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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2150377-007",
   "text": "Under the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act, hedge funds with more than $150 million in assets under management must register as investment advisers and disclose information about their trades and portfolios to the SEC, making assets under management the operative trigger for the regime.",
   "abstract": "Under the PFIARA, hedge funds with more than $150 million assets under management (AUM) are required to register as investment advisers and have to disclose information about their trades and portfolios to the SEC.81",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
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   "text": "Because Title IV's registration exemptions are broad enough to threaten the rule they qualify, the Dodd-Frank Act deliberately gives the SEC rulemaking authority to keep the exemptions from swallowing the rules.",
   "abstract": "The Dodd-Frank Act also empowers the SEC to utilize its rulemaking authority to prevent the exemptions from registration to \"swallow the rules.\"100",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
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   "text": "Quarterly rather than annual Form PF updating for large hedge fund advisers is designed for timeliness: its purpose is to give the Financial Stability Oversight Council data current enough to identify emerging trends in systemic risk.",
   "abstract": "Mandatory quarterly reporting for large hedge fund advisers in the United States aligns with international trends and is intended \"to provide the FSOC with timely data to identify emerging trends in systemic risk.\"151",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
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   "text": "This Article reports the first survey study of hedge fund advisers conducted after the SEC's registration effective date, drawing on a population of 1267 private fund advisers who registered before March 30, 2012.",
   "abstract": "This Article presents the results of the first survey study with hedge fund advisers after the SEC's registration effective date. The population consists of 1267 private fund advisers who registered before the SEC's registration effective date for private funds, March 30, 2012.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
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   "text": "Advisers responded to Dodd-Frank registration mainly through administrative and advisory adjustments: the most common actions were outsourcing compliance work, hiring additional counsel, instituting new record keeping policies, hiring additional staff, changing marketing materials, and changing investor communications.",
   "abstract": "The most common actions taken include: (1) outsourced compliance work, (2) hired additional counsel, (3) instituted new record-keeping policies, (4) hired additional staff, (5) changed marketing materials, and (6) changed communications with investors.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
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    "survey respondents, n=94",
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   "text": "Structural and portfolio level responses to registration were rare: only a minority of respondents severed an advising relationship, changed a fund's legal structure, liquidated positions, changed investment styles, changed portfolio structure, or closed funds to new investors.",
   "abstract": "A minority of respondents: (1) severed an advising relationship, (2) changed funds' (legal) structure, (3) liquidated positions, (4) changed investment styles, (5) changed portfolio structure, or (6) closed funds to new investors.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
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   "text": "A majority of surveyed advisers, 72.09%, do not plan any strategic response to the Dodd-Frank Act registration and reporting requirements.",
   "abstract": "Figure 4.0 indicates that a majority (72.09%) of survey respondents do not plan a strategic response to the Dodd-Frank Act registration and reporting requirements.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
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   "text": "Compliance with the registration and disclosure requirements cost a majority of surveyed advisers between $50,000 and $200,000, while a significant minority estimated total compliance cost from $200,000 to over $400,000.",
   "abstract": "A majority of respondents found the compliance cost will range from $50,000 to $200,000. However, a significant minority estimates the total compliance cost will range from $200,000 to over $400,000.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
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   "text": "The regulatory regime does not drive fund sizing for most advisers: 82.02% of respondents would not take the current regulatory regime into account in determining the assets under management size of their funds.",
   "abstract": "Of those who responded, 82.02% would not have taken the current regulatory regime into account in determining the AUM size of their funds.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
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    "respondents to survey Questions 7.a and 7.b"
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2150377-029",
   "text": "Registration and disclosure costs had not reached investors at the time of the survey: 76.09% of respondents reported that their investors' rate of return was not affected, while 23.91% believed investors would be affected.",
   "abstract": "Of those who responded, 76.09% stated that their investors' rate of return has not been affected by the registration and disclosure requirements, whereas 23.91% of respondents believe their investors will be affected by the registration and disclosure requirements.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "respondents to survey Questions 11a and 11b",
