{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/defection",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:defection",
 "name": "Defection",
 "termCode": "defection",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/defection.md",
 "sha256": "be2f494b3df179b107a4f069cb54f12c9171288fd84ca1fe0791c3bc8c380a36",
 "additionalProperty": [
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   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
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   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 4
  },
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   "value": 4
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2012",
    "2021"
   ]
  },
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   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-009",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2029983-009",
   "text": "Harmonization invites its own defeat by creating an incentive for rogue jurisdictions to attract, into their legal systems, the private actors who do not agree with the harmonized rule.",
   "abstract": "Third, harmonization invites efforts to undermine harmony by \"rogue\" jurisdictions that seek to benefit by attracting to their legal systems private actors who do not agree with the harmonization.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies even within organized communities of jurisdictions such as the European Union"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "fde2ff611420eb283cbb49a6b681a2ae8efa2b4603ae71480e2d91483f0295f2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782203-019",
   "text": "Allowing periodic opportunities for renegotiation lets players escape the grim trigger trap, but it does not improve outcomes overall because it creates new incentives to defect and then gamble on talking one's way out of the punishment.",
   "abstract": "Or if you allow periodic opportunities for renegotiation, then you might be able to get out of a grim trigger trap. This sounds like it would improve outcomes, but in fact it gives new opportunities for defecting/cheating.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "repeated games with renegotiation windows"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ab8a22d0dbb026a09212a4c85963f3c05787cf80775e8613ae3724e3883e7a56",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3799320-035",
   "text": "Charging an admission fee disincentivizes betrayal and defection, because the sunk cost of joining makes cheating expensive when rejoining would also be expensive even under anonymity.",
   "abstract": "The DAO of DAOs disincentivizes betrayal and defection by charging an admission fee to become a DAO of DAOs member. Given the sunk cost of joining the DAO of DAOs, it is more expensive for prospective members to cheat because it would be expensive to rejoin even if members could be anonymous.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "members who can be blacklisted",
    "anonymous membership"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c3dff852f2d3f04718c829a24189309a7db4d92d84f6045d3d4f562d87c03e63",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-032",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3981021-032",
   "text": "Charging an admission or denial of service fee to become a voting associate disincentivizes betrayal and defection, because the sunk cost of joining makes cheating expensive even where associates can remain anonymous.",
   "abstract": "- The CHARITYxDAO disincentivize betrayal and defection by charging an admission fee, ie. DoS fee to become a CHARITYxDAO VA. Given the sunk cost of joining the CHARITYxDAO, it is more expensive for prospective VAs to cheat because it would be expensive to rejoin even if VAs could be anonymous.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "DAO membership with paid admission and blacklisting"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "4 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'defection'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}