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  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-032",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1428387-032",
   "text": "More disclosure does not always mean better governance, because the information provided may be hard to assess and evaluate.",
   "abstract": "More disclosure may not, however, always mean better governance if the information provided is hard to assess and evaluate.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387",
   "datePublished": "2009",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "where disclosed valuation and risk data is complex"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-031",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-031",
   "text": "The United States compensates for its lenient corporate law treatment of risk taking under the business judgment rule with a comparatively strict disclosure regime and a robust securities class action litigation regime; substantive corporate law pushes the monitoring requirement toward leniency while securities enforcement pushes it back toward stringency.",
   "abstract": "In sum, what the United States lacks in its lenient approach to risk taking in the application of the business judgment rule the Unit- ed States may make up for with its relatively strict disclosure regime and robust securities class action litigation regime.",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-032",
   "text": "In the United States the duty to disclose risk indirectly generates risk monitoring, because directors who know they are responsible for disclosing risk have reason to monitor it even though corporate law imposes no explicit duty to monitor.",
   "abstract": "Directors thus may monitor for risk because they know they are responsible for dis- closing it.",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-039",
   "text": "Delaware courts have not explicitly imposed a duty to monitor risk, but that omission may be moot: because failing to disclose risk violates federal securities law, unmonitored risk is likely to become undisclosed risk and therefore actionable.",
   "abstract": "In the United States, Delaware courts have not explicitly im- posed a duty to monitor risk. Because failure to disclose risk is a vi- olation of federal securities laws, however, this may be a moot point. Unmonitored risk is likely to be undisclosed risk.",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1664809-034",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1664809-034",
   "text": "If US law requires disclosure of information that another country's law prohibits from being disclosed, whether for privacy or other reasons, there could be a true conflict of law and a credible case that the United States is in breach of international law.",
   "abstract": "disclosure of information that another country's law would prohibit to be disclosed, whether for privacy reasons or other reasons, there could be a true conflict of law and a credible case that the United States is in breach of international law.",
   "citation": "Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Law – Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for (2010). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664809",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "a genuine incompatibility between US disclosure duties and foreign prohibitions"
   ],
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-009",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1806252-009",
   "text": "Regulators who obtain hedge funds' proprietary information could inadvertently pass it to third parties, and because that information is highly valuable to competitors in the same markets, such leakage could undermine trading strategies and the long-term viability of hedge funds.",
   "abstract": "The confidential nature of this information makes it highly valuable for third parties who engage in the same markets as the owner of the proprietary information, and this form of leakage could undermine trading strategies and the long-term viability of hedge funds.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252",
   "datePublished": "2011",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "mandatory disclosure of trading positions and strategies to regulators"
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   "status": "current"
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1806252-010",
   "text": "Because hedge fund trading strategies depend on confidentiality, required disclosures that let other market participants trade along or anticipate a fund's transactions can negatively affect the fund's absolute returns.",
   "abstract": "If other market participants trade along or are enabled to anticipate certain transactions by a hedge fund because of required disclosures, the disclosing hedge fund may not be able to fulfill its mandate to maximize shareholders' value",
   "citation": "Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252",
   "datePublished": "2011",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "strategies rely on interpreting market environments not yet priced in by others"
   ],
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1806252-035",
   "text": "Registering hedge funds with regulators and requiring disclosure of pertinent information could help minimize the moral hazard, social externalities, and systemic risk generated by the hedge fund industry.",
   "abstract": "Recent attempts at regulating hedge funds by registering them with regulators and requiring disclosure of pertinent information could help to minimize moral hazard, social externalities, and systemic risk generated by the hedge fund industry.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252",
   "datePublished": "2011",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "extent of hedge fund involvement in the 2008 to 2009 credit crisis remains unclear"
   ],
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1908473-038",
   "text": "Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define adequate information, prepackaged plans risk inadequate disclosure, creditor challenge, and unusable prepetition votes that force the case into the longer ordinary Chapter 11 confirmation procedure.",
   "abstract": "Given this shortcoming, the agreement may be challenged by creditors. In many cases, the prepetition votes cannot be utilized, forcing the reorganization into the ordinary and much longer plan confirmation procedure under Chapter 11.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473",