    "measured within three months of the registration effective date"
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2150377-031",
   "text": "Of the respondents reporting an effect on management company profits, 87.50% attributed it specifically to increased costs and decreased profits caused by the registration and reporting requirements.",
   "abstract": "Of those who responded, 87.50% indicated that the profits of their investment company were affected by increased costs and decreased profits as a result of the registration and reporting requirements.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
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    "the 78.26% of respondents who reported that management company profits were affected"
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-032",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2150377-032",
   "text": "Registration and disclosure did not push advisers to change what they invest in: only 2.44% of respondents said they would have to change strategy significantly over five years, while 4.88% expressly reported no strategy change.",
   "abstract": "Only 2.44% of respondents indicated that they would have to change their strategy significantly as a result of the registration and disclosure requirements, but 4.88% reported that the new requirements would not result in a strategy change.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
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   "is_failure_mode": false,
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2150377-035",
   "text": "Prior surveys of hedge fund manager expectations left the central questions unanswered because they were fielded before the registration effective date and used substantially smaller samples, so they measured anticipation rather than experience.",
   "abstract": "These prior studies left many questions unanswered because they were conducted before the registration effective date and had substantially lower sample sizes.204",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
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    "surveys conducted before March 30, 2012",
    "including the EisnerAmper and Rothstein Kass studies"
   ],
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2150377-036",
   "text": "Despite documented cost concerns, the hedge fund industry appears to be only modestly affected by the Dodd-Frank reporting and disclosure requirements and is adapting well to the new regulatory environment.",
   "abstract": "Despite these concerns, the hedge fund industry appears to be only modestly affected by the Dodd-Frank reporting and disclosure requirements and is adapting well to the new regulatory environment.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "the first months after the March 30, 2012 registration effective date",
    "survey respondents, n=94"
   ],
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2150377-038",
   "text": "Quick absorption of registration costs does not settle the policy question: even if advisers absorb the reported cost implications relatively quickly after registration, the long-term cost implications of registration and reporting obligations could still affect the private fund industry.",
   "abstract": "Although hedge fund advisers may absorb the reported cost implications of registration and disclosure rules relatively quickly after registration, the long-term cost implications of registration and reporting obligations could affect the private fund industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private fund industry beyond the short observation window of this study"
   ],
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-041",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2150377-041",
   "text": "The study's findings are bounded in time: because the data was collected within three months of the registration effective date, the study shows trends and perceptions but does not provide insights on the long-term implications of the registration and disclosure requirements.",
   "abstract": "Although this study shows trends and perceptions within the industry, it does not provide insights on the long-term implications of the registration and disclosure requirements because the data was collected within a relatively short time period after the registration requirements took effect.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-001",
   "text": "Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act represents the most significant regulatory change in the history of the hedge fund industry, imposing mandatory adviser registration and disclosure for the first time since the industry's inception.",
   "abstract": "Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act introduced the most significant regulatory change in the history of the hedge fund industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
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   "scope_conditions": [],
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-002",
   "text": "Contrary to the hedge fund industry's claim that increased supervision and disclosure would harm profitability, the authors find statistical evidence that the Dodd-Frank Act requirements had a positive effect on hedge fund performance.",
   "abstract": "Contrary to the hedge fund industry's claims that increased supervision and disclosure would affect their profitability, we find statistical evidence of a positive effect of the requirements introduced by the Dodd- Frank Act on hedge fund performance.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "US hedge fund advisers subject to Title IV",
    "sample period January to October 2012"
   ],
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-003",
   "text": "The hedge fund adviser registration requirement under the Dodd-Frank Act creates a discontinuity in hedge fund returns at the registration effective date of March 30, 2012.",
