# Definitions `kaal:entity:definitions` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 19 claims that carry the concept tag `definitions`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 19 claims across 10 works, 2004 to 2025. **2004** - [617681-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-033) [definitional/asserted] -- Forum unbundling is the arrangement in which the incorporation jurisdiction's statutes and interpretive case law are unbundled only from the adjudication services of its courts, so corporations may choose a different adjudicator in their charters. > The second alternative is "forum unbundling" in which the incorporation jurisdiction's statutes and interpretive caselaw are unbundled from the adjudication services of its courts. Corporations may in their charters choose an adjudicator other than the courts of the state of incorporation. Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681 **2011** - [1806252-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-015) [definitional/asserted] -- An institution or a country creates externalities when it manages its own hedge fund generated systemic risk without considering how its actions or inactions affect risk in the system as a whole. > An institution or country creates externalities if it manages its own hedge fund-generated systemic risk without considering the impact of its actions or inactions on the risk in the system as a whole. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252 **2012** - [2029983-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-002) [definitional/asserted] -- The authors stipulate that Choice of Law Competition is a subcategory of jurisdictional competition in which jurisdictions compete on substantive legal rules to attract contracting parties ex ante, with adjudication of disputes a secondary consideration. > Choice of Law Competition is a subcategory of jurisdictional competi- tion. The emphasis in Choice of Law Competition is on substantive legal rules to attract contracting parties. Adjudication of disputes may be of secondary importance in Choice of Law Competition. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-003) [definitional/asserted] -- The authors stipulate that jurisdictions which take steps only to expand the jurisdiction of their courts as venues for litigation, rather than to attract transactions, engage in Forum Competition. > Jurisdictions that take steps only to expand the jurisdic- tion of their courts as venues for litigation engage in "Forum Competition." Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 **2013** - [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-032) [definitional/asserted] -- Dynamic Regulation is defined as an adapting governance mechanism that is constantly evolving and adjusting to the given market environment, financial innovation, and regulatory environment. > 1.) Dynamic Regulation suggests an adapting governance mechanism that is constantly evolving and adjusting to the given market environment, financial innovation, and the given regulatory environment; Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013) **2017** - [2957645-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-010) [definitional/asserted] -- Feedback effects, defined as informational exchange processes between public and private rulemakers, between outcomes and institutions, between rules and rulemaking processes, and across jurisdictions, are a central tenet of the theory of dynamic regulation. > Feedback effects occur when an informational exchange process exists between public and private rulemakers, outcomes and institutions, rules and rulemaking processes, and jurisdictions.20 Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645 - [2957645-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-015) [definitional/asserted] -- Contingent capital is an automatic mechanism for increasing capital while reducing debt, and its long term benefit is lowering leverage. > Contingent capital is an automatic mechanism for increasing capital while reducing debt with the long-term benefit of lowering leverage. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645 - [2957645-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-016) [definitional/asserted] -- For purposes of this article, contingent capital is stipulated to mean the predefined conversion of a certain percentage of a financial institution's debt securities into equity securities. > For purposes of this article, contingent capital is the predefined conversion of a certain percentage of financial institutions' debt securities into equity securities. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645 **2018** - [3128900-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3128900-033) [definitional/asserted] -- Gamification is stipulated as the process of adding games or game like elements, such as a micro task, in order to encourage active worker participation, boost motivation, and increase user loyalty. > Gamification is defined as the process of adding games or game-like elements, such as a micro-task, to encourage active task worker participation, boost motivation, and increase user loyalty. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900 - [3227967-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227967-021) [definitional/asserted] -- A smart contract is computer program code that enables the verification, execution and enforcement of specific terms and conditions of a contractual arrangement. > A smart contract is a computer program code that enables the verification, execution, and enforcement of specific terms and conditions of a contractual arrangement. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in a Digital Age Why 'Coding for Lawyers' Matters (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227967 **2020** - [3606663-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-004) [definitional/asserted] -- The article stipulates a broad definition of digital assets covering all virtual and electronic assets regardless of how regulators name or categorize them, including cryptocurrencies, security tokens, utility tokens, virtual collectibles, stablecoins, and altcoins. > For the purposes of this article, digital assets are defined broadly. Digital assets cover all types of virtual and electronic assets, regardless of how they are otherwise named or categorized by regulatory agencies, including cryptocurrencies, security tokens, Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663 **2021** - [3782214-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-012) [definitional/asserted] -- The authors stipulate corruption in an organization as any action that benefits a minority at the greater expense of the group, and locate its source in power that is distributed inappropriately as measured by efficiency. > We broadly define corruption in an organization as any action that benefits a mi- nority at the greater expense of the group. Corruption arises when power is distrib- uted inappropriately as measured by efficiency. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214 **2025** - [5886342-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-011) [definitional/asserted] -- Identity under the Codex is not limited to persons: it is the unique existence of a subject, of a digital or physical object, of data or of a programme, expressly including AI systems, so machine agents can hold an identity within the framework. > ital and physical object, data, or programme includ- ing but not limited to AI-Systems. Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342 - [5886342-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-012) [definitional/asserted] -- Legal Identity is the narrower category: it is an Identity to which rights and obligations are attributed on the basis of the applicable law, in particular natural and legal persons, so having an identity in a digital system does not by itself confer legal personality. > A Legal Identity is an Identity to which rights and obligations are attributed based on the Applicable Law, in particular Natural and Legal persons. Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342 - [5886342-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-015) [definitional/argued] -- The Codex treats a Digital Object as rival digital information that carries an identity, which is the move that makes property style ownership rules coherent for digital assets, since rivalry means control by one identity excludes or impairs control by another. > (1) A Digital Object is a rival Digital Information Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342 - [5886342-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-017) [definitional/asserted] -- Digital control is defined as the actual technical possibility of an identity to exercise full power over a digital object, so the legal category tracks technical capability rather than formal title. > (1) Digital Control is the actual technical possibility Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342 - [5886342-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-026) [definitional/asserted] -- The Codex separates the Will, defined as the actual intent of a legal identity, from the Stated Will, the expression made to others with the intention of being legally bound; this separation is what allows encoded expressions to be tested against actual intent. > (1) A Will is the actual intent of a Legal Identity. Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342 - [5886342-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-030) [definitional/asserted] -- A DAO is defined for the Codex as a collective of identities pursuing a common goal through a decentralized and transparent decision making process, a definition that turns on process rather than on legal form. > (DAO) is a collective of Identities that pursues a common goal through a decentralized and transpar- Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342 - [5886342-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-031) [definitional/asserted] -- A DAO may or may not be a Legal Identity, so the Codex rules for DAOs are written to work whether or not the organization has legal personality under the applicable law. > (2) A DAO may or may not be a Legal Identity ac- Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/definitions.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.