   "datePublished": "2011",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-038",
   "text": "Rather than banning purchases by systemically important institutions of each other's contingent capital, which could be detrimental to market evolution, the design should require disclosure of the purchaser's identity and approval by the issuer.",
   "abstract": "An outright ban of SIFI CCS purchases, or at least purchases in other SIFI CCS issuances, could be detrimental for CCS mar- ket evolution. Perhaps a mechanism that requires disclosure of the identity of the purchaser for SIFIs and approval by the issuer could address these concerns.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "where the concern is competitors acquiring voting rights as equity holders upon conversion"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2150377-001",
   "text": "Freedom from supervision and disclosure obligations was functional rather than incidental for hedge funds: it enabled successful fund launches, helped generate higher returns, and attracted investors, which is why manager registration is contested.",
   "abstract": "Hedge funds' ability to invest in global markets without supervision and significant disclosure obligations was important for successful hedge fund launches, helped generate higher returns, and attracted investors.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "hedge funds operating before the Dodd-Frank Act",
    "funds investing in global markets"
   ],
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2150377-007",
   "text": "Under the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act, hedge funds with more than $150 million in assets under management must register as investment advisers and disclose information about their trades and portfolios to the SEC, making assets under management the operative trigger for the regime.",
   "abstract": "Under the PFIARA, hedge funds with more than $150 million assets under management (AUM) are required to register as investment advisers and have to disclose information about their trades and portfolios to the SEC.81",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "advisers acting solely as advisers to private funds",
    "assets under management measured in the United States"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-022",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-022",
   "text": "Codes of conduct adopted under a CIA should encourage disclosure of compliance issues and protect whistle blowers from retaliation by maintaining the anonymity of disclosures.",
   "abstract": "Codes of conduct should encourage disclosure of compliance issues and protect whistle blowers from retaliation by maintaining the anonymity of disclosures.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "normative",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "codes of conduct implemented under a CIA"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2337268-018",
   "text": "Registration is the gateway that makes data collection and enhanced disclosure by hedge fund managers possible, and the Dodd-Frank Act raised disclosure requirements for registered advisers specifically to address systemic risk concerns.",
   "abstract": "The registration of investment advisers facilitates the collection of data and enhanced disclosure by hedge fund managers. The Dodd-Frank Act increased the disclosure requirements for registered investment advisers to address concerns over systemic risk.40",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "registered investment advisers after the Dodd-Frank Act"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7075ce35282a8ee75b81ae3dec0e19f68631beae7f3c3a00ab2827538dc9e302",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-043",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2337268-043",
   "text": "Referral fees to third parties are permitted only if the recipients are bona fide persons under securities laws, the fees are disclosed to the adviser's clients, and the fees are paid under a written agreement.",
   "abstract": "Advisers may pay referral fees provided the referral fee recipients are bona fide persons under securities laws, the fees have been disclosed to the investment adviser's clients, and the fees are paid in accordance with a written agreement.113",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "referral fees paid by investment advisers to third parties"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7075ce35282a8ee75b81ae3dec0e19f68631beae7f3c3a00ab2827538dc9e302",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-002",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-002",
   "text": "Contrary to the hedge fund industry's claim that increased supervision and disclosure would harm profitability, the authors find statistical evidence that the Dodd-Frank Act requirements had a positive effect on hedge fund performance.",
   "abstract": "Contrary to the hedge fund industry's claims that increased supervision and disclosure would affect their profitability, we find statistical evidence of a positive effect of the requirements introduced by the Dodd- Frank Act on hedge fund performance.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "US hedge fund advisers subject to Title IV",
    "sample period January to October 2012"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-011",
   "text": "The quarterly Form PF reporting obligation imposed on hedge fund advisers with more than $1.5 billion in regulatory assets under management is designed to give the FSOC timely data for identifying systemic risk trends.",
   "abstract": "The quarterly reporting requirement for large hedge fund advisers is intended to provide timely data that enables the FSOC to identify trends in systemic risk (IA Release 3308).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "advisers with RAUM above $1.5 billion attributable to hedge funds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0e1c4615b104821577498d9655de43b9c5c3e985bb0215f56c038b8232be65c3",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-040",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-040",
   "text": "The SEC's collection of proprietary hedge fund data through Forms ADV and PF does not negatively affect the performance of the hedge fund industry as a whole, and appears to affect only a subset of the industry.",
