# Devdao

`kaal:entity:devdao`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `devdao`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 1 works, 2020 to 2020.

**2020**

- [3652481-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-036) [mechanism/argued] -- Paying DevDAO salaries in fungible stable tokens in proportion to members' non fungible reputation scores makes the economic benefit indirect, which removes corruptive elements and makes the governance design more attack resistant and stable over the long run.
  > The salary payments in fungible stable tokens are in proportion to DevDAO members' respective non-fungible reputation token scores. The indirect economic effects remove corruptive elements and make the governance design more attack resistant and stable in the long run.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481
- [3652481-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-037) [mechanism/argued] -- The reputation based DevDAO governance design creates a positive sum game, because members have incentives to build lasting non fungible value through a long term record of productive cooperation that improves the DevDAO itself.
  > By contrast, the reputation- based DevDAO governance design creates a positive-sum game because DevDAO members have incentives to create lasting non- fungible value for the DevDAO by developing a long-term non- fungible record of productive cooperation that in effect improves the DevDAO.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481
- [3652481-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-038) [mechanism/argued] -- DevDAO member reputation is inflationary by design, so that non use, meaning failure to stake reputation tokens or to vote, causes value depreciation, which incentivizes action and makes liveness faults less likely.
  > The DevDAO member reputation is inflationary in the DevDAO design. As such, non-use, e.g. non-staking of reputation tokens or non-voting, would lead to value depreciation, which incentivizes action and thus value enhancement. Liveness faults become less likely.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481
- [3652481-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-039) [mechanism/argued] -- Reputation weighted salary distribution defeats sock puppet attacks, because a member who creates ten accounts holding one reputation token each ends up in the same position as one account holding ten reputation tokens.
  > This solves the sock- puppet attack because if a DevDAO member creates 10 accounts with 1 reputation token each, it is the same as 1 account with 10 reputation tokens.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/devdao.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.