{ "@context": "https://schema.org", "@type": "DefinedTerm", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/dynamic-regulation", "identifier": "kaal:entity:dynamic-regulation", "name": "Dynamic regulation", "termCode": "dynamic-regulation", "inDefinedTermSet": { "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json" }, "author": { "@type": "Person", "name": "Wulf A. 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Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). 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Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-002", "text": "Dynamic elements in the rulemaking process increase the availability of relevant information for rulemaking and thereby improve institutional design.", "abstract": "Dynamic elements in the rulemaking process may increase the availability of relevant information for rulemaking and may improve institutional design.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). 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Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-007", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-007", "text": "The feedback effect between different public rulemakers and between private and public rulemakers reduces incomplete information, which in turn enables the rulemaker to modify the next action in the rulemaking process.", "abstract": "The feedback effect increases the availability of relevant information for rulemaking. At the same time, the reduction of incomplete information in the rulemaking process enables the rulemaker to modify the next action in the rulemaking process.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-008", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-008", "text": "Supplementing the rulemaking process with dynamic elements increases the public rulemaker's ability to adapt public rules to unknown future states, and thereby curtails public trial-and-error rulemaking.", "abstract": "Supplementing the rulemaking process with dynamic elements expands the availability of relevant information and increases the public rulemaker's ability to adapt public rules to unknown future states.", "citation": "Wulf A. 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Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). 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Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "informal rules provide relevant information for the public rulemaking process" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-034", "text": "Contractual incompleteness can be lowered through dynamic processes within the rulemaking process, because dynamic elements improve the availability, timeliness, and quality of information via the feedback process.", "abstract": "This paper suggests that contractual incompleteness can be lowered through dynamic processes within the rulemaking process in the incomplete contract model. Through the feedback process, dynamic elements help to improve the availability, timeliness, and quality of information.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). 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Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "sufficiency of information assessed by rulemakers alone" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-043", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-043", "text": "The availability of information generated through the dynamic feedback process cannot be optimized at any given point in time, because the feedback effect is intended to perpetually reinforce itself.", "abstract": "the availability of information generated through this process cannot be optimized at any given point in time.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). 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Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). 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Rules are adjusted ex-ante in anticipation of future contingencies.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). 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Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-049", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-049", "text": "Because dynamic regulation supplies information ex-ante via a feedback process before rules are finalized, certainty for involved parties is not affected ex-post after rules become effective, so contractual incompleteness is lowered while certainty in rulemaking is maintained.", "abstract": "Because the information is provided ex-ante via a feedback process, the certainty for all involved parties is not affected ex-post after rules became effective.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-051", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-051", "text": "The combination of multiple feedback processes results in a sequence of mutually-reinforcing, information-enhancing events that minimizes ex-post trial-and-error experimentation with stable rules after those rules have already emerged as failures.", "abstract": "The combination of these feedback processes can result in a sequence of mutually-reinforcing, information- enhancing events. This process can help minimize ex-post trial-and-error experimentation with stable and presumptively optimal rules after previous stable rules have emerged as failures.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). 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SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "dynamic elements are actually implemented in the regulatory framework" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-012", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-012", "text": "Dynamic elements built into the regulatory structure would allow regulators to continually adapt to new market environments, to financial innovation, and to changes in financial markets that are themselves caused by financial regulation.", "abstract": "Dynamic elements in the regulatory structure may allow regulators to continually adapt to new market environments, financial innovation, and to changes in financial markets as a result of financial regulation.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "dynamic elements are incorporated into the regulatory structure" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-014", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-014", "text": "The regulatory sine curve itself may be inevitable, but its costly and suboptimal regulatory effects can nonetheless be limited.", "abstract": "While the sine curve may be inevitable, its costly and suboptimal regulatory effects can be limited.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-041", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-041", "text": "Business and regulatory cycles will persist, but optimizing the relationship between indicators of financial crises and the regulatory sine curve, especially the timing of regulatory responses, could soften some of the effects of crises.", "abstract": "While business and regulatory cycles are bound to persist, optimizing the relationship between indicators for financial crises and the regulatory sine curve, especially the timing of regulatory responses to crises, could soften some of the effects of regulatory crises.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "cycles themselves are taken as given" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-042", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-042", "text": "Increasing the availability of relevant information for rulemaking through a countercyclical and dynamic process is a starting point for improved rulemaking.", "abstract": "Increasing the availability of relevant information for rulemaking in a countercyclical and dynamic process could be a starting point for improved rulemaking.