   "abstract": "The preliminary results in this study suggest that the SEC's collection of proprietary hedge fund data via Forms ADV and PF does not negatively impact the hedge fund industry's performance as a whole. It seems to affect merely a subset of the hedge fund industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "preliminary results based on ten months of data",
    "does not address administrative cost effects"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0e1c4615b104821577498d9655de43b9c5c3e985bb0215f56c038b8232be65c3",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389423-009",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389423-009",
   "text": "The new regulatory framework for private funds in the United States requires hedge fund manager registration in combination with enhanced disclosure of sensitive proprietary information, a combination that marks a shift in how private funds are regulated.",
   "abstract": "The new regulatory framework for private funds in the United States requires hedge fund manager registration in combination with enhanced disclosure of sensitive proprietary information (Dodd–Frank §§ 401, 402).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "United States private fund regulation after the Dodd-Frank Act"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "6b95323abbaffd00a012589531859f2938ab8b372d0243171059ff82e55a0838",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389423-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389423-012",
   "text": "Title IV mandates hedge fund adviser registration in order to increase record keeping and disclosure, requiring advisers above the statutory AUM threshold to register as investment advisers and to disclose information about their trades and portfolios to the SEC.",
   "abstract": "Title IV mandates hedge fund adviser registration to increase record-keeping and disclosure (Dodd-Frank § 408). Hedge fund advisers with more than $150 AUM are required to register as investment advisers and have to disclose information about their trades and portfolios to the SEC",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "hedge fund advisers above the Title IV registration threshold"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "6b95323abbaffd00a012589531859f2938ab8b372d0243171059ff82e55a0838",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389423-013",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389423-013",
   "text": "Registered investment advisers must report systemic risk relevant information to the SEC, including trading practices, trading and investment positions, the amount of assets under management, valuation policies, and side letters.",
   "abstract": "Investment advisers must provide reports with respect to certain information related to systemic risk (Dodd-Frank § 404(b)(3)), such as trading practices, trading and investment positions, the amount of AUM, valuation policies, side letters",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "investment advisers registered under Title IV"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "6b95323abbaffd00a012589531859f2938ab8b372d0243171059ff82e55a0838",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2447306-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2447306-005",
   "text": "Prior scholarship, including the author's own earlier work, established that Form PF created core challenges for the private fund industry but did not clarify what impact the disclosure requirements actually have on managers; this study is designed to fill that gap.",
   "abstract": "While prior studies have acknowledged that the SEC's mandated collection of private fund data via Form PF created several core challenges for the private fund industry, these studies do not sufficiently clarify the impact of Form PF disclosure requirements on managers.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "literature available before the first mandatory Form PF collection"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0c950d73240845e78faf1c3ca0ab820fcc50556faf7ff07f7f773d0876f0be8a",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-004",
   "text": "Even though the private fund industry broadly accepted Form PF, the form's core problems for the SEC are the ambiguity of several questions, advisers' disagreement with the definition of funds, and correspondingly insufficient SEC guidance.",
   "abstract": "the core challenges for the SEC in Form PF include: the ambiguity of several questions on Form PF, private fund advisers' disagreement with the definition of funds in Form PF and corresponding insufficiency of SEC guidance",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Form PF as implemented by the SEC",
    "registered private fund advisers"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-014",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-014",
   "text": "Form PF data was tailored primarily for the FSOC rather than for the SEC's own purposes, a design choice that shaped the level of reporting required.",
   "abstract": "The data collected via Form PF has been tailored primarily for the use of the FSOC.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Form PF as adopted by the SEC Division of Investment Management"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-022",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-022",
   "text": "The SEC itself reports that the consistency of investment advisers' responses on Form PF is not ensured and may be questionable.",
   "abstract": "The analysis of the data collected in Form PF presents several key challenges. The SEC suggests that the consistency of investment adviser's responses on Form PF is not ensured and could be questionable.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Form PF filings as analyzed by SEC staff"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-024",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-024",
   "text": "The SEC's initial analysis of Form PF data turned up anomalies attributed to filer error, which prompted SEC concern about the quality of the information private fund advisers report.",
   "abstract": "Upon initial analysis of Form PF data, the SEC identified data anomalies deemed to be attributable to filer error165 which precipitated SEC concerns about the quality of the information provided by private fund advisers.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "early Form PF filing cycles"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-025",
   "text": "Expanding the uses of Form PF data remains difficult so long as there is insufficient confidence in the accuracy of what advisers report, notwithstanding SEC efforts to improve quality through interpretive FAQs and curative amendments.",
