# Deterrence

`kaal:entity:deterrence`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 12 claims that carry the concept tag `deterrence`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

12 claims across 11 works, 2010 to 2026.

**2010**

- [1664809-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1664809-037) [mechanism/argued] -- If national securities regulators are unable or unwilling to cooperate with each other, there is likely to be more securities fraud.
  > If national securities regulators are unable or unwilling to cooperate with each other, there is likely to be more
  Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Law – Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for (2010). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664809

**2011**

- [1765901-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-030) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Overuse of the Dodd-Frank extraterritorial enforcement provision by the SEC or the DOJ could deter foreign companies from having U.S. operations.
  > Overuse of this provision by the SEC or DOJ could deter foreign companies from having U.S. operations.
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1908473-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-030) [normative/argued] -- The second trigger voting rights increase should never actually be triggered; its function is to level the playing field between constituents, incentivize negotiation, and provide an alternative to reorganization.
  > The second trigger voting rights increase should never actually be triggered. Rather, it should help level the playing field between constituents and incentivize negotiation and provide an alternative to reorganization.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

**2012**

- [2029983-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-040) [normative/argued] -- Although many jurisdictions may protect investors less well than the United States, it is not at all certain that U.S. law does a better job of deterring securities fraud.
  > While many jurisdictions could be worse than the United States at protecting investors, it is not at all certain that U.S. law does a better job of deterring securities fraud.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983

**2013**

- [2317580-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-017) [mechanism/argued] -- A CIA raises the stakes for directors who would otherwise neglect their governance responsibilities, because the agreement puts the company effectively on parole and gives the government direct access that facilitates detection of compliance failures.
  > A CIA increases the stakes for directors choosing to eschew their governance responsibilities. A company operating under a CIA is essentially on parole.55 CIAs give the government direct access to a health care corporation, facilitating the detection of compliance issues.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580
- [2348463-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2348463-002) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Under the regulatory framework in place at the time of writing, the threat that hedge funds' systemic risk filings could be publicly disclosed through the bankruptcy process will affect hedge funds' tactics and their role in distressed investing only marginally.
  > In the current regulatory framework, the threat of public disclosure of systemic risk filings by hedge funds via the bankruptcy process may only marginally affect hedge funds' tactics and their role in distressed investing.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures in Bankruptcy (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2348463

**2014**

- [2486570-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-023) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because the board changes mandated by non and deferred prosecution agreements consist largely of additional reporting obligations and committee reform rather than removal of officers or directors, those reforms alone may not create sufficient incentives for boards and management to improve governance and avoid execution of an agreement.
  > These reforms alone may not create sufficient incentives for boards and management to improve governance and avoid N/DPA execution.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [2486570-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-024) [mechanism/argued] -- The threat of bad press, reputational harm, legal costs, stock price declines, and the cost of implementing mandated governance changes can partly substitute for the weak direct incentives, pushing boards and management to optimize governance and keep the entity out of an agreement.
  > the cost of implementing N/DPA governance changes can help counteract lack- ing incentives for boards and management to optimize governance and protect the entity from entering into a N/DPA.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

**2021**

- [3782203-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-034) [mechanism/argued] -- The deterrent power of reputation tokens grows with network size, because the loss of opportunity from having reputation slashed increases as the network gets larger.
  > Another advantage to digital tokens in open global networks is that the loss of opportunity from having your reputation slashed grows as the size of the network in- creases.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203
- [3799320-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-036) [mechanism/argued] -- The opportunity loss from having reputation slashed grows as the network grows, because a larger network means more competition for the reputation tokens that determine fungible salary shares.
  > In the DAO of DAOs design the loss of opportunity from slashing DAO of DAOs member reputation grows as the size of the network increases. In other words, the larger the DAO of DAOs network, the more competition for reputation tokens to receive fungible token salaries.
  Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320
- [3981021-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-033) [mechanism/argued] -- The loss of opportunity from slashing a voting associate's reputation grows as the size of the network increases, because a larger network intensifies competition among associates for the reputation tokens that determine fungible salary payouts.
  > reputation tokens to receive fungible token salaries that are paid in proportion to reputation tokens. Accordingly, in the CHARITYxDAO design, the loss of opportunity from slashing CHARITYxDAO VA reputation grows as the size of the network increases.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021

**2026**

- [6269518-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6269518-021) [condition/argued] -- Retroactive citation penalties deter under-citation only if the penalty parameter is set high enough that the expected gain from under-citation is less than the probability of detection multiplied by the penalty magnitude.
  > where the penalty parameter is set sufficiently high (e.g., 0.5) that the expected value of under-citing is negative: the expected gain from under-citation must be less than the probability of detection multiplied by the penalty magnitude.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/deterrence.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.