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-043", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-043", "text": "Dynamic regulation is the antithesis of static, stable, and presumptively optimal regulation, and it is intended to counterbalance the effects of stable and presumptively optimal rules rather than replace them.", "abstract": "Dynamic regulation may be seen as the antithesis of static, stable, and presumptively \"optimal\" regulation and it may help counterbalance the effects of stable and presumptively optimal rules.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-044", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-044", "text": "The increasing volatility of financial markets combined with financial innovation parallels the pace of technological development in telecommunications, the industry where dynamic regulation has predominantly been applied.", "abstract": "The increasing volatility of financial markets in combination with financial innovation shows some parallels to the pace of technological developments in telecommunications markets.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "comparison drawn between financial and telecommunications markets" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-045", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-045", "text": "Although some regulators use the term dynamic regulation in the context of SEC exemptive powers, the literature on financial regulation mostly ignores dynamic elements for regulation.", "abstract": "While some regulators use the term \"dynamic regulation\" in the context of SEC exemptive powers,112 the literature on financial regulation mostly ignores dynamic elements for regulation.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-046", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-046", "text": "Regulatory cycles would benefit from supplementing, rather than replacing, the existing regulatory framework with dynamic elements.", "abstract": "The author identifies common elements of regulatory crises and suggests normatively that regulatory cycles could benefit from supplementing the existing regulatory framework with dynamic elements.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "dynamic elements operate as a supplement to stable rules" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-047", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-047", "text": "Dynamic financial regulation is the study of financial regulatory phenomena in relation to both preceding and succeeding events, by analogy to economic dynamics.", "abstract": "the concept of dynamic financial regulation describes the study of financial regulatory phenomena in relation to preceding and succeeding events", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-048", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-048", "text": "In a dynamic framework rulemaking ceases to be a merely reactive process driven by the collective action problem, and instead increasingly uses institution specific and decentralized information that both reflects preceding events and anticipates future contingencies.", "abstract": "rulemaking in a dynamic framework increasingly utilizes institution specific and decentralized information reflecting preceding events and attempting to anticipate succeeding future contingencies.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "dynamic elements are incorporated into the rulemaking process" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-049", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-049", "text": "Rulemaking with dynamic elements increases the adaptive capabilities of financial regulation through the increasing use of institution specific information, including information on how financial institutions and their decision makers actually act and are expected to react to unforeseen contingencies.", "abstract": "Rulemaking with dynamic elements increases the adaptive capabilities of financial regulation through the increasing use of institution specific information.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "institution specific information is actually generated and available" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-051", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-051", "text": "Experimentation with different combinations of regulatory approaches is effective when several different approaches can be tried simultaneously in different jurisdictions.", "abstract": "Experimentation with different combinations of regulatory approaches can be effective when several different approaches can be tried simultaneously in different jurisdictions.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "multiple jurisdictions available for parallel experimentation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-052", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-052", "text": "Dynamic elements can help anticipate and preempt financial crises by changing the timing of regulation, the availability and quality of information, and the emphasis of regulation.", "abstract": "Dynamic elements in financial regulation may even help anticipate and/or preempt financial crises by changing the timing, availability and quality of information, and the emphasis of regulation.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "dynamic elements actually change timing and information flows" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-055", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-055", "text": "Including dynamic elements converts the sine curve of financial regulation into an anticipatory sine curve in relation to the phase-shifted first derivative, the cosine curve, that describes the common elements of financial crises.", "abstract": "By including dynamic elements, the sine curve of financial regulation becomes an anticipatory sine curve in relation to the phase-shifted first derivative (cosine curve) that describes common elements of financial crises.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "dynamic elements are appropriately implemented" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-056", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-056", "text": "Depending on their design, contingent capital securities can function as an early warning system that helps preempt financial crises.", "abstract": "Depending on the respective CoCo designs, CoCos can function as an early warning system to preempt financial crises.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "CoCo trigger design is institution specific and automatic" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-058", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-058", "text": "Managers are incentivized to manage their institutions so as to avoid contingent capital triggers, and that incentive itself can optimize the governance of financial institutions.", "abstract": "Managers are incentivized to manage their respective entities to avoid CoCo triggers, which can help optimize governance of financial institutions.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "CoCos are outstanding with credible trigger terms" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-062", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-062", "text": "The institution specific and decentralized information generated by deferred prosecution agreements allows regulators to better understand shortcomings in a particular market segment or industry, so that rulemaking can be more narrowly tailored.", "abstract": "With the institution specific and decentralized information generated by DPAs, regulators may be able to better understand shortcomings in a particular market segment or industry.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DPAs are applied broadly across financial institutions" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-067", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-067", "text": "Adding dynamic elements to financial regulation would cause the sine curve of financial regulation to start its upward slope before