{
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 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/disclosure-incentives",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:disclosure-incentives",
 "name": "Disclosure incentives",
 "termCode": "disclosure-incentives",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
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 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
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   "value": 2
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   "value": [
    "2010",
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 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-014",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-014",
   "text": "The U.S. governance structure, built on periodic disclosure of performance data and stock price maximization, encourages risk taking because managers feel compelled to meet shareholder expectations at every reporting interval.",
   "abstract": "Risk taking in this context may be encour- aged by the perceived need to satisfy expectations of shareholders. Managers feel compelled to fulfill performance expectations whenev- er results are disclosed, be it quarterly, bi-annually, or annually.",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "governance systems that emphasize periodic performance disclosure and stock price"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811718-007",
   "text": "Because a material omission or misstatement in Form ADV Part 2A can support a serious securities law charge, private fund managers have an incentive to keep the narrative language of that required disclosure as high level, summary, and non committal as possible.",
   "abstract": "the imperative for a private fund manager is to keep the narrative language as high-level, summary, and as non-committal as possible, because a material omission and/or misstatement in that section could lead to a serious charge of violating the securities laws.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Form ADV Part 2A narrative brochure",
    "private fund managers"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b52152af561288173840a1cabbcf8f4b337e73507c856ee01600799073f4156f",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'disclosure-incentives'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}