   "abstract": "The registration requirement for hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act creates a discontinuity in hedge fund returns at the registration effective date, March 30, 2012.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "threshold of $150 million assets under management",
    "registration effective date March 30, 2012"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-005",
   "text": "Dodd-Frank Act compliance costs reduce the profitability of hedge fund advisers' investment management companies, but registration and disclosure requirements do not appear to reduce the returns of the hedge funds themselves.",
   "abstract": "However, while Dodd-Frank Act compliance costs affect the profitability of hedge fund advisors' investment management companies, registration and disclosure requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act do not seem to affect the returns of hedge funds (Kaal 2013a).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "distinction between adviser management company profits and fund returns"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0e1c4615b104821577498d9655de43b9c5c3e985bb0215f56c038b8232be65c3",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-006",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-006",
   "text": "Analyst estimates place the annual cost of Dodd-Frank Act registration and disclosure compliance for hedge fund advisers in a range from $50,000 to $400,000 per year.",
   "abstract": "Some analysts estimate that the cost will range from $50,000 to $400,000 per year (Kaal 2013a and 2013b).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "estimates by analysts, not measured by the authors"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0e1c4615b104821577498d9655de43b9c5c3e985bb0215f56c038b8232be65c3",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-007",
   "text": "Hedge fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act positively affects adviser returns in March 2012, but the effect does not persist in the months after the registration effective date.",
   "abstract": "We find evidence that hedge fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act positively affects hedge fund adviser returns in March 2012, but this effect is not persistent in the subsequent months after the registration effective date for hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "sample of 2145 US hedge fund advisers",
    "monthly data January to October 2012"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0e1c4615b104821577498d9655de43b9c5c3e985bb0215f56c038b8232be65c3",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-008",
   "text": "The authors find no empirical evidence that hedge fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act negatively affects hedge fund performance, contradicting the industry's claims.",
   "abstract": "Contrary to the claims of the hedge fund industry, we find no empirical evidence that would suggest that hedge fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act negatively affects hedge fund performance.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "US hedge fund advisers subject to Title IV",
    "January to October 2012 earnings data"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0e1c4615b104821577498d9655de43b9c5c3e985bb0215f56c038b8232be65c3",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-009",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-009",
   "text": "No prior study had analyzed the performance implications of hedge fund adviser regulation, making this the first estimate of the causal effect of the Dodd-Frank Act registration requirement on hedge fund returns.",
   "abstract": "To our knowledge, no other study has analyzed the implications of hedge fund adviser regulation.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "as of the paper's 2014 version"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0e1c4615b104821577498d9655de43b9c5c3e985bb0215f56c038b8232be65c3",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-022",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-022",
   "text": "The discontinuity in hedge fund earnings at the registration effective date is positive, which is the opposite of what the hedge fund industry expected the Dodd-Frank Act to produce.",
   "abstract": "Figure 8 suggests that the requirements introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act create a positive effect on hedge fund performance. By contrast, the hedge fund industry expected the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act to result in negative effects on hedge fund returns.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "March 30, 2012 registration effective date",
    "$150 million AUM threshold"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0e1c4615b104821577498d9655de43b9c5c3e985bb0215f56c038b8232be65c3",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-038",
   "text": "The finding that Dodd-Frank Act registration does not depress hedge fund returns is consistent with prior evidence that higher administrative costs are only a second-order effect of the regulation.",
   "abstract": "Kaal (2013a) finds non-robust evidence that the higher administrative costs imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act are a second-order effect of the regulation, thereby not affecting the overall returns of hedge funds.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "evidence in the prior study described as non-robust"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0e1c4615b104821577498d9655de43b9c5c3e985bb0215f56c038b8232be65c3",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-001",
   "text": "Five years after the Dodd-Frank Act, the private fund industry is most affected by the uncertainty and the higher costs the Act generates, yet on multiple metrics the industry is coping well with the evolving post Dodd-Frank regulatory landscape.",