   "abstract": "expanding the utility of Form PF data without sufficient confidence in the accuracy of the information provided by investment advisers on Form PF remains difficult",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "current state of Form PF data accuracy",
    "SEC remedial measures limited to FAQs and curative amendments"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-026",
   "text": "Form PF data quality and utility are likely to improve over time as filers grow familiar with the form's requirements and calculation methods, because the SEC's experience with the data is still early.",
   "abstract": "On the upside, the SEC's experience with Form PF data is in its early stages and the data quality and utility is likely to evolve over time as filers become more familiar with the requirements of Form PF and the methods of calculation.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "speculative",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "early stage of SEC experience with Form PF",
    "assumes filers become more familiar with requirements"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-030",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-030",
   "text": "The Form PF definition of Regulatory Assets under Management is the leading example of a definition that forced filers to interpret what they were required to report.",
   "abstract": "Especially the definition of Regulatory Assets under Management (RAUM), as required by Form PF, required filers to interpret what they were required to report.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "RAUM reporting under Form PF"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-031",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-031",
   "text": "The interpretation Form PF demands generated particular concern among filers about the definition of counterparties and about counterparty performance measures.",
   "abstract": "The level of interpretation required to answer Form PF precipitated particular concerns among filers pertaining to the definition of counterparties and performance measures for counterparties in Form PF.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Form PF counterparty reporting items"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-036",
   "text": "Widespread filer disagreement with Form PF definitions implies that a large share of filers are uncertain how to answer, which raises the possibility that they complete the form with estimates and varied assumptions.",
   "abstract": "This suggests that a large proportion of filers are uncertain as to how Form PF questions are to be answered. This uncertainty at least raises the possibility that the filers are using estimates and a variety of assumptions to complete Form PF.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "filers who disagreed with Form PF definitions or instructions"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-038",
   "text": "Private fund advisers reporting under Form PF encountered issues that could affect the FSOC's systemic risk assessment, but the author does not claim that the FSOC is unable to fulfill its congressional mandate.",
   "abstract": "The article suggests that private fund advisers who reported data as required by SEC Form PF encountered issues that could affect FSOC's systemic risk assessment of private funds. The author does not suggest that the FSOC is unable to fulfill Congress's mandate.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "scope limited to the effects of Form PF reporting issues"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2714974-007",
   "text": "Under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, hedge funds with more than $150 million in assets under management must register as investment advisers and disclose information about their trades and portfolios to the SEC.",
   "abstract": "Under PFIARA, hedge funds with more than $150 million AUM must register as investment advisers and disclose information about their trades and portfolios to the SEC.",
   "citation": "Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies to advisers above the $150 million AUM threshold"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7764601d3ed5bb056b58949e8411eff9dfb9855f143719062030c980c5fa801b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2714974-008",
   "text": "Some of the most sensitive Form PF disclosures are not readily obtainable by the funds themselves: counterparty credit exposure often cannot be determined by individual fund managers, which makes the reporting requirement burdensome in practice.",
   "abstract": "For example, the disclosure of counterparty credit exposure is sensitive information that often cannot readily be determined by the individual fund managers.",
   "citation": "Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies to Form PF counterparty credit exposure reporting"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7764601d3ed5bb056b58949e8411eff9dfb9855f143719062030c980c5fa801b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2714974-012",
   "text": "The most pressing problem with Form PF identified by the majority of SEC registered hedge fund advisers is not the volume of data but the ambiguity of the data reporting requirements themselves.",
   "abstract": "The majority of SEC-registered hedge fund advisers identified the ambiguity of Form PF data reporting requirements as the most pressing issue (Kaal 2016b).",
   "citation": "Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "based on survey responses from SEC registered hedge fund advisers"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7764601d3ed5bb056b58949e8411eff9dfb9855f143719062030c980c5fa801b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2714974-015",
   "text": "Co-investment arrangements become problematic when a fund grants a co-investment opportunity in exchange for a future or increased fund commitment and the practice is not adequately disclosed, especially where the fund's governing documents would prohibit the allocation.",
   "abstract": "If such private fund advisers' practices are not adequately disclosed, co-investments can often be problematic.",
   "citation": "Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies where limited partners are also co-investors",
    "turns on adequacy of disclosure and the fund's governing documents"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7764601d3ed5bb056b58949e8411eff9dfb9855f143719062030c980c5fa801b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-022",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2714974-022",
