{ "@context": "https://schema.org", "@type": "DefinedTerm", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/decentralized-governance", "identifier": "kaal:entity:decentralized-governance", "name": "Decentralized governance", "termCode": "decentralized-governance", "inDefinedTermSet": { "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json" }, "author": { "@type": "Person", "name": "Wulf A. Kaal", "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X" }, "dateModified": "2026-07-29", "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/decentralized-governance.md", "sha256": "d749a78e95ab851b9068544fd66c538c4f611420a3ac130e00d5a1f9194ac7ad", "additionalProperty": [ { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "status", "value": "derived" }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "claim_count", "value": 39 }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "work_count", "value": 18 }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "year_span", "value": [ "2017", "2025" ] }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "non_current_claims", "value": 0 } ], "subjectOf": [ { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-035", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2922176-035", "text": "Fundamental flaws in the DAO's code allowed hackers to move one third of contributed funds to a subsidiary account, ending that initiative, but the flaws were in the implementation and do not defeat the DAO vision, which developers continue to rebuild.", "abstract": "The initial DAO did not end well, but DAO enthusiasts and coders are developing new structures to address the flaws of the existing DAO infrastructure. Fundamental flaws in the DAO code made it possible for hackers to transfer one third of the total contributed funds to a subsidiary account.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "the original DAO, launched May 2016 on Ethereum" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "fa4e986917d437cb1504281e7b986be2698e9507d8feaf426c9d7d1754ca882c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-001", "text": "As a foundational technology, blockchain technology builds the infrastructure for decentralized networked governance, which over time creates an environment in which the internal and external monitoring mechanisms previously necessitated by agency problems in corporate governance can be removed.", "abstract": "As a foundational technology, blockchain technology creates the infrastructure for decentralized networked governance that, over time, creates the environment that enables the removal of internal and external monitoring mechanisms previously necessitated by agency problems in corporate governance.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "over a multi-decade time horizon", "requires the supporting infrastructure components to be built" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782191-013", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782191-013", "text": "Because information in decentralized systems is continuously outdated by a changing environment, decentralized governance must be autonomous and automated, able to evolve, mutate, and create new information precedent, in the way mitosis replaces worn out cells.", "abstract": "Like mitosis, this decentralized governance process has to be autonomous and automated in the system. Decentralized governance has to be able to evolve and mutate and create new information precedent for the continuous efficient operation of the system.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Preface to (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782191", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized systems whose information changes continuously" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "b0bf0529c3cf69839879bc4da476714efee2717a4beb768bd5c859b810e6174e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-044", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782210-044", "text": "A revolutionary new system of decentralized governance is a precondition for the Web3 vision succeeding, and because efficiency requires stability, the steering mechanisms must be subtle.", "abstract": "Before any of this Web@ vision of the future has a chance of success, we need a revolutionary new system of decentralized governance.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized organizations pursuing the Web3 vision" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9cc531ab239f6266c8aeddcc8e54f4c06029c44e825444bee137bbcc0c9d0a8e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782216-026", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782216-026", "text": "It is not possible to create a centralized regulator like the SEC for the decentralized economy, because doing so would place a supranational market under competing jurisdictions with naturally contradictory regulations.", "abstract": "It is, however, not possible to create a centralized organization, such as the SEC, for regulating the decentralized economy. Submitting to such regulatory power would place the supranational decentralized market under competing jurisdictions which naturally have contradictory regulations.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782216", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "f1739743aa06bbc1641cd65da790d531b69d8628ea3f5cc3fcad1bf5a1242373", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3931933-013", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3931933-013", "text": "The initial Casper testnet was subject to inevitable centralization, illustrated by a small group of core developers setting validator performance numbers and other rules without broader community input.", "abstract": "The initial Casper testnet was subject to inevitable forms of centralization. For example, a small group of core developers determined the testnet validator performance numbers and other rules without broader community input. Moreover, only a rather small group of developers managed", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hybrid Secure Proof of Stake (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931933", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "initial Casper testnet governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "55a71cdfceb96fadefba1f2fed9563b588825378c91aff644ee7faaccdf31204", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3931933-020", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3931933-020", "text": "Any testnet environment depends on proper governance to allocate power fairly and equitably at equilibrium in a sustainable fashion.", "abstract": "Any testnet environment depends on proper governance to allocate power fairly and equitably at equilibrium in a sustainable fashion. The Shasper Network accomplishes the need for proper decentralized", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hybrid Secure Proof of Stake (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931933", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "testnet environments generally" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "55a71cdfceb96fadefba1f2fed9563b588825378c91aff644ee7faaccdf31204", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3931933-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3931933-025", "text": "A voting associate's SDAO reputation score is determined by that associate's merit, level of activity, and engagement in the SDAO.", "abstract": "The respective SDAO reputation score of each VA, in turn, is determined by their respective merit, level of activity, and engagement in the SDAO.