   "abstract": "The findings in this study suggest that the industry is mostly affected by the uncertainty and higher costs associated with the Act, but under multiple metrics the industry appears to be coping well overall with the evolving post Dodd- Frank Act regulatory landscape.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey of a population of 1267 registered investment advisers, N=69 respondents",
    "United States, post Title IV registration"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-002",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-002",
   "text": "The private fund industry is adjusting well to the evolving post Dodd-Frank regulatory landscape, and the long-term impact of that landscape is much less intense than the industry itself initially anticipated.",
   "abstract": "This Article demonstrates that the private fund industry is adjusting well to the evolving regulatory landscape pertaining to it. The long-term impact of the evolving post Dodd-Frank Act regulatory landscape appears to be much less intense than the industry initially anticipated.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "registered U.S. private fund advisers five years after enactment"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-003",
   "text": "The long-term cost implications of Title IV registration and reporting obligations are absorbed relatively quickly after registration, so that Dodd-Frank compliance costs are largely manageable depending on the size of the investment adviser.",
   "abstract": "The long-term cost implications of registration and reporting obligations as reported in this study appear to be absorbed relatively quickly after registration. The costs of compliance associated with the Dodd-Frank Act are, depending on size of the investment adviser, largely manageable.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "cost absorption measured after the initial registration period",
    "manageability varies with adviser size"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-004",
   "text": "Although the industry adapted well to the post Dodd-Frank environment, the Act has already produced some negative effects on the private fund industry and may produce further negative long-term effects.",
   "abstract": "Nevertheless, the findings of this study show that the Act has already had some negative effects on the industry and that it may have some negative long-term effects.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "based on survey responses about the next five years"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-018",
   "text": "A majority of private fund adviser respondents, 74.5 percent, do not plan any strategic response to Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act.",
   "abstract": "majority (74.5%) of private fund adviser respondents do not plan a strategic response to Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "N=69 survey respondents",
    "strategic response understood as action to avoid or limit the impact of Title IV"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-022",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-022",
   "text": "Compliance cost is a significant issue for the private fund industry: a majority of respondents put Dodd-Frank compliance costs between $50,000 and $200,000, while a significant minority estimates total compliance cost between $200,000 and over $400,000.",
   "abstract": "Compliance costs are a significant issue for the private fund industry. A majority of respondents found Dodd-Frank compliance costs to range from $50,000 to $200,000. However, a significant minority estimates the total compliance cost will range from $200,000 to over $400,000.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "N=69 survey respondents",
    "cost defined as actual expenses incurred"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-025",
   "text": "Reported compliance time tracks reported compliance cost: a clear majority of adviser respondents spent fewer than 500 hours complying with Title IV, while a noticeable minority of 11.5 percent estimated more than 1000 hours.",
   "abstract": "estimates pertaining to compliance time are consistent with their estimates pertaining to compliance cost. Although a clear majority of adviser respondents spent fewer than 500 hours to comply with Title IV, a noticeable minority (11.5%) estimated compliance time at more than 1000 hours.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "N=69 survey respondents",
    "time treated as a proxy for cost"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-028",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-028",
   "text": "The majority of private fund advisers in the United States are not considering changing their assets under management in order to lower Dodd-Frank compliance costs, notwithstanding the $150 million registration threshold and the $1.5 billion Form PF quarterly reporting threshold.",
   "abstract": "the majority response to Survey Question 7 implies that the majority of private fund advisers in the United States are not considering changing their AUM in order to lower their Dodd-Frank Act compliance costs.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "inference from responses to survey question 7",
    "$150 million registration threshold and $1.5 billion Form PF threshold in force"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-033",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-033",
   "text": "Sixty five percent of adviser survey respondents believed that their fund earnings were not affected by the Dodd-Frank Act.",
   "abstract": "Figure 16 shows that 65% of adviser survey respondents believed that fund earnings were not affected by the Dodd-Frank Act.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "responses to survey question 11 on fund earnings and net rate of return to investors"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-038",
   "text": "The long-term effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private investment fund industry is likely to be characterized by increasing additional expenses and associated barriers to entry for new market entrants.",
