# Deferred prosecution

`kaal:entity:deferred-prosecution`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 14 claims that carry the concept tag `deferred-prosecution`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

14 claims across 2 works, 2014 to 2014.

**2014**

- [2486570-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-001) [mechanism/argued] -- The increasing use of non prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements has allowed federal prosecutors to expand their traditional role incrementally, marking a shift in prosecutorial culture away from an ex post focus on punishment toward an ex ante emphasis on compliance.
  > has enabled federal prosecutors to incrementally expand their traditional role, exemplifying a shift in prosecutorial culture from an ex-post focus on punish- ment to an ex-ante emphasis on compliance.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [2486570-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-002) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Prior scholarship on the corporate governance effects of non and deferred prosecution agreements rests largely on anecdotal evidence and individual case studies rather than on systematic evidence, which is why its conclusions about those effects are unreliable.
  > The evaluation of issues pertaining to the effect of N/DPAs on corporate governance in prior studies is largely based on anecdotal evidence and valuable case studies.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [2486570-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-003) [design/argued] -- Because the population of executed non and deferred prosecution agreements is now large, their real trends and real governance impact are quantifiable and measurable, so policy makers can be given evidence based guidance rather than conjecture.
  > given the large number of N/DPAs, the real trends and the real impact of N/DPAs are quantifiable and measurable, giving real guidance to policy makers.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [2486570-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-004) [mechanism/argued] -- Once prosecutors have investigated and identified corporate wrongdoing, non and deferred prosecution agreements let them avoid an expensive trial against a sophisticated and well funded corporate defendant, which is one reason both sides have strong incentives to settle.
  > prosecutors have investigated and identified corporate wrongdoing, they can use N/DPAs to avoid an expensive trial against a sophisticated and well-funded cor- porate defendant.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [2486570-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-005) [mechanism/argued] -- Prosecutors favor non and deferred prosecution agreements because those agreements avoid the uncertainty of potentially catastrophic collateral consequences for the company, unlike an indictment.
  > Second, prosecutors favor N/DPAs because they do not entail the uncertainty of potentially catastrophic collateral consequences for the company.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [2486570-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-008) [mechanism/argued] -- At the pre charging stage the government typically holds extraordinary bargaining power, which lets it extract fines and sanctions comparable to those following a criminal conviction while avoiding the risk and cost of trial.
  > The government typically has extraordinary bargaining power at the pre-charging stage, enabling it to extract fines and sanctions similar to those from a criminal conviction69 without the risk and cost of a trial.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [2486570-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-011) [empirical/evidenced] -- Coding of all publicly available non and deferred prosecution agreements executed between 1993 and 2013 shows that 97.41 percent of them, or 264 of 271 agreements, contained relevant corporate governance changes.
  > we show that 97.41 percent [N=264] of the public N/DPAs from 1993–2013 con- tained relevant corporate governance changes.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [2486570-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-017) [empirical/evidenced] -- Business change provisions in non and deferred prosecution agreements can go as far as requiring the entity to fundamentally change its business model or to shut down entire business units.
  > N/DPA mandated business changes identified in this study could require the respective entity to fundamen- tally change its business model or shut down entire business units, among other possible business changes.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [2486570-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-021) [empirical/argued] -- The increasing execution of non and deferred prosecution agreements since 2002 has raised the overall regulatory burden borne by the corporate entities subject to them.
  > since 2002 the increasing execution of N/DPAs has heightened the overall regu- latory burden for corporate entities that are subject to N/DPAs.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [2486570-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-036) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The underlying corporate governance problems in United States corporations may be more severe than non and deferred prosecution agreements are capable of adequately addressing.
  > The underlying corporate governance problems in U.S. corporations could be more severe than N/DPAs can adequately address.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [2486570-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-039) [normative/evidenced] -- The evidence assembled in this study supports the conclusion that non and deferred prosecution agreements can play a legitimate role in addressing corporate governance shortcomings, contrary to the broad legitimacy critique in the literature.
  > The findings in this study suggest that N/DPAs can play a legitimate role in addressing corporate governance shortcomings.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-022) [definitional/asserted] -- Governmental contracts are contractual arrangements between the government and a corporate entity under which the government imposes sanctions and institutional changes in exchange for foregoing further investigation and corporate criminal indictment.
  > Governmental contracts are contractual arrangements executed between the government and a corporate entity that allow the government to impose sanc- tions against the respective entity and set up institutional changes in exchange for the government's agreement to forego further investigation
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-024) [empirical/evidenced] -- Over 97 percent of the non and deferred prosecution agreements executed in the United States between 1993 and 2013 contained governance changes, including required business changes in 30 percent and board and senior management changes in 38 percent.
  > Over 97% of the N/DPAs executed in the United States between 1993 and 2013 contained governance changes, including required business changes (30%), board and senior management changes (38%
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-026) [empirical/evidenced] -- More than 60 percent of the non and deferred prosecution agreements executed between 1993 and 2013 were preceded by preemptive remedial measures instituted by the corporate wrongdoer.
  > Over 60% of N/DPAs executed between 1993 and 2013 instituted preemptive remedial measures prior to the execution of the N/DPA82.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/deferred-prosecution.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.