# Duality of incentives

`kaal:entity:duality-of-incentives`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `duality-of-incentives`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 3 works, 2020 to 2021.

**2020**

- [3652481-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-019) [condition/argued] -- Overcoming attempts by rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game a DAO's governance design requires a duality of incentives, in which actors improve their own utility while their actions simultaneously benefit the whole institution over the long run.
  > Human nature and any effective machine derivates of human engagements in institutional form require a duality of incentives in order to overcome attempts of rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game the governance design of a given DAO.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

**2021**

- [3799320-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-013) [condition/argued] -- Effective institutional governance requires a duality of incentives, namely incentives for actors to improve their own utility while their actions simultaneously benefit the whole institution over the long run, in order to defeat rational and opportunistic attempts to game the design.
  > Human nature and any effective machine derivatives of human engagements in institutional form require a duality of incentives in order to overcome attempts of rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game the governance design of a given DAO.
  Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320
- [3808873-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-037) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Effective institutional governance, human or machine, requires a duality of incentives in which actors improve their own utility while their actions benefit the whole institution over the long run, and without that duality rational and opportunistic constituents will game the governance design.
  > Human nature and any effective machine derivates of human engagements in institutional form require a duality of incentives in order to overcome attempts of rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game the governance design of a given DAO.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/duality-of-incentives.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.