   "abstract": "Given these survey results, it seems possible that the long- term effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private investment fund industry is characterized by increasing additional expenses and associated levels of barriers to entry for market entrants.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "inference from respondent forecasts for the next five years"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-001",
   "text": "Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act ended more than fifty years during which the hedge fund industry operated under low-level regulatory oversight, constituting a tectonic shift in the regulatory framework for private funds.",
   "abstract": "Over fifty years of low-level regulatory oversight for the hedge fund in- dustry ended with Title IV.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "United States private fund industry",
    "period following the 2010 enactment of Title IV"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-003",
   "text": "The reporting obligations imposed on private fund advisers by Form PF raised regulatory oversight of private funds to unprecedented levels.",
   "abstract": "Reporting obligations on Form PF72 increase the regulatory oversight of pri- vate funds to unprecedented levels.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "SEC-registered private fund advisers",
    "after Form PF became operative in 2012"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-004",
   "text": "Prior survey evidence indicates that the hedge fund industry adjusted well to the Dodd-Frank registration and disclosure requirements, and that the actual impact of those rules was much less significant than the private fund industry had feared.",
   "abstract": "In summary, prior surveys suggest that the hedge fund industry seems to be adjusting well to the registration and disclosure requirements of Dodd- Frank. The impact of the registration and disclosure rules appears to be much less significant than feared by the private fund industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "short-term period immediately following the 2012 effective date",
    "based on survey responses from registered private fund advisers"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-009",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-009",
   "text": "Smaller private funds spend more on compliance than larger ones, both as a share of AUM and relative to operating costs, which means increasing regulatory scrutiny falls disproportionately on smaller funds.",
   "abstract": "Smaller private funds spend more on compliance costs than their larger counterparts—both as a percentage of AUM and in relation to oper- ating costs; this suggests that increasing regulatory scrutiny disproportionately impacts smaller funds.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private fund advisers subject to Dodd-Frank compliance obligations",
    "compliance measured as share of AUM and of operating costs"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-011",
   "text": "Because the Dodd-Frank Act discouraged banks from growing too large and made bank lending harder, private funds and other alternative lenders filled the resulting void by financing small and medium sized businesses that traditional banks no longer served.",
   "abstract": "In essence, because the Dodd-Frank Act discouraged banks from getting too big, private funds and other alternative lenders filled the void, providing fi- nancing to the small- and medium-size businesses that traditional banks were no longer equipped to serve.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "United States lending markets after Dodd-Frank",
    "small and medium sized business borrowers"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-019",
   "text": "The decline in survey response rate between 2012 and 2015 is itself evidence of the private fund industry's relatively rapid adaptation to the new statutory and regulatory regime.",
   "abstract": "The decline in response rate may itself be suggestive of the relatively rapid adaptation to changes brought about by the new statutory and regulatory regime.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "comparison of 2012 and 2015 responses from the same adviser population"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-021",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-021",
   "text": "The share of advisers reporting that they changed their communications with investors nearly doubled from 25 percent in 2012 to 47 percent in 2015, a shift the author attributes to advisers increasing investor communications on advice of counsel.",
   "abstract": "a substantially higher rate of responses (47% in 2015 versus 25% in 2012) suggests that respondents changed their communications with investors. Since 2012, many private fund advisers have changed and increased their communications with in- vestors, often based on advice from counsel.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey respondents in 2012 and 2015"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-022",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-022",
   "text": "Although rare in absolute terms, structural responses grew: at least part of the industry is increasingly changing the legal structure of its funds and closing funds to new investors in response to the post-2012 regulatory changes.",
   "abstract": "Most notably, the comparative data in Figure 4 suggest that at least a part of the industry is increasingly changing the legal structure of their fund(s) and closing funds to new investors in response to the regulatory changes",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "least common actions reported in the 2012 and 2015 surveys",
    "rates doubled or tripled between the two surveys from a low base"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-024",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-024",