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hybrid Secure Proof of Stake (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931933", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "SDAO reputation accounting" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "55a71cdfceb96fadefba1f2fed9563b588825378c91aff644ee7faaccdf31204", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3931933-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3931933-031", "text": "Changes to the Shasper Network codebase require Shasper Network governance votes.", "abstract": "Shasper Network governance votes are required to make changes to the codebase. To further", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hybrid Secure Proof of Stake (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931933", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "Shasper Network codebase changes" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "55a71cdfceb96fadefba1f2fed9563b588825378c91aff644ee7faaccdf31204", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3931933-035", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3931933-035", "text": "By balancing validator stakes against reputation, HSPoS reaches an equilibrium of incentives in which validators are motivated both to succeed economically as validators and to participate actively in decentralized governance.", "abstract": "Through this balancing of validator SHAS stakes and reputation, HSPoS attains an equilibrium of incentives for validators to: a. attain economic success as validators, and", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hybrid Secure Proof of Stake (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931933", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "validators holding both SHAS stake and SDAO reputation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "55a71cdfceb96fadefba1f2fed9563b588825378c91aff644ee7faaccdf31204", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-022", "text": "In the theoretical model, the incentive design of decentralized reputation staking governance aligns the individual with the group so tightly that the agent cannot gain personally at the expense of the principal.", "abstract": "aligns the interests of the individual with the interest of the group. In other words, the incentives of the principal, e.g. the group, and the individual are aligned so much that the agent cannot gain personally at the expense of the principal.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "theoretical model", "adoption of the decentralized reputation staking governance mechanisms" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-031", "text": "Once its market position is solidified, the DAOIC could mandate that each token opportunity adopt decentralized governance mechanisms before the DAOIC begins reputation staking on it, using its market power to force governance reform.", "abstract": "It is conceivable that the DAOIC, over time, once its position in the market has been solidified, mandates the adoption of decentralized governance mechanisms (Calcaterra & Kaal et al (2019) for the governance of each token opportunity", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "speculative", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "after the DAOIC has solidified its market position" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-033", "text": "The decentralized reputation staking governance mechanisms provide a higher form of decentralized governance than most legal standards in any given jurisdiction.", "abstract": "(Calcaterra & Kaal et al (2019)) provide a higher form of decentralized governance than most legal standards in a given jurisdiction.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-002", "text": "Decentralized reputation governance models in venture capital have the potential to upgrade the venture capital market.", "abstract": "This article shows that decentralized reputation governance models in venture capital have the potential to upgrade the venture capital market.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-033", "text": "Through the decentralized governance precedent system, projects upvoted by the whale validation pool that have the highest comparative ROI get more citations in the reputation system and continually enhance the reputation of the whale who sourced and proposed them.", "abstract": "Through the decentralized governance precedent system, projects that were upvoted by the Whale validation pool and have the highest comparative ROI get more citations in the reputation system and continually enhance the reputation of the whale who sourced and proposed it.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "a DAO operating a decentralized governance precedent system" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-042", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-042", "text": "The collective wisdom of DAO investment club members helps hedge against purchase risk, and because decentralized governance with loosely and tightly coupled votes will very likely make all tightly coupled votes unanimous, no member loses reputation NFTs.", "abstract": "The collective wisdom of DAOIC members helps hedge against purchase risk. Moreover, because the applicable decentralized governance with loosesly and tightly coupled votes will very likely make all tightly coupled votes unanimous, no DAOIC member loses RNFTs", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized governance combining loosely and tightly coupled votes" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-021", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3981021-021", "text": "Decentralized evolutionary and dynamic governance forms the foundation of the CHARITYxDAO community values and core beliefs, and decentralized governance is what provides cohesion and longevity in the DAO.", "abstract": "provides the necessary decentralized evolutionary and dynamic governance that forms the foundation of the CHARITYxDAO community values and core beliefs. Decentralized governance provides cohesion and longevity in the CHARITYxDAO.