   "text": "Neither obvious remedy for the increased sales pressure created by the Rule 506 amendment works well: added disclosure obligations such as filing all Rule 506 sales documents with FINRA or the SEC may burden issuers inappropriately, while litigation based enforcement may not reach all offenders equally or appropriately.",
   "abstract": "Litigation-based enforcement, on the other hand, may not encapsulate all offenders equally and/or appropriately.",
   "citation": "Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies to private placements where commissions exceed those on other investments"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7764601d3ed5bb056b58949e8411eff9dfb9855f143719062030c980c5fa801b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2714974-035",
   "text": "SEC rules should be amended to require public companies, particularly financial institutions, to disclose their material exposure to hedge funds and other highly leveraged institutions in the MD&A or Description of Business sections, which would be consistent with existing SEC disclosure philosophy.",
   "abstract": "SEC rules could provide for such disclosures in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) or Description of Business segments of the periodic financial statements.",
   "citation": "Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies to publicly traded lenders and counterparties of hedge funds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7764601d3ed5bb056b58949e8411eff9dfb9855f143719062030c980c5fa801b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2715083-003",
   "text": "Mandatory registration and increased disclosure for certain hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act place hedge fund advisers under registration and reporting obligations similar to those long borne by mutual fund advisers.",
   "abstract": "The registration and increased disclosure requirements for certain hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act subjects investment advisers to hedge funds to similar registration and reporting obligations as mutual fund advisers.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "advisers meeting the Dodd-Frank registration thresholds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b5c92186260d4a8499a14f81ee24ace093b24e7740af3effcd1c526fa4fa221e",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2715083-011",
   "text": "Private party litigation against hedge fund managers stays minimal because well counseled managers make extensive disclosures to investors who are presumed sophisticated, unlike mutual fund advisers who face ongoing high value investor suits.",
   "abstract": "By contrast, private-party litigation involving hedge fund managers is minimal because of the extent and nature of the disclosures well-counseled hedge fund managers provide to their investors",
   "citation": "Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "U.S. hedge funds and offshore vehicles chartered in the Caymans or BVI",
    "assumes industry standard disclosure practice"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b5c92186260d4a8499a14f81ee24ace093b24e7740af3effcd1c526fa4fa221e",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2715083-025",
   "text": "For the first time in the industry's history, the Dodd-Frank Act required most hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC, mandating disclosure of information previously treated as proprietary and private.",
   "abstract": "For the first time in the history of the hedge fund industry, the Dodd-Frank Act required most advisers to hedge funds to register with the SEC.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "investment advisers with more than 150 million dollars of assets under management"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b5c92186260d4a8499a14f81ee24ace093b24e7740af3effcd1c526fa4fa221e",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-010",
   "text": "Form PF raised regulatory oversight of private funds to unprecedented levels by requiring managers to disclose, for the first time, information about themselves, their funds, their investors, performance, financing, risk metrics, strategies, and credit exposure.",
   "abstract": "increased the level of regulatory oversight of private funds to unprecedented levels.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "registered investment managers subject to periodic Form PF reporting"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-011",
   "text": "Prior studies acknowledge that the SEC's mandated collection of private fund data through Form PF created several core challenges for the industry, but they do not sufficiently clarify the long-term impact of the Form PF disclosure requirements.",
   "abstract": "Although prior studies have acknowledged that the SEC's mandated collection of private fund data via Form PF created several core challenges for the private fund industry, these studies do not sufficiently clarify the long-term impact of the Form PF disclosure requirements.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "literature on Form PF available as of 2016"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-003",
   "text": "The reporting obligations imposed on private fund advisers by Form PF raised regulatory oversight of private funds to unprecedented levels.",
   "abstract": "Reporting obligations on Form PF72 increase the regulatory oversight of pri- vate funds to unprecedented levels.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "SEC-registered private fund advisers",
    "after Form PF became operative in 2012"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2748096-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2748096-026",
   "text": "Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act addresses alleged hedge fund systemic risk through an information strategy rather than a substantive one: it authorized the SEC to require registration and enhanced disclosure from private fund advisers and to facilitate data collection for assessing systemic risk.",
   "abstract": "The Dodd-Frank Act authorized the SEC to promulgate rules requiring registration and enhanced disclosure for private funds advisers, and facilitating data collection to assess hedge funds' systemic risk.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy A. Krause, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748096",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "U.S. private fund advisers with more than $150 million AUM"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "8f30260f2c1db728b45c4f3b9b7c64358cf9d3217277bc3c63a910c32f87b508",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811729-007",
