# Daoic `kaal:entity:daoic` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 13 claims that carry the concept tag `daoic`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 13 claims across 2 works, 2021 to 2021. **2021** - [3949098-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-005) [design/argued] -- In the proposed DAO investment club, members substitute reputation non fungible token staking for capital commitments on incoming deals, the public market supplies the funding for approved deals, and members are compensated through 20 percent of the public return on purchases minted into a fungible reputation token. > Instead of capital commitments, DAOIC members stake RNFTs on newly proposed incoming deals. The public market funds the DAOIC approved deals and the DAOIC members get paid via the 20% public ROP minting to fungible reputation token. Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 - [3949098-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-006) [predictive/argued] -- Over time the public market replaces the need for capital commitments by DAOIC members, who continue to earn from their staking work without contributing capital, so the reputation effect grows and uncoupling from capital increases. > The long-term effect here is that the market replaces the need for capital commitments by DAOIC members. The members still continue to benefit from their staking work without the need to contribute capital. Over time, the reputation effect grows and the uncoupling from capital increases. Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 - [3949098-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-010) [mechanism/argued] -- Replacing capital with reputation gives DAOIC members a permanent option and a right of first refusal on deals, because a member can stake reputation non fungible tokens on a deal without joining the purchase commitment. > The replacement of capital with reputation gives the DAOIC members a permanent option and right of first refusal on deals. DAOIC members can merely stake RNFT on a deal without participating in the purchase commitment for such a deal. Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 - [3949098-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-019) [mechanism/argued] -- Reputation non fungible token staking removes counterparty risk because the desire to preserve and increase reputation scores dominates DAOIC decision making, making bad actors less likely to appear since their reputation would inevitably suffer. > Similarly, RNFT staking by DAOIC members removes counterparty risk. The desire to preserve and increase RNFT scores predominates the DAOIC decision making. Therefore, bad actors are less likely to occur in the system as their reputation would inevitably suffer. Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 - [3949098-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-024) [design/argued] -- In a firm commitment reputation staking engagement the DAOIC commits no capital at all except for the portion of the token opportunity that does not sell out to the public. > In a firm commitment RNFT staking engagement, the DAOIC does not commit any capital at all, except for the portion of the token opportunity that does not sell out to the public. Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 - [3949098-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-025) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- If the public fails to purchase the capped amount of a token opportunity, the DAOIC must sacrifice its own liquidity and buy the remaining part of the sale, so firm commitment underwriting turns a collective misjudgment of public demand into a capital obligation. > Should the public fail to purchase the capped amount of the token opportunity, the DAOIC will have to sacrifice its own liquidity and commit to buy the remaining part of the token opportunity sale. Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 - [3949098-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-037) [definitional/asserted] -- Kaal characterizes the 20 percent of public return on purchases as an access to information fee, paid to the DAOIC in exchange for the ability to learn which deals DAOIC members upvoted through reputation staking. > In other words, the 20% of ROP coming from the public is paid as a fee to the DAOIC in exchange for the ability to find out about the DAOIC deals that are upvoted via RNFT staking by DAOIC members. Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 - [3949098-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-038) [definitional/argued] -- The key difference from the traditional venture capital model is that the DAOIC only makes its investment choices public and never provides investment analysis, so public co purchases are entirely voluntary. > The key difference from the traditional VC model is that even for the co-purchases through the market, the DAOIC only makes their investment choices public. The co-purchases by the public are entirely voluntary, the DAOIC never provides investment analysis etc. Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 - [3949098-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-039) [design/argued] -- Ratio adjustments are the DAOIC's key tool for strategic increases in profitability and overall policy, and they should be subject to a member vote conducted through the decentralized reputation staking governance mechanisms. > Ratio adjustments provide a key tool for strategic increases in profitability and overall DAOIC policy. Ratio adjustments should be subject to DAOIC member vote following the decentralized reputation staking governance mechanisms (Calcaterra & Kaal et al (2019)). Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 - [3962614-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-038) [design/argued] -- In the non custodial DAO investment club model all of the return on purchase is minted into fungible reputation tokens that get paid as reputation salaries following decentralized governance, which provides the best incentive alignment for members and the highest potential return for all involved. > In this model, all of the ROP is minted into fungible reputation tokens that get paid as reputation salaries following decentralized governance. This model provides the best incentive alignment for DAOIC members with the highest potential return for all involved. Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614 - [3962614-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-039) [design/argued] -- Because the public co purchases alongside DAO investment club members and expects to pay for the right to benefit from the collective wisdom of those members and the deal pipeline they generate, the public should expect to pay the usual two and twenty fees. > Because the public co-purchases with the DAOIC members and expects to pay a price for the right to benefit from the collective wisdom of the DAOIC members and the deal pipeline they can together generate, the public should expect to pay the usual 2/20 fees. Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614 - [3962614-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-040) [mechanism/argued] -- Over time the members of a DAO investment club do not need capital any longer, because the public market funds the deals and members get paid through the twenty percent public return on purchase that is minted into fungible reputation tokens. > Over time, the members of the DAOIC do not need capital any longer. All they need is the ability to stake RNFTs on newly proposed incoming deals. The public market funds the deals and the DAO members get paid via the 20% public ROP minting to fungible reputation token. Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614 - [3962614-041](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-041) [mechanism/argued] -- Removing capital as a necessity for deal participation creates a very high level of flexibility for DAO investment club members, allowing them to invest without ever being forced to invest, and making capital calls entirely unnecessary. > The removal of capital as a necessity for deal participation creates a very high level of flexibility for DAOIC members. It allows the DAOIC members to invest if they so choose but it does not force them to invest, under any conditions. Capital calls are entirely unnecessary. Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/daoic.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.