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAO communities adopting decentralized dynamic governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-006", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-006", "text": "The author contests the myth that DAOs are generally run by scammers: many DAOs and users have indeed fallen victim to rug pulls, but most of those rug pulls trace to the absence of decentralized governance in fundraiser DAOs rather than to DAOs as such.", "abstract": "While it is true that many DAOs and DAO users have fallen victim to the infamous rug-pulls, most of these rug pulls are associated with the lack of decentralized governance in fundraiser DAOs.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to fundraiser DAOs lacking decentralized governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-009", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-009", "text": "Most DAOs that suffer unethical behavior and rug pulls are abused by insiders, and this is possible because insiders are not properly governed and hold too much control over the DAO; true decentralized community governance removes insider and council control over keys and code.", "abstract": "Most DAOs that fall victim to unethical behavior and rug pulls are subject to abuses from insiders. Typically these insider abuses are possible because the insiders are not governed properly and have too much control over the DAO.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "DAOs where councils or privileged insiders retain key and code control" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-012", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-012", "text": "The absence of proper decentralized governance built on non-fungible tokens is a key common denominator across DAO failures and rug pulls.", "abstract": "The lack of proper decentralized governance with non-fungible tokens is a key common denominator among DAO failures and rug pulls.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-026", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-026", "text": "Properly implemented anonymity strengthens decentralized governance because it lets individuals relate without the inherited biases of predecessor generations and a lifetime inside centralized power structures.", "abstract": "If properly implemented, anonymity strengthens decentralized governance by taking out parts of the human nature that hold business and society back. First and foremost, anonymity allows individuals to relate to each other without the inherited biases of generations of predecessors", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "anonymity is properly implemented" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4685567-020", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4685567-020", "text": "The two stage vote is the mechanism that produces consensus: a non binding test vote reveals how every donor assesses a project, after which donors can change their minds in the formal vote where their reputation tokens are at stake, and in practice decisions are made with unanimity.", "abstract": "Once every donor sees how all other donors assess the given project, they can jointly change their minds during the \"formal vote\" in which their respective reputation tokens are at stake. Typically, in this form of decentralized governance, all decisions are made with unanimity.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4685567", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "reputation tokens are staked in the formal vote", "the chosen WEB3 decentralized governance design" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "87fb1be89d2661967ed2b0b673fe26448ded3bc3119b122177a4fc13ae5c085c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4685567-024", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4685567-024", "text": "Because expert communities can be set up quickly and self organized through a WEB3 governance software suite, the agency structures used to supervise centralized legacy service providers become obsolete.", "abstract": "Expert communities can be set up quickly and self-organized through a software suite of WEB3 governance. Agency structures used in centralized legacy system service providers become obsolete.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4685567", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "a WEB3 governance software suite is available" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "87fb1be89d2661967ed2b0b673fe26448ded3bc3119b122177a4fc13ae5c085c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4734750-021", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4734750-021", "text": "The Code Review DAO drives review prices down by running a decentralized, community driven review process built on a bidding process, combined with open access for any qualified reviewer rather than membership in a few firms.", "abstract": "which facilitates a decentralized community-driven code review process that utilizes a bidding process on code reviews to drive prices down", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Code Review DAO (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4734750", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "60eadf91c0913468505afc664c8d8d1e1673d6c5326d031ca7060addb8ab2eda", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4755632-028", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4755632-028", "text": "The Code Review DAO should be built as a decentralized community-driven review process that uses a bidding process to drive prices down and provides open access to anyone who qualifies rather than only to members of the few incumbent code review firms.", "abstract": "The CRDAO provides a new code review platform, which facilitates a decentralized community-driven code review process that utilizes a bidding process on code reviews to drive prices down", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Learning - Decentralized Governance to Optimize Human Output Datasets for AI Learning (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4755632", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to the Code Review Platform operated under CRDAO governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "972ccebf0c06ac1767a9e443bb95942b7670e806a63c25ee817c368a64c8eca8", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4755632-029", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4755632-029", "text": "DAO governance and policing functions reduce duplication of code reviews, so decentralized community policing substitutes for the redundant parallel work that centralized platforms use to assure quality.", "abstract": "the CRDAO governance and policing functions ensure less duplication of code reviews.