# Defection

`kaal:entity:defection`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `defection`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 4 works, 2012 to 2021.

**2012**

- [2029983-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-009) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Harmonization invites its own defeat by creating an incentive for rogue jurisdictions to attract, into their legal systems, the private actors who do not agree with the harmonized rule.
  > Third, harmonization invites efforts to undermine harmony by "rogue" jurisdictions that seek to benefit by attracting to their legal systems private actors who do not agree with the harmonization.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983

**2021**

- [3782203-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Allowing periodic opportunities for renegotiation lets players escape the grim trigger trap, but it does not improve outcomes overall because it creates new incentives to defect and then gamble on talking one's way out of the punishment.
  > Or if you allow periodic opportunities for renegotiation, then you might be able to get out of a grim trigger trap. This sounds like it would improve outcomes, but in fact it gives new opportunities for defecting/cheating.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203
- [3799320-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-035) [mechanism/argued] -- Charging an admission fee disincentivizes betrayal and defection, because the sunk cost of joining makes cheating expensive when rejoining would also be expensive even under anonymity.
  > The DAO of DAOs disincentivizes betrayal and defection by charging an admission fee to become a DAO of DAOs member. Given the sunk cost of joining the DAO of DAOs, it is more expensive for prospective members to cheat because it would be expensive to rejoin even if members could be anonymous.
  Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320
- [3981021-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-032) [mechanism/argued] -- Charging an admission or denial of service fee to become a voting associate disincentivizes betrayal and defection, because the sunk cost of joining makes cheating expensive even where associates can remain anonymous.
  > - The CHARITYxDAO disincentivize betrayal and defection by charging an admission fee, ie. DoS fee to become a CHARITYxDAO VA. Given the sunk cost of joining the CHARITYxDAO, it is more expensive for prospective VAs to cheat because it would be expensive to rejoin even if VAs could be anonymous.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/defection.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.