# Dodd frank

`kaal:entity:dodd-frank`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 51 claims that carry the concept tag `dodd-frank`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

51 claims across 17 works, 2010 to 2017.

**2010**

- [1558614-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-037) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The Dodd-Frank Act is notable for what it omits: it does not break up the largest banks, does little to help smaller and regional banks compete, and because compliance is burdensome and expensive may actually have raised the barrier to entry into financial services.
  > It does little to help smaller and regional banks compete with the big banks. Because complying with regulation is burdensome and expensive, the Act may have raised the barrier for entry into the financial services industry.
  Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614
- [1558614-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-038) [predictive/argued] -- Dodd-Frank's mandatory risk committee is a significant change because most boards then delegated risk oversight to the audit committee, and it may generate new litigation if committee composition or alleged committee failure becomes a basis for shareholder suits.
  > This requirement also could result in more litigation if the composition of the risk committee or its alleged fail- ure to do its job appropriately becomes a basis for additional share- holder suits.
  Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**2011**

- [1765901-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-021) [condition/argued] -- Unless courts can construe Morrison for swap agreements and other derivatives consistently with both the logic and the language of the opinion, Congress will have to enact new clarifying legislation.
  > Unless courts can clearly construe Morrison in the context of swap agreements and other derivative securities, in a manner that is consistent with the logic as well as the language of the Court's opinion, Congress will have to enact new legislation that clarifies this issue.
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1765901-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-023) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- On its face Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act addresses only the jurisdiction of the district courts and does not expand the geographic scope of the substantive provisions of U.S. securities law.
  > On its face, the language of Section 929P(b) does not expand the geographic scope of substantive regula- tory provisions of the U.S. Securities laws.
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1765901-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-024) [predictive/argued] -- There is a substantial likelihood that U.S. courts will read the Dodd-Frank Act as giving some extraterritorial effect to SEC and DOJ suits, so Morrison cannot be expected to survive intact in actions brought under Section 929P(b).
  > There is substantial likelihood that U.S. courts could find that Congress has provided for some extraterritorial effect for SEC and DOJ suits in the Dodd-Frank Act and that therefore Morrison cannot be upheld in its entirety in suits by the SEC or the DOJ under Section 929P(b).
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1765901-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-025) [condition/argued] -- Section 929P(b) may not have been necessary, because Section 10(b) already gives the SEC enforcement authority whenever a single U.S. securities transaction is affected by the alleged fraud.
  > Section 929P(b) furthermore may not have been necessary. Section 10(b) al- ready gives the SEC enforcement authority whenever a single U.S. securities transaction is affected by the alleged fraud.
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1765901-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-027) [normative/argued] -- Read as more than a jurisdictional grant, the Dodd-Frank provision becomes an open-ended statute rather than the targeted authority the SEC already held under Section 10(b) and Section 30, and it is undesirable for the SEC to use such powers unilaterally without consulting foreign regulators and the U.S. foreign policy establishment.
  > To the extent the provision gives the SEC additional powers, it may not be desirable that the SEC use these powers unilaterally without consulting with both foreign se- curities regulators and the United States foreign policy establishment.
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1765901-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-030) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Overuse of the Dodd-Frank extraterritorial enforcement provision by the SEC or the DOJ could deter foreign companies from having U.S. operations.
  > Overuse of this provision by the SEC or DOJ could deter foreign companies from having U.S. operations.
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1765901-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-034) [normative/asserted] -- Regardless of what the SEC study concludes, Congress should decline to reinstate private rights of action in foreign-cubed cases.
  > An SEC study of private rights of action is also required by the Dodd-Frank Act, but regardless of the outcome of this study, Congress should decline to reinstate private rights of action in "foreign-cubed" cases.
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1765901-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-036) [design/argued] -- Because of the ambiguities in Morrison and Dodd-Frank and the consequences of a broad reading for persons and companies in European and other jurisdictions, Congress should clarify its intent in Section 929P(b) with respect to SEC and DOJ suits over securities transactions outside the United States.
  > Congress should also clarify its intent in Section 929P(b) with respect to SEC and DOJ suits over securities transac- tions outside the United States.
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1806252-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-004) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Asymmetric hedge fund regulation, in which Dodd-Frank and the AIFM Directive regulate banks and hedge funds separately and differently, is counterproductive.
  > Asymmetric hedge fund regulation in Dodd—Frank and the AIFM Directive is counterproductive.
  Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252
- [1806252-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-009) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Regulators who obtain hedge funds' proprietary information could inadvertently pass it to third parties, and because that information is highly valuable to competitors in the same markets, such leakage could undermine trading strategies and the long-term viability of hedge funds.
  > The confidential nature of this information makes it highly valuable for third parties who engage in the same markets as the owner of the proprietary information, and this form of leakage could undermine trading strategies and the long-term viability of hedge funds.
  Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252
- [1806252-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-027) [condition/argued] -- Even combining hedge fund regulation via Basel III rules with the de minimis investment rules in Dodd-Frank could leave some issues open, and calibrating such a regulatory combination requires time and experience.
  > Even the combination of hedge fund regulation via rules in Basel III and de minimis investment rules in Dodd—Frank could leave open some issues. The calibration of such a regulatory combination requires time and experience.
  Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252
- [1806252-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-033) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Requiring advisers to adopt written policies to prevent and detect securities law violations presumes those violations are foreseeable, yet because Dodd-Frank substantially changed securities law, the foreseeability of potential violations is itself further curtailed.
  > But because securities law has been substantially changed under the Dodd—Frank Act, the foreseeability of potential violations could be further curtailed.
  Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252

