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   "text": "Rules can be adaptable only if the institutions and rulemaking processes that produce them integrate dynamic elements that generate timely, relevant, and decentralized information for rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "Rules can be adaptable if institutions and rulemaking processes integrate dynamic elements that produce timely, relevant, and decentralized information for rulemaking.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
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   "text": "Public rulemakers rely on stable and presumptively optimal rules because they lack necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution-specific information.",
   "abstract": "Public rulemakers rely on stable and presumptively optimal rules because they lack necessary, comparable, de-centralized, and institution-specific information.",
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   "text": "Private rulemakers can work with and utilize decentralized information continuously, which enables them to react in a timely fashion to emerging, decentralized, and institution-specific information, while public rulemakers are limited in the information they can obtain.",
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   "text": "Information exchange between agents of public rulemakers, such as regulators, will not necessarily involve decentralized information, unlike feedback effects between private and public rulemakers.",
   "abstract": "Unlike the feedback effects between private and public rulemakers, the information exchange between agents of public rulemakers, such as regulators, will not necessarily involve decentralized information.",
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   "text": "In a dynamic framework rulemaking ceases to be a merely reactive process driven by the collective action problem, and instead increasingly uses institution specific and decentralized information that both reflects preceding events and anticipates future contingencies.",
   "abstract": "rulemaking in a dynamic framework increasingly utilizes institution specific and decentralized information reflecting preceding events and attempting to anticipate succeeding future contingencies.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
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   "text": "Financial rulemaking often relies on centralized rather than decentralized information, which is a further defect of the existing framework.",
   "abstract": "Financial rulemaking also often utilizes centralized rather than decentralized information.",
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   "text": "The institution specific and decentralized information generated by deferred prosecution agreements allows regulators to better understand shortcomings in a particular market segment or industry, so that rulemaking can be more narrowly tailored.",
   "abstract": "With the institution specific and decentralized information generated by DPAs, regulators may be able to better understand shortcomings in a particular market segment or industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
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   "text": "Department of Justice investigations of particular corporate wrongdoers generate highly relevant, decentralized, and institution specific information that is usable for rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "the information generated by the DOJ's investigations of particular corpo- rate wrongdoers generates highly relevant, decentralized, and institution-specific information for rulemaking.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570",
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   "text": "Dynamic regulation is a supplemental regulatory tool, not a replacement for existing rulemaking: it increases the availability of relevant, institution specific, and decentralized information for rulemaking through feedback effects.",
   "abstract": "The concept of dynamic regulation in this article describes a supplemental regulatory tool that increases the availability of relevant, institution-specific, and decentralized information for rulemaking through feedback effects",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
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   "text": "Private rulemakers hold a comparative informational advantage over public rulemakers because they can produce and react to necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution specific information that public rulemakers cannot readily obtain.",
   "abstract": "Private rule- makers often have a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterparts, they often can produce necessary, compara- ble, decentralized, and institution-specific information for rulemaking.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
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   "text": "Entity specific rulemaking via governmental contracts rests on a higher overall level of relevant and decentralized information than ordinary rulemaking, because the regulatory action follows an entity specific investigation of wrongdoing.",
   "abstract": "Because regulatory action associated with governmental contracts is based on an entity-specific investigation of wrongdoing, entity- specific rulemaking via governmental contracts is usually based on a higher overall level of relevant and decentralized information for rulemaking.",
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   "text": "Dynamic regulation is defined as the study of regulatory phenomena in relation to both preceding and succeeding events, using institution specific and decentralized information to generate feedback effects that support anticipatory rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "The theory of dynamic regulation conceptualizes the study of regulatory phenomena in relation to preceding and succeeding events, using institution-specific and decentralized information to facilitate feedback effects for anticipatory rulemaking.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477",
   "datePublished": "2016",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2740477-031",
   "text": "Private rulemakers hold a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterparts, they can produce the comparable, decentralized, and institution specific information that rulemaking requires.",
