entity · derived
Dilution
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying dilution. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 1908473-009 : The volume of contingent capital issuance should be large enough that conversion produces sufficient dilution, and the trigger timeframe should be roughly ninety days.
- 1908473-018 : The threat of loss on conversion and the implicit dilution of existing stock holdings reduce shareholders' incentive to press management for higher risk in pursuit of higher returns.
- 1998455-010 : The threat of dilution of stock holdings, combined with the threat of loss on conversion, reduces the pressure shareholders place on the management of systemically important financial institutions to
- 2061166-022 : Because conversion carries a threat of loss and implicit dilution of stock holdings, contingent capital reduces shareholders' incentive to push management toward higher risk in pursuit of higher retur
- 2097160-037 : Contrary to Gordon's view that contingent convertible bonds do not address the Fuld Problem, if executive packages do not include a large equity portion, managers have no incentive to block an equity
- 3067615-023 : Because the token supply is controlled by ICO promoters who must reserve tokens for future funding needs, token holders can be diluted by later issuance of reserve tokens and their token value can be
- 3067615-024 : Hardcoded lockup periods can protect token holders against supply side induced devaluation, but they also decrease the token economic flexibility the promoter team needs to raise additional funds, so
- 3071378-035 : Because the total supply of DAO tokens is pre-determined in code, dilution by central administrators such as government officials or self-interested or biased executives is impossible.
- 3117224-010 : ICO investors have no preemptive rights or other anti-dilution protections, so they may be diluted if promoters later issue more reserve tokens to additional investors.
- 3782216-015 : Because underwriting mints new reputation tokens, passive holders see their proportional ownership in the DAO fall over time, which is designed to incentivize agents to underwrite actively while still