**2012**

- [1998455-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-025) [predictive/argued] -- The political economy of financial regulation ensures that the expansion of regulatory oversight induced by Dodd-Frank will be followed by a phase of relaxation, since historically the introduction of regulatory regimes after a crisis is followed by a gradual easing of regulatory strictures.
  > The political economy of financial regulation ensures that af- ter the Dodd-Frank-induced expansion of regulatory oversight there will be a subsequent phase of relaxation of regulatory over- sight.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455
- [2061166-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-001) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Where bank resolution regimes are not coordinated across jurisdictions, the same systemically important financial institution can be handled in opposite ways: it might petition for reorganization under German law and emerge leaner and more competitive, while its United States operations are liquidated under the Boxer Amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act.
  > it is possible that a SIFI with operations in multiple countries could petition for reorganization under German law, for instance, and emerge as a more competitive and leaner business while the same SIFI in the United States may be liquidated under the Boxer Amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act.
  Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

**2013**

- [2273857-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-005) [empirical/evidenced] -- Since 2002 United States corporate governance has been substantially upgraded twice in response to crises, following more than seventy years of comparative regulatory inactivity, a concentration of regulatory activity in a short timespan that is itself striking.
  > Since 2002, corporate governance in the United States has been, not just once but twice, substantially upgraded in response to crises, after more than seventy years of comparative regulatory inactivity.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-032) [empirical/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act were amended and revised, and some of their most controversial provisions were never enforced.
  > Both SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act were amended and revised. Some of their most controversial provisions were not enforced.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-036) [empirical/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The partial repeal of Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley through the Dodd-Frank Act illustrates that broad rules enacted during times of political expediency are often later retracted.
  > The partial repeal of section 404 of SOX70 via the Dodd-Frank Act is another example that illustrates how broad rules enacted during times of political expediency are often later retracted.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-038) [empirical/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act exemptions for emerging growth companies from Section 404(b), from say-on-pay, and from pay ratio disclosure illustrate the post-crisis easing of constraints imposed on the financial services industry.
  > These exemptions again illustrate the easing of constraints imposed on the financial services industry after a crisis.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2317580-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-008) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Sarbanes-Oxley and the Dodd-Frank Act have influenced and shaped fiduciary duties, but they have not necessarily improved or clarified them.
  > The Sarbanes-Oxley Act20 and the Dodd-Frank Act have influenced and shaped fiduciary duties but have not necessarily improved and clarified them.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580
- [2337268-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-018) [mechanism/argued] -- Registration is the gateway that makes data collection and enhanced disclosure by hedge fund managers possible, and the Dodd-Frank Act raised disclosure requirements for registered advisers specifically to address systemic risk concerns.
  > The registration of investment advisers facilitates the collection of data and enhanced disclosure by hedge fund managers. The Dodd-Frank Act increased the disclosure requirements for registered investment advisers to address concerns over systemic risk.40
  Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268
- [2337268-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-029) [condition/asserted] -- The Dodd-Frank Act added an inflation adjustment to the qualified client standard, requiring the SEC to adjust any dollar amount test within one year of enactment and every five years thereafter.
  > If the SEC uses a net asset threshold or any other dollar-amount test to determine the qualified client standard for exemption under the IAA, the SEC is required to adjust the dollar-amount test for the effects of inflation within one year after enactment and every five years thereafter.91
  Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268
- [2337268-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-032) [design/argued] -- The Dodd-Frank Act tightened custodial practice by requiring safeguards for client assets and verification by independent accountants, a response to concerns over theft and client exposure to Ponzi schemes.
  > In 2010, in an effort to address concerns over theft and to lower clients' exposure to the risks of Ponzi schemes, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the IAA, heightening custodial practices by requiring safeguards for client assets and the use of independent accountants to verify assets.96
  Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-025) [definitional/asserted] -- The common denominator between the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, and other reform proposals is a top down regulatory approach of direct regulatory intervention with stable and supposedly optimal rules.
  > a noteworthy common denominator between SOX and Dodd-Frank and other reform proposals is the use of a top down regulatory approach, i.e. direct regulatory intervention with stable and supposedly optimal rules.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

**2014**

- [2389423-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389423-001) [empirical/evidenced] -- This study finds no evidence of an inverse relationship between the size of regulated hedge fund advisers and the per-unit cost of compliance, contrary to the common complaint that financial regulation brings increasing returns to scale.
  > The author finds no evidence of an inverse relationship between the size of regulated hedge fund advisers and the per-unit cost of compliance.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423
- [2389423-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389423-004) [empirical/asserted] -- Before Title IV, launching a hedge fund could be accomplished by raising roughly $25 to $50 million, whereas after the Dodd-Frank Act the required initial amount may have risen to around $100 million.
  > Setting up a hedge fund before the enactment of Title IV could be accomplished by raising around $25-50 million. After the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, this number may have increased to around $100 million.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423
- [2389423-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389423-005) [condition/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Below $100 million in initial assets under management, the administrative cost of running a hedge fund in a post Dodd-Frank environment could be prohibitive.
  > Below $100 million in initial assets under management (AUM), the administrative cost of running a hedge fund in a post Dodd-Frank environment could be prohibitive (Kaal [2013]).
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423
- [2389423-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389423-015) [empirical/evidenced] -- Prior work shows that registration and the increased compliance requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act only marginally increase the cost structure of hedge funds.
  > requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act marginally increase the cost structure of hedge funds (Kaal [2013]).
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423
- [2389423-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389423-038) [empirical/evidenced] -- There is no evidence that private fund adviser regulation in Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act increases returns to scale, which counters the most damning putative concern raised about regulatory compliance costs.
  > There is no evidence that private fund adviser regulation in Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act increases returns to scale.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423
- [2447306-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2447306-001) [definitional/asserted] -- Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and the SEC rules implementing it produced a paradigm shift in United States private fund regulation, raising regulatory oversight of an industry that had been largely exempt to unprecedented levels.
  > Title IV and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules implementing the requirements under Title IV created a paradigm shift for the regulation of private funds in the United States, increasing the level of regulatory oversight to unprecedented levels.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306
- [2470008-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-015) [empirical/argued] -- The FSOC's powers over nonbank financial institutions are broad and without precedent in United States financial regulation.
  > The FSOC's powers over nonbank financial institutions are broad and unprecedented in U.S. financial regulation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008