   "text": "Between 2012 and 2015 the annual cost of Dodd-Frank compliance doubled for many survey respondents, moving from the $50,000 to $100,000 range into the $100,000 to $200,000 range.",
   "abstract": "In fact, the data suggest that the annual cost of compliance doubled for many survey respon- dents, moving from the $50,000 to $100,000 range to the $100,000 to $200,000 range.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "respondents to the 2012 and 2015 surveys",
    "self-reported total compliance costs"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-025",
   "text": "The shift of reported compliance hours out of the 251 to 500 hour band and into the 100 to 250 hour band suggests the industry became more effective at satisfying Dodd-Frank reporting obligations between 2012 and 2015.",
   "abstract": "One possible explanation is that the industry became more effective in satisfying the reporting obligations of Dodd-Frank in the interim between 2012 and 2015.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "hours reported for Dodd-Frank Act compliance specifically, not all federal regulation"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-032",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-032",
   "text": "A majority of respondents in both surveys, 76.1 percent in 2012 and 65 percent in 2015, believed the Dodd-Frank Act did not affect their reporting funds' earnings.",
   "abstract": "Figure 16 illustrates that the majority of survey respondents in both the 2012 survey (76.1%) and 2015 survey (65%) believed that the Dodd-Frank Act did not affect reporting funds' earnings.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey respondents in 2012 and 2015",
    "perceived effect on fund earnings, not measured returns"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-036",
   "text": "By 2015 a clear majority of respondents, 93 percent, attributed effects on their investment management company's profits to additional expenses associated with the Dodd-Frank Act, and no respondent reported no additional expenses, compared with 19 percent in 2012.",
   "abstract": "Figure 19 illustrates that a clear majority of respondents in 2015 (93%) be- lieved that the profits of their investment management company were affected by additional expenses associated with the Dodd Frank Act.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey respondents reporting on management company profits",
    "2012 and 2015 surveys"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-037",
   "text": "Even though the Dodd-Frank Act's overall regulatory impact on the private fund industry was low, the compliance costs generated by the evolving regulatory environment carry many unexpected consequences with the potential to further reshape industry practices.",
   "abstract": "Despite the low regulatory impact of the Dodd-Frank Act overall, this article indicates that compliance costs associated with the evolving regulatory environment for private fund advisers have many unexpected consequences that could have the potential to further shape industry practices.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private fund advisers",
    "period from 2012 to 2015"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-039",
   "text": "The comparative evidence suggests the long-term effects of the evolving post-Dodd-Frank regulatory environment may be more substantial than either the industry or regulators initially anticipated.",
   "abstract": "The comparative evidence in this study suggests that long-term ef- fects of the evolving post-Dodd-Frank-Act regulatory environment might be more substantial than the industry and regulators initially anticipated.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private fund advisers and their reporting funds",
    "based on 2015 responses citing lower returns and plans to consolidate or close funds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811729-007",
   "text": "Post-crisis legislation accelerated the convergence of mutual funds and private funds, because the registration and increased disclosure requirements the Dodd-Frank Act imposed on certain private fund advisers subject them to substantively the same obligations that apply to advisers of mutual funds.",
   "abstract": "The registration and increased disclosure requirements for certain private fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act subject those managers to substantively the same registration and reporting obligations as those that apply to advisers to mutual funds.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private fund advisers required to register under the Dodd-Frank Act"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0877b0a076f2614559cb0b1a736f73401cecbee7cfe014da6e36709208e92a74",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-021",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811729-021",
   "text": "Among the factors driving unconstrained mutual fund growth, the Dodd-Frank Act decreased the number of eligible private fund investors by raising the minimum net worth requirement for individuals to qualify as accredited investors.",
   "abstract": "Second, the Dodd-Frank Act decreased the number of eligible private fund investors by raising the minimum net-worth requirement for individuals to qualify as \"accredited investors,\"",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "individuals near the accredited investor net worth threshold after Dodd-Frank"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0877b0a076f2614559cb0b1a736f73401cecbee7cfe014da6e36709208e92a74",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-001",
   "text": "Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 is the most significant regulatory change in the history of the private fund industry, ending decades in which the industry operated with little regulatory supervision.",
   "abstract": "Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 introduced the most significant regulatory change in the history of the private fund industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "United States private fund industry",