   "text": "Post-crisis legislation accelerated the convergence of mutual funds and private funds, because the registration and increased disclosure requirements the Dodd-Frank Act imposed on certain private fund advisers subject them to substantively the same obligations that apply to advisers of mutual funds.",
   "abstract": "The registration and increased disclosure requirements for certain private fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act subject those managers to substantively the same registration and reporting obligations as those that apply to advisers to mutual funds.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private fund advisers required to register under the Dodd-Frank Act"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0877b0a076f2614559cb0b1a736f73401cecbee7cfe014da6e36709208e92a74",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811729-011",
   "text": "The go anywhere features of unconstrained mutual funds impede a retail investor's ability to ascertain and understand what the fund is invested in and what risks those investments carry.",
   "abstract": "However, these \"go anywhere\" features may impede a retail investor's ability to ascertain and understand the UMF's investments, and the risks associated with those investments.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "retail investors relying on fund disclosures"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0877b0a076f2614559cb0b1a736f73401cecbee7cfe014da6e36709208e92a74",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-030",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811729-030",
   "text": "It is questionable whether retail investors typically have the experience or training to fully appreciate the risks disclosed in unconstrained mutual fund prospectuses.",
   "abstract": "First, it is questionable whether retail investors typically have the experience or training to fully appreciate the risks disclosed in UMF prospectuses.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "average retail investors reading unconstrained fund prospectuses"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0877b0a076f2614559cb0b1a736f73401cecbee7cfe014da6e36709208e92a74",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-032",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811729-032",
   "text": "Because an unconstrained mutual fund's performance is typically not assessed against any established benchmark, the retail investor must evaluate the fund without the contextual information routinely available for mutual funds pursuing more traditional credit strategies.",
   "abstract": "Therefore, it is left to the retail UMF investor to assess the fund's performance without the type of contextual information routinely available in relation to other mutual funds pursuing more \"traditional\" credit strategies.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "unconstrained funds that decline to adopt a benchmark"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0877b0a076f2614559cb0b1a736f73401cecbee7cfe014da6e36709208e92a74",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-020",
   "text": "The absence of any statistically significant effect of mandatory disclosure on hedge fund returns suggests that the transparency costs associated with disclosure do not significantly affect the profitability of hedge fund advisers.",
   "abstract": "The absence of any statistical significant effect of mandatory disclosure on hedge fund returns may suggest that the transparency costs associated with disclosure do not significantly affect the profitability of hedge fund advisers.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "conditional on the null RD result",
    "US hedge fund advisers around the $150 million threshold"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-032",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-032",
   "text": "For much of its history the private fund industry has treated adviser registration and disclosure of proprietary information as a threat to its profitability, a view this study's evidence does not support.",
   "abstract": "For much of its history, the private fund industry has viewed private fund adviser registration and the disclosure of proprietary information as a threat to its profitability.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private fund industry over its history"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-030",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-030",
   "text": "Information generated by contingent capital securities may allow regulators to adjust their regulatory requirements and the intensity of regulatory investigations anticipatorily rather than after the fact.",
   "abstract": "Such information may allow regulators to anticipatorily adjust their regulatory requirements and the intensity of regulatory investigations.60",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "depends on the disclosure regime applicable to the respective contingent capital securities"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2959730-026",
   "text": "Blockchain based fund reporting substitutes verifiable transparency for hedge fund secrecy: the LendingRobot ledger shows detailed holdings and supplies a hash code signature as evidence that the data is tamper proof.",
   "abstract": "Unlike traditional hedge funds that are rather secretive, the LendingRobot ledger shows detailed holdings and provides a \"hash code\" signature as evidence that the data is tamper-proof in the blockchain.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "funds recording trades to a public blockchain ledger",
    "weekly trade recording in the LendingRobot Series"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ebd86972d8817b0c1c80326ae5564476983cedba3f258ff3b2610f156b93fb50",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998097-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998097-011",
   "text": "Under PFIARA, private investment fund advisers with more than 150 million dollars of assets under management must register as investment advisers and disclose information about their trades and portfolios to the SEC.",
