Web3 Reputation System (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4941807", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "given the cost of on chain operations" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ab66c1e99a88da1fa36b0c6b536df5184231fe6aa427f3dd53287a4e0ac79853", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4941807-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4941807-033", "text": "Under the proposed model the input parameters and learning data of AI systems are themselves governed by expert community consensus, through submission of proposals to the Forum and review by Validation Pool, so that only vetted and consensus backed data and parameters enter AI development.", "abstract": "the input parameters and learning data for AI systems can be governed through expert community consensus. This process involves submitting proposals to the Forum and undergoing Validation Pool review,", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance Via Web3 Reputation System (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4941807", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "where training data and parameters are submitted as forum proposals subject to validation pool review" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ab66c1e99a88da1fa36b0c6b536df5184231fe6aa427f3dd53287a4e0ac79853", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5095633-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5095633-025", "text": "Transparent DAO governance lets platforms compensate contributors according to demonstrated expertise and reputation, which mitigates the exploitative labor practices associated with centralized annotation services.", "abstract": "By implementing transparent governance mechanisms—often in the form of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (\"DAOs\")—these ventures can equitably compensate data contributors based on demonstrated expertise and reputation, thus mitigating exploitative labor practices", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Artificial Intelligence The Final Frontier (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5095633", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "governance is genuinely transparent and reputation is verifiable" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "cbb484711f89bcefc9fc6a5730a1ed0a3f764d7999ad9b6f7d8ea05634c26c63", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5095633-029", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5095633-029", "text": "DAO-based governance introduces unresolved uncertainty about liability and legal accountability when personal data crosses international boundaries, and a mismatch between platform governance and regulatory mandates produces legal liability that erodes user trust.", "abstract": "decentralized governance models, such as DAOs, introduce uncertainties regarding liability and legal accountability when personal data is exchanged across international boundaries. A mismatch between platform governance and regulatory mandates can result in legal liabilities, undermining user trust", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Artificial Intelligence The Final Frontier (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5095633", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "cross-border exchange of personal data", "GDPR-style regulatory regimes" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "cbb484711f89bcefc9fc6a5730a1ed0a3f764d7999ad9b6f7d8ea05634c26c63", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-040", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5554218-040", "text": "The Universal Digital Law Codex is a continuously evolving project whose first draft was scheduled for publication in autumn 2025, after which its institutional structures would be established as a DAO.", "abstract": "UDLC is a project that is constantly evolving. The first draft will be published in the autumn 2025, after which the corresponding institutional structures will be set up based on a DAO.", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "as of the August 2025 version of the paper" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "55738b4035a91b70aa2ddaa127552fe4b373ec641afee2719fbdcabebdcbea44", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-030", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-030", "text": "A DAO is defined for the Codex as a collective of identities pursuing a common goal through a decentralized and transparent decision making process, a definition that turns on process rather than on legal form.", "abstract": "(DAO) is a collective of Identities that pursues a common goal through a decentralized and transpar-", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-031", "text": "A DAO may or may not be a Legal Identity, so the Codex rules for DAOs are written to work whether or not the organization has legal personality under the applicable law.", "abstract": "(2) A DAO may or may not be a Legal Identity ac-", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-032", "text": "A DAO is formed on the basis of a DAO Agreement setting out its terms and rules, and that agreement may consist of digital contracts, of written documents, or of a combination of the two.", "abstract": "(1) A DAO shall be formed on the basis of a DAO Agreement, which sets out the relevant terms and rules of the DAO in question. This agreement may consist of Digital Contracts, written documents, or a combination of the two.", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-033", "text": "Membership in a DAO follows from consent, explicit or implicit, given on the basis of a sufficiently accessible DAO Agreement, so accessibility of the agreement is a precondition for binding members who joined by interacting with the code.", "abstract": "(1) Any Legal Identity who have consented to join the DAO based on a sufficiently accessible DAO", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "the DAO Agreement is sufficiently accessible", "consent may be given by interacting with the DAO digital contracts or governance systems" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-034", "text": "DAO members owe each other duties of good faith, transparency and loyalty within the scope of the DAO Agreement, which imports fiduciary style obligations into a relationship that would otherwise be purely contractual.", "abstract": "(3) DAO Members owe each other duties of good faith, transparency, and loyalty within the scope of", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "duties run within the scope of the DAO Agreement" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-035", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-035", "text": "Internal liability among DAO members is capped: members are liable towards each other only up to the amount of their agreed contributions, unless the DAO Agreement stipulates otherwise.", "abstract": "(1) DAO Members are liable towards each other only up to the amount of their agreed contributions, unless", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "unless otherwise stipulated in the DAO Agreement" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-036", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-036", "text": "Where an external claim is brought against a DAO member for actions taken in good faith on behalf of the DAO and within its mandate, the DAO indemnifies that member out of the treasury, with no indemnification beyond the treasury and none where the member acted with gross negligence, wilful misconduct or bad faith.", "abstract": "(3) If an external claim is brought against a DAO Member for actions undertaken in good faith on be-", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "action taken in good faith and within the DAO mandate", "indemnification is limited to the DAO treasury", "no indemnity for gross negligence, wilful misconduct or bad faith" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-037", "text": "Every DAO member must have a real possibility to exit the DAO under the rules of the DAO Agreement without incurring unreasonable costs, which makes exit a mandatory feature of a compliant DAO rather than a matter of design choice.", "abstract": "(1) A DAO Member must have the possibility to exit", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "exit follows the rules of the DAO Agreement" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5887242-005", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5887242-005", "text": "The UDLC does not merely aspire to dynamism, it constitutionally mandates it by requiring annual AI-assisted review and legal garbage collection, and it establishes the UDLC DAO as the exclusive institutional vehicle for that continuous evolution.", "abstract": "Crucially, the Codex does not merely aspire to dynamism. It constitutionally mandates it, requiring annual AI-assisted review, and legal garbage collection. It further establishes a UDLC DAO as the exclusive institutional vehicle for this continuous evolution.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The UDLC DAO Operationalizing a Continuously Evolving Universal Digital Law Codex Through Weighted (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5887242", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "4e5c2e2b4304af6d22e0b0939b1fddeabcf091e19a1b00b7bfccf77cbd6280c5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6244278-008", "identifier": "kaal:claim:6244278-008", "text": "Rather than trying to endow AI with consciousness, embodiment, or sentience, the proposed framework engineers the institutional conditions under which consequence becomes a structural feature of agent participation, using the reputation-driven decentralized autonomous organization as the mechanism.", "abstract": "my proposal engineers the institutional conditions under which consequence becomes a structural feature of probabilistic agent participation. The mechanism is the reputation-driven decentralized autonomous organization.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI's Mother's Instinct Engineered Consequence Emergent Ethics and the Institutional Trajectory Toward Agentic Alignment (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6244278", "datePublished": "2026", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "consciousness and embodiment are treated as capacities probabilistic AI manifestly lacks" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "53533cdcc081184e7a376516ad4fece0a64ce49f6c8931b6a2c2e98ed914a84b", "status": "current" } ], "description": "161 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'dao'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition." }