    "post 2010"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-002",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-002",
   "text": "Attempts to rescind Title IV through the Investment Advisers Modernization Act of 2016 demonstrate that private fund registration and disclosure obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act are highly politically sensitive.",
   "abstract": "Politician's attempts to rescind Title IV via the Investment Advisers Modernization Act of 2016 (IAMA 2016) illustrate the highly politically sensitive nature of Dodd-Frank Act registration and disclosure obligations for the private fund industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "United States",
    "2016 legislative context"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-003",
   "text": "Using self-reported Morningstar earnings data for 3,424 US private fund advisers covering 2010 to 2015 in multiple regression discontinuity designs with robustness checks, private fund adviser registration and disclosure under the Dodd-Frank Act had no significant effect on private fund adviser returns.",
   "abstract": "Based on the evidence in multiple RD designs including robustness checks, we conclude that private fund adviser registration and disclosure under the Dodd-Frank Act had no significant effect on private fund adviser returns.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "US based private fund advisers subject to Title IV",
    "2010 to 2015 monthly earnings data",
    "registration effective date March 30, 2012 as the discontinuity"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-004",
   "text": "The evidence contradicts the private fund industry's claim that private fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act negatively affects private fund performance.",
   "abstract": "This evidence contradicts claims of the private fund industry that private fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act negatively affects private fund performance.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "US private fund advisers",
    "2010 to 2015"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-006",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-006",
   "text": "Dodd-Frank Act compliance costs fall most heavily on advisers managing the largest number of reporting funds, because private fund advisers incur roughly $10,000 in compliance cost per reporting fund.",
   "abstract": "Because private fund advisers incur about $10,000 compliance cost per reporting fund (Kaal 2013a), Dodd-Frank Act compliance costs are highest for those advisers in our dataset with the highest number of reporting funds under management.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "advisers with multiple reporting funds",
    "per fund cost estimate from Kaal 2013a"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-007",
   "text": "A second channel by which Title IV could lower performance is risk reduction: private fund advisers have expressed concern that regulation will force them to take on less risk and therefore earn lower returns.",
   "abstract": "Second, some private fund advisers have expressed concern that regulation will force them to take on less risk (Kaal 2013a), therefore lowering performance.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "advisers subject to registration and disclosure"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-009",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-009",
   "text": "Surveys of private fund managers conducted in 2012 and 2015 show that a clear majority of managers believed increased compliance costs negatively affect the industry.",
   "abstract": "Kaal (2013a, 2016b) demonstrated in surveys of private fund managers conducted in 2012 and 2015 that a clear majority of private fund managers believed that increased compliance costs negatively affect the industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey respondents among private fund managers",
    "2012 and 2015 surveys"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-011",
   "text": "Estimates of annual Dodd-Frank Act compliance cost for private fund advisers range from $50,000 to $400,000 per year.",
   "abstract": "Some estimates suggest that compliance cost will range from $50,000 to $400,000 per year (Kaal 2013a and 2015b).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "registered private fund advisers",
    "estimates drawn from prior work"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-015",
   "text": "Beyond the authors' own prior work, there is no other empirical evidence on the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private fund industry.",
   "abstract": "We are not aware of any other empirical evidence on the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private fund industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "as of the paper's writing in 2016"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-033",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-033",
   "text": "Relative to existing work, this study uses a much larger dataset and a more sophisticated empirical approach, regression discontinuity, and finds no statistical evidence for an effect of Dodd-Frank Act requirements on private fund advisers' performance.",
   "abstract": "Compared with the existing prior work, in this study, we use a much larger dataset and a more sophisticated empirical approach such as regression discontinuity. We find no statistical evidence for an effect of the requirements introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act on private fund advisers' performance.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "comparison to prior studies of Dodd-Frank effects on private funds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "62 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'dodd-frank-act'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}