**2016**

- [2714974-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-007) [definitional/asserted] -- Under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, hedge funds with more than $150 million in assets under management must register as investment advisers and disclose information about their trades and portfolios to the SEC.
  > Under PFIARA, hedge funds with more than $150 million AUM must register as investment advisers and disclose information about their trades and portfolios to the SEC.
  Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974
- [2714974-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-009) [empirical/evidenced] -- Contrary to the hedge fund industry's own predictions, the industry has absorbed Form PF quickly and the impact of the Dodd-Frank registration and disclosure rules has proven much less intense than the industry initially anticipated.
  > The hedge fund industry seems to be adjusting well to the registration and disclosure requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act, and the impact of the registration and disclosure rules appears to be much less intense than the hedge fund industry initially anticipated.
  Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974
- [2714974-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-010) [empirical/evidenced] -- The majority of hedge fund advisers spent less than $10,000 preparing their initial Form PF data reporting to the SEC, and subsequent annual filings cost about half of that initial amount.
  > The majority of hedge fund advisers incurred less than $10,000 to prepare their initial data reporting to the SEC, with the cost of subsequent annual Form PF filings at about half the initial cost (Kaal 2014).
  Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974
- [2714974-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-013) [empirical/evidenced] -- The cost of hedge fund manager registration under the Dodd-Frank Act brings increasing returns to scale for the industry, meaning compliance burdens fall disproportionately on smaller advisers.
  > Kaal shows that the cost of hedge fund manager registration under the Dodd-Frank Act brings increasing returns to scale for the industry (Kaal 2016a).
  Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974
- [2714974-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-039) [empirical/evidenced] -- The overall effects of enhanced hedge fund regulation are not as immense as industry representatives predicted, but there is evidence that the enhanced Dodd-Frank Act rules do increase compliance costs for the industry.
  > While the overall effects of enhanced hedge fund regulation are not as immense as hedge fund industry representatives had predicted, some evidence exists that enhanced rules under the Dodd-Frank Act increase the cost of compliance for the industry.
  Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974
- [2714974-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-040) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Higher compliance costs from hedge fund regulation can create barriers to entry for new market entrants and can accelerate consolidation of the hedge fund industry.
  > costs can lead to barriers to entry for new market entrants and can also accelerate the consolidation of the industry.
  Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974
- [2715083-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-002) [mechanism/argued] -- Regulatory convergence is not driven only by tightened post crisis rules: the liberalization of advertising restrictions after the Dodd-Frank Act also pushes hedge funds toward mutual fund form, so deregulation and reregulation work in the same convergent direction.
  > This is not just a result of more stringent regulations enacted via the Dodd-Frank Act in the aftermath of the financial crisis; the liberalization of the advertising restrictions post Dodd-Frank Act also makes hedge funds more like mutual funds.
  Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083
- [2715083-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-003) [mechanism/argued] -- Mandatory registration and increased disclosure for certain hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act place hedge fund advisers under registration and reporting obligations similar to those long borne by mutual fund advisers.
  > The registration and increased disclosure requirements for certain hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act subjects investment advisers to hedge funds to similar registration and reporting obligations as mutual fund advisers.
  Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083
- [2715083-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-025) [mechanism/evidenced] -- For the first time in the industry's history, the Dodd-Frank Act required most hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC, mandating disclosure of information previously treated as proprietary and private.
  > For the first time in the history of the hedge fund industry, the Dodd-Frank Act required most advisers to hedge funds to register with the SEC.
  Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083
- [2715083-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-028) [mechanism/argued] -- Confluence factors help move the hedge fund industry from the fringes of finance into recognition as part of mainstream finance, aided by increased oversight under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and the JOBS Act.
  > Factors associated with confluence of mutual and hedge funds help the hedge fund industry transition from an industry operating at the fringes of finance to be recognized as part of mainstream finance (Baghai et al. (2015) and Muhtaeb (2012)).
  Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083
- [2715083-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-031) [mechanism/argued] -- By tightening the accredited investor net worth standard, the Dodd-Frank Act pushes investors who lose eligibility for hedge fund investments toward hybrid and retail alternative funds, even if the number of affected investors is small.
  > While the number of such investors may be negligible, investors who no longer qualify for retail alternative fund investments under Dodd-Frank qualified investor standards are likely to seek out hybrid funds.
  Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083
- [2715083-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-032) [mechanism/argued] -- The Volcker Rule cuts banks off from direct hedge fund investment and thereby pushes them toward accessing hedge fund strategies through retail alternative funds, a shift that could be substantial given banks' prior role as major hedge fund investors.
  > By limiting banks' investments in derivatives and the hedge funds they sponsor,57 the Dodd-Frank Act limits access to hedge fund investments but incentivizes banks to access hedge fund strategies using a retail alternative fund.
  Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083
- [2748096-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2748096-010) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Any conclusion that hedge funds contributed to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 is circumstantial or anecdotal, because the data needed to test it, on leverage, counterparty relations, AUM, and portfolio holdings, were not collected for any substantial period before the crisis.
  > Without such data for a substantial time period before the financial crisis, concluding that hedge funds may have had a role in the financial crisis is circumstantial or anecdotal.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy A. Krause, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748096
- [2748096-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2748096-026) [design/asserted] -- Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act addresses alleged hedge fund systemic risk through an information strategy rather than a substantive one: it authorized the SEC to require registration and enhanced disclosure from private fund advisers and to facilitate data collection for assessing systemic risk.
  > The Dodd-Frank Act authorized the SEC to promulgate rules requiring registration and enhanced disclosure for private funds advisers, and facilitating data collection to assess hedge funds' systemic risk.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy A. Krause, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748096
- [2748096-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2748096-028) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The SIFI designation regime does not reach hedge funds in practice: because the asset threshold is set high, at $50 billion or more in aggregate total consolidated assets, hedge funds are unlikely to be designated as systemically important financial institutions.
  > However, hedge funds are unlikely to be designated as SIFIs because of the high threshold on AUM.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy A. Krause, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748096

