# Deferred prosecution agreements

`kaal:entity:deferred-prosecution-agreements`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 10 claims that carry the concept tag `deferred-prosecution-agreements`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

10 claims across 4 works, 2013 to 2017.

**2013**

- [2273857-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-013) [design/argued] -- Although implementing dynamic elements in regulatory structures remains uncertain, promising regulatory tools with dynamic elements already exist, including contingent capital securities, corporate integrity agreements, and deferred prosecution agreements.
  > Although the implementation of dynamic elements in regulatory structures is uncertain, some promising regulatory tools with dynamic elements already exist, including contingent capital securities, corporate integrity agreements, and deferred prosecution agreements.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-061](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-061) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Prosecutors negotiating deferred prosecution agreements may lack the expertise needed to negotiate high level corporate governance changes such as personnel changes and internal corporate and compliance procedures.
  > While prosecutors may not have the necessary expertise to negotiate high level corporate governance changes, such as personnel changes and internal corporate and compliance procedures
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-062](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-062) [mechanism/argued] -- The institution specific and decentralized information generated by deferred prosecution agreements allows regulators to better understand shortcomings in a particular market segment or industry, so that rulemaking can be more narrowly tailored.
  > With the institution specific and decentralized information generated by DPAs, regulators may be able to better understand shortcomings in a particular market segment or industry.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-063](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-063) [empirical/evidenced] -- Almost 300 deferred prosecution agreements have been executed since 2003, whereas before 2003 they were rarely used.
  > Almost 300 DPAs have been executed since 2003. Before 2003, DPAs were rarely used.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-065](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-065) [mechanism/argued] -- The threat of heightened scrutiny under a deferred prosecution or corporate integrity agreement optimizes incentives because increased government monitoring attaches only after a first time offense, giving institutions a reason to comply and self-regulate in order to avoid it.
  > The threat of heightened scrutiny for institutions subject to a DPA/CIA may help optimize incentives because financial institutions would be subjected to increased monitoring by government regulators only after a first time offense had occurred.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2317580-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-039) [predictive/argued] -- As a unique hybrid category, CIAs transcend both the law of fiduciary duties and aspirational corporate governance, and courts may come to interpret CIAs and other hybrid forms such as deferred prosecution agreements as expanding the basic legal duty of care.
  > Given the characteristics of CIAs and courts' increasing recognition of CIAs and VCPs, courts may interpret CIAs and other hybrid forms, such as deferred prosecution agreements, as expanding the basic legal duty of care.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580

**2016**

- [2831040-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-020) [empirical/evidenced] -- Deferred prosecution agreements produce relevant, real time, decentralized, high quality information for regulation in most industries and are used as a preferred alternative to litigation by both prosecutors and corporations.
  > Dynamic regulatory mechanisms such as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) produce relevant, real-time, decentralized, high quality information for regulation in most industries and are used as a preferred alternative to litigation by both prosecutors and corporations
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040
- [2831040-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-021) [mechanism/argued] -- Deferred prosecution agreements produce superior feedback effects for regulation because the prosecutor's investigation and the negotiation and execution of the agreement signal regulatory needs in real time.
  > DPAs produce superior feedback effects for regulation as the prosecutor's investigation and DPA negotiations and executions signal regulatory needs real-time.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040
- [2831040-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-033) [mechanism/argued] -- Deferred prosecution agreements and venture capital investment decisions increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking and give at least some estimate of where innovative trends exist and what regulatory challenges may accompany them.
  > DPAs and venture capital investment decisions increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040

**2017**

- [2957645-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-013) [mechanism/argued] -- Deferred prosecution agreements and venture capital investment decisions function as dynamic regulatory tools because they increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking and facilitate feedback effects.
  > DPAs and venture capital investment decisions increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking and facilitate feedback effects.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/deferred-prosecution-agreements.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.