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Learning - Decentralized Governance to Optimize Human Output Datasets for AI Learning (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4755632", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to reviews conducted under the CRDAO governance model" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "972ccebf0c06ac1767a9e443bb95942b7670e806a63c25ee817c368a64c8eca8", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4755632-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4755632-038", "text": "Reputation based market dynamics lower the cost of duplication relative to centralized micro task work: where a reliable high reputation worker completes the task, duplication can fall from fifteen to five or fewer in a decentralized setup, which is what enables scaling of micro task work.", "abstract": "If a reliable and high reputation score worker completes the tasks, the duplication may be brought from 15 to 5 or less in the", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Learning - Decentralized Governance to Optimize Human Output Datasets for AI Learning (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4755632", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "conditioned on a reliable and high reputation score worker completing the tasks" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "972ccebf0c06ac1767a9e443bb95942b7670e806a63c25ee817c368a64c8eca8", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4755632-041", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4755632-041", "text": "Combining decentralized governance with gamification of micro task work is the condition under which gamification does not compromise dataset quality and accuracy, and this combination is what allows gamified micro task work to scale high-quality diverse datasets for AI learning.", "abstract": "combination of decentralized governance and gamification of micro task work, ALE Platform ensures that gamification techniques do not compromise the quality and accuracy", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Learning - Decentralized Governance to Optimize Human Output Datasets for AI Learning (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4755632", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to the ALE Platform design" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "972ccebf0c06ac1767a9e443bb95942b7670e806a63c25ee817c368a64c8eca8", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4796714-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4796714-032", "text": "Managing machine learning assets and complying with laws such as GDPR and CCPA becomes significantly harder under decentralized governance, because distributed data and operations complicate tracking data flows, enforcing privacy controls, and demonstrating compliance during audits.", "abstract": "Managing ML assets and adhering to laws such as GDPR and CCPA is significantly more challenging under decentralized governance, raising concerns over privacy and data management.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to decentralized ML governance spanning multiple stakeholders and locations", "concerns stringent privacy regimes such as GDPR and CCPA" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "59fa63bae179e8f9b6b8efbdf90cee28400276512a1b04f9f579a48641305c93", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4855607-020", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4855607-020", "text": "Decentralized collective governance without a central authority reduces both single points of failure and the biases that attach to traditional centralized systems, which is the core structural argument for governing AI through web3 rather than through a central body.", "abstract": "This model enables a decentralized decision-making process, where stakeholders collectively govern without a centralized authority, thereby reducing single points of failure and potential biases associated with traditional centralized systems.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How AI Models are Optimized Through Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4855607", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "governance arrangements where stakeholders collectively govern" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "eb0b3e62374b45a8fa888c6bde9725e606bcb46cf4b5e74a6e851d9f25099113", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4855607-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4855607-034", "text": "Distributing governance across all participants prevents any single entity from dominating decision making, and because model or training changes then require consensus, the resulting decisions reflect collective rather than individual interest.", "abstract": "By distributing governance across all participants, the proposed web3 community governance system ensures that no single entity can dominate the decision-making process. This structure promotes the alignment of incentives since changes to the model or the training process require consensus", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How AI Models are Optimized Through Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4855607", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "governance systems where change requires consensus among distributed participants" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "eb0b3e62374b45a8fa888c6bde9725e606bcb46cf4b5e74a6e851d9f25099113", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4855607-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4855607-039", "text": "Organizations should adopt web3 governance frameworks incrementally, beginning with less critical applications in order to assess impacts and refine methodologies, because staged adoption is what allows the risks to be managed while the benefits of decentralized AI governance are realized.", "abstract": "the author recommends adopting web3 governance frameworks incrementally, starting with less critical applications to assess impacts and refine methodologies. This staged adoption allows organizations to manage risks while realizing the benefits of decentralized AI governance.