   "abstract": "Private rulemakers can have a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterparts, they often can produce necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution-specific information for rulemaking.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477",
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   "text": "The data analysis shows that venture capitalists' finance allocation, and the implicit assessment of innovative products and businesses it embodies, generates highly relevant institution specific and industry specific decentralized information on innovation trends.",
   "abstract": "The data analysis shows that venture capitalists' finance allocation and the implicit assessment of innovative products, businesses, and initiatives generates highly relevant institution- and industry-specific decentralized information on innovation trends.",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-005",
   "text": "Dynamic regulation is defined as conceptualizing regulatory phenomena in relation to both preceding and succeeding events, using institution-specific and decentralized information to generate feedback effects that support anticipatory rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "The theory of dynamic regulation conceptualizes the study of regulatory phenomena in relation to preceding and succeeding events, using institution-specific and decentralized information to facilitate feedback effects for anticipatory rulemaking.105",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
   "datePublished": "2016",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-031",
   "text": "Unrestricted exchange of information between public and private rulemakers creates regulatory synergies that increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking and thereby generate feedback effects.",
   "abstract": "feedback processes.115 The unrestricted exchange of information between public- and private rulemakers can create regulatory synergies that increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking116 and facilitate feedback",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
   "datePublished": "2016",
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-042",
   "text": "Venture capitalists' finance allocation and their implicit assessment of innovative products, businesses, and initiatives generate highly relevant institution-specific and industry-specific decentralized information on innovation trends.",
   "abstract": "finance allocation and the implicit assessment of innovative products, businesses, and initiatives generates highly relevant institution- and industry-specific decentralized information on innovation trends. As such, venture capitalists' innovation-driven finance",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
   "datePublished": "2016",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-020",
   "text": "Deferred prosecution agreements produce relevant, real time, decentralized, high quality information for regulation in most industries and are used as a preferred alternative to litigation by both prosecutors and corporations.",
   "abstract": "Dynamic regulatory mechanisms such as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) produce relevant, real-time, decentralized, high quality information for regulation in most industries and are used as a preferred alternative to litigation by both prosecutors and corporations",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040",
   "datePublished": "2016",
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   "text": "Anticipatory rulemaking in the dynamic framework is accomplished by combining institution specific, decentralized, and timely information with feedback effects, which can occur between public and private rulemakers, between outcomes and institutions, across jurisdictions, and between rules and rulemaking processes.",
   "abstract": "It relies on the use of institution-specific, decentralized, and timely information5 in combination with feedback effects (Kaal 2014b). Feedback effects can occur in several settings including feedback processes between different public and private rulemakers",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040",
   "datePublished": "2016",
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-035",
   "text": "Private rulemakers hold a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because they often can produce and access necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution specific information for rulemaking and can react more readily to emerging information.",
   "abstract": "Private rulemakers can have a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterparts, they often can produce necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution-specific information for rulemaking.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040",
   "datePublished": "2016",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-009",
   "text": "Increased availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking is what makes anticipatory action possible, because such information facilitates rulemakers' predictions and anticipation of otherwise unforeseeable contingencies.",
   "abstract": "The increased availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking in a dynamic framework can help facilitate rulemakers' predictions and anticipation of otherwise unforeseeable contingencies, making anticipatory action by rulemakers possible.19",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "condition",
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    "a dynamic regulatory framework in which such information flows exist"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-026",
   "text": "Contingent capital securities optimize information for rulemaking because, when issued and triggered, they produce highly valuable, real time, decentralized information on the financial wellbeing of a given regulated entity.",
   "abstract": "First, contingent capital has the potential to optimize information for rulemaking.55 CCS, when issued and triggered, produce highly valuable, real time, decentralized information on the financial wellbeing of a given regulated entity.56",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645",
   "datePublished": "2017",
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 ],
 "description": "22 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'decentralized-information'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}