**2017**

- [2957645-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-014) [empirical/evidenced] -- Section 165(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act already authorizes the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to utilize contingent capital, so the mechanism has a statutory foundation in United States law.
  > Section 165(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to utilize contingent capital.28
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645
- [2998097-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998097-015) [empirical/evidenced] -- The second survey found long-term negative effects of Title IV: 34.9 percent of respondents expected it to affect the industry over the next five years through additional expenses, and 32.6 percent expected it to create barriers to entry for new private fund market entrants.
  > More than a third of respondents (34.9%) opined that Title IV will affect the private fund industry in the next five years because of additional expenses, and nearly a third (32.6%) opined that it will create barriers to entry to private fund market entrants. 50% of
  Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097
- [2998097-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998097-016) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The SEC's efforts to clarify and optimize the post Dodd-Frank framework cut both ways: they supported industry compliance with the revised standards while simultaneously creating uncertainty and higher costs for the industry.
  > At the same time, there is sufficient evidence in the findings of this study suggesting that the SEC's implementation and clarification of Dodd-Frank Act registration and reporting requirements for private funds also created uncertainty and higher costs for the industry.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097
- [2998097-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998097-020) [empirical/evidenced] -- Using a regression discontinuity design around the 150 million dollar registration threshold with five years of performance data on more than 3500 reporting private funds, the study finds no significant effect of Dodd-Frank requirements on private fund performance, with all p-values above the 5 percent level.
  > Using an array of robustness tests validating the RD results, the paper shows that the requirements introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act create no significant effect on private fund performance. The P-values for all RD results are above the 5% level and confirm the finding of no affect.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097

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