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How AI Models are Optimized Through Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4855607", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "organizations incorporating these optimizations into existing and future AI systems" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "eb0b3e62374b45a8fa888c6bde9725e606bcb46cf4b5e74a6e851d9f25099113", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4941807-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4941807-025", "text": "Kaal proposes that a more decentralized Web3 model of AI governance can address the failures of the federated model by distributing governance more equitably across network participants, so that no single entity dominates decision making.", "abstract": "A more decentralized web3 model of AI governance as proposed here could ostensibly address these challenges in a federated AI governance model by distributing governance more equitably across network participants.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance Via Web3 Reputation System (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4941807", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "where governance rights are distributed across network participants" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ab66c1e99a88da1fa36b0c6b536df5184231fe6aa427f3dd53287a4e0ac79853", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4941807-027", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4941807-027", "text": "Decentralized governance makes privacy compliance harder to demonstrate, because the distributed nature of these systems complicates tracking data flows and enforcing privacy controls, which in turn makes it difficult to prove compliance during audits.", "abstract": "The distributed nature of these systems complicates the tracking of data flows and the enforcement of privacy controls, making it difficult to demonstrate compliance during audits.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance Via Web3 Reputation System (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4941807", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "under regimes such as the GDPR and CCPA", "where data and operations are spread across multiple stakeholders and locations" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ab66c1e99a88da1fa36b0c6b536df5184231fe6aa427f3dd53287a4e0ac79853", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5245185-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5245185-034", "text": "Making governance decisions collectively through web3 consensus minimizes bias and single points of failure, because oversight is no longer subject to the limitations or errors of a solitary AI system.", "abstract": "decentralized approach minimizes the risk of bias and single points of failure, as governance decisions are made collectively rather than being subject to the limitations or potential errors of a solitary AI system.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How can we Best Monitor AI Agents (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5245185", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "consensus driven decision making among diverse stakeholders" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d7adba83ec722480e97bde6528cbe9ce98c709e45cb18794f157a64b8fe7da2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5245185-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5245185-039", "text": "Taken together, the transparency, decentralized decision making, and automated real time response properties of the proposed model make decentralized governance superior to AI driven supervision for secure, compliant, and efficient execution of AI agent transactions.", "abstract": "demonstrate that a decentralized governance model is superior to AI-driven supervision for ensuring the secure, compliant, and efficient execution of AI agent transactions in modern digital infrastructures.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How can we Best Monitor AI Agents (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5245185", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "monitoring of AI agent transaction execution in modern digital infrastructures" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d7adba83ec722480e97bde6528cbe9ce98c709e45cb18794f157a64b8fe7da2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-014", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5554218-014", "text": "Conflict of laws rules should instead be used as a vehicle for implementing innovative national legal systems that utilize decentralized governance models and respect the autonomy of blockchain.", "abstract": "conflict-of-laws rules should be used to implement innovative national legal systems that utilize decentralized governance models and respect the autonomy of blockchain.", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "national legal systems willing to experiment with decentralized governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "55738b4035a91b70aa2ddaa127552fe4b373ec641afee2719fbdcabebdcbea44", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-021", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5554218-021", "text": "Coded automation leads inevitably to corruption of the system and must be supplemented with decentralized governance of the code, which produces preferable outcomes and improved ethics.", "abstract": "(arguing that coded automation leads inevitably to corruption of the system and needs to be supplemented with decentralized governance of code, thus leading to preferable outcomes and improved ethics).", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "automated code based systems operating without decentralized governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "55738b4035a91b70aa2ddaa127552fe4b373ec641afee2719fbdcabebdcbea44", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-023", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5554218-023", "text": "The absence of accountability mechanisms in anonymous, automated smart contracts encourages a take the money and run mentality, which makes a historical record of conduct and incentives for ethical behavior necessary.", "abstract": "We argue that the absence of accountability mechanisms in anonymous, automated smart contracts encourages a \"take the money and run\" mentality, necessitating a historical record of conduct and incentives for ethical behavior.", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "anonymous participants", "absence of any external legal or reputational sanction" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "55738b4035a91b70aa2ddaa127552fe4b373ec641afee2719fbdcabebdcbea44", "status": "current" } ], "description": "39 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'decentralized-governance'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition." }