   "abstract": "PFIARA mandates private investment fund adviser registration to increase record keeping and disclosure. Under PFIARA, private investment fund advisers with more than $150 million AUM must register as investment advisers and disclose information about their trades and portfolios to the SEC.58",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "United States",
    "Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0955054f49c7011d33c285579bb046e6b284e42755b10fd2546a728c202669d5",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998097-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998097-012",
   "text": "The private fund industry's central fear about Form PF was not the filing itself but eventual publicity: if the disclosures ever became public, competitors could reverse engineer fund strategies and largely eliminate managers' ability to generate absolute returns.",
   "abstract": "the industry feared that such information could at some point in the future be made public which would largely eliminate private investment fund managers' ability to make absolute returns for their clients as competitors would be able to reverse engineer their strategies. Apart",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Form PF disclosures held confidentially by the SEC"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0955054f49c7011d33c285579bb046e6b284e42755b10fd2546a728c202669d5",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3067615-005",
   "text": "Because whitepapers are not audited by any authority, the preliminary steps of the ICO roadmap, project announcement, executive summary, and investor comments, carry the burden of building market credibility and investor trust in the soundness of the project.",
   "abstract": "Whitepapers are not audited by any authority. Therefore these preliminary steps are crucial in order to build a general market credibility and investors' trust in the soundness of the project",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "standard ICO roadmap practice as of 2017"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "164ce15b9eb1e8847ebcb073f5b23a96b4974ad0308d77469a9455d4a1ebeb38",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3067615-025",
   "text": "ICOs provide the highest possible liquidity for investors at the very beginning of a platform's lifecycle, before the reporting, accounting, and legal infrastructure that gives the investing public assurance of underlying business success, so investors trade on very limited information and volatility of the tokens and the whole cryptocurrency market increases.",
   "abstract": "Because ICOs typically take place at the beginning of the lifecycle of a crypto business/platform, ICO investors typically invest - and the token exchange - on very limited information which increases volatility of the tokens and the entire cryptocurrency market.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "ICOs occurring at the beginning of a crypto business lifecycle"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "164ce15b9eb1e8847ebcb073f5b23a96b4974ad0308d77469a9455d4a1ebeb38",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3067615-037",
   "text": "ICO promoters should not allow tokens to be traded before the underlying protocol network or application is live, and should not use a landing page that focuses almost exclusively on the ICO while providing less content on the product, project, technology, and team.",
   "abstract": "Such practices include allowing tokens to be traded before underlying protocol network or application is live, using a landing page that focuses almost exclusively on the ICO with project timeline etc. but provides less content on product, project, technology, and team.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "emerging bad ICO practices identified in 2017"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "164ce15b9eb1e8847ebcb073f5b23a96b4974ad0308d77469a9455d4a1ebeb38",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3067615-038",
   "text": "ICO promoters should make significant and ongoing disclosures on vesting and lockup periods and should never manipulate the smart contract to change ICO sales rules mid-course during the offering.",
   "abstract": "Moreover, ICO promoters should include significant and ongoing disclosures on vesting and lockup periods, should never manipulate the smart contract to change ICO sales rules mid-course during the ICO.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "ongoing ICO sales governed by smart contracts"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "164ce15b9eb1e8847ebcb073f5b23a96b4974ad0308d77469a9455d4a1ebeb38",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3067615-039",
   "text": "ICO disclosures should be as clear as possible: promoters should avoid an unclear or uncertain use of proceeds pie chart and should be very clear on plans for converting cryptocurrency into actual company reserves.",
   "abstract": "Moreover, the ICO disclosures have to be as clear as possible and should avoid an unclear or uncertain use of proceeds pie chart and should be very clear on cryptocurrency conversion plans into actual company reserves.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "ICO issuers seeking to meet emerging good practice standards"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "164ce15b9eb1e8847ebcb073f5b23a96b4974ad0308d77469a9455d4a1ebeb38",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3117224-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3117224-007",
   "text": "The absence of mandatory disclosure requirements for ICOs leads many promoters to make irregular or no disclosures about the platform over time, producing a significant lack of transparency in the ICO market.",
   "abstract": "Moreover, the lack of mandatory disclosures for ICOs leads many promoters to make irregular or no disclosures about the platform as time passes, leading to a significant lack of transparency in the ICO market.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings The Top 25 Jurisdictions and Their Comparative Regulatory Responses (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3117224",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "83e9ccb9219a217d9fcfc5c098b897229ee7cf85623bee3ae22d2e986548466b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3117224-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3117224-011",
   "text": "Because ICOs give investors very limited assurances through upfront and continuous disclosures, the token market is highly volatile.",
   "abstract": "ICOs on the other hand, give investors very limited assurances through upfront and continuous disclosures, making the token market highly volatile.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings The Top 25 Jurisdictions and Their Comparative Regulatory Responses (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3117224",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "83e9ccb9219a217d9fcfc5c098b897229ee7cf85623bee3ae22d2e986548466b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3117224-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3117224-026",
   "text": "In Australia, an ICO that falls under the Corporations Act triggers additional disclosure requirements, for example where the ICO constitutes a managed investment scheme.",
   "abstract": "If an ICO/cryptocurrency falls under the Corporations Act, additional disclosures are triggered. For instance, an ICO might trigger a disclosure requirement if the ICO is a managed investment scheme (MIS).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings The Top 25 Jurisdictions and Their Comparative Regulatory Responses (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3117224",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Australia"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "83e9ccb9219a217d9fcfc5c098b897229ee7cf85623bee3ae22d2e986548466b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-027",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-027",
   "text": "The removal of checks and balances, agent monitoring, audit requirements, disclosure regimes, market pressure, and executive compensation schemes produces a qualitative shift in efficiency in the agency relationship and in corporate governance overall.",
   "abstract": "The removal of checks and balances in corporate governance, monitoring of agents, audit requirements, disclosure regimes, market pressure, executive agent compensation schemes, among many others, provides a qualitative shift in efficiency in the agency relationship",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3405660-010",
   "text": "Hedge fund disclosure to counterparties and investors relies on balance sheet concepts that are uninformative about the actual nature of market risk and credit risk exposures.",
   "abstract": "Disclosure by hedge funds to counterparties and investors are often made by using balance-sheet concepts, which are not informative about the nature of the exposures to market risk and credit risk.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "cf507b1833071765bc13a5605f38c2591582eca85f40869e38b6ff075c04d29d",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3405660-038",
   "text": "Under an indirect approach hedge funds can remain exempt from disclosure and transparency requirements because only the financial intermediaries are required to reveal the relevant information, which is why the approach reconciles secrecy with reduced information asymmetry.",
   "abstract": "At the same time, under an indirect regulatory approach, hedge funds can remain exempt from disclosure and transparency requirements. Only financial intermediaries are required to unveil that information.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "cf507b1833071765bc13a5605f38c2591582eca85f40869e38b6ff075c04d29d",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3606663-012",
   "text": "The absence of mandatory disclosure obligations for ICOs leads promoters to make irregular disclosures or none at all as time passes, producing a significant lack of transparency in the ICO market.",
   "abstract": "Moreover, the lack of mandatory disclosures for ICOs leads many promoters to make irregular or no disclosures about the platform as time passes, leading to a significant lack of transparency in the ICO market.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "ICO markets without mandatory disclosure rules",
    "post issuance period"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "d1d4a15a293b715bb6a5a32e689f59c3a1587915039ba9a1cf4eeb8ee2a1e57c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-038",
   "text": "The key difference from the traditional venture capital model is that the DAOIC only makes its investment choices public and never provides investment analysis, so public co purchases are entirely voluntary.",
   "abstract": "The key difference from the traditional VC model is that even for the co-purchases through the market, the DAOIC only makes their investment choices public. The co-purchases by the public are entirely voluntary, the DAOIC never provides investment analysis etc.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "public co purchases alongside DAOIC deals"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4033886-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4033886-012",
   "text": "Digital asset fund valuation disputes are aggravated by nondisclosure: Polychain Capital told a redeeming investor that the fund's asset valuation policy would not be disclosed.",
   "abstract": "Upon request, Polychain Capital told Greenhouse the fund's asset valuation policy would not be disclosed.16",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Hayley Howe, Digital Asset Valuation (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4033886",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private digital asset funds",
    "Polychain Capital redemption dispute"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "52ba05b1292b1be4bfaf1ee5cf56b14fea9c196d870603e794d7ee316df129bd",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4796714-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4796714-019",
   "text": "Mandatory AI use reporting fails as a transparency mechanism because it assumes accurate and complete disclosure, while regulated entities have incentives to underreport or misreport in order to avoid scrutiny and regulatory burdens.",
   "abstract": "However, this approach assumes that entities will accurately and fully disclose their AI applications and potential issues. There may be incentives for underreporting or misreporting to avoid scrutiny or regulatory burdens, which could undermine the effectiveness of the regulations.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies to self reporting mandates such as the White House AI reporting proposals",
    "holds where disclosure is unverified"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "59fa63bae179e8f9b6b8efbdf90cee28400276512a1b04f9f579a48641305c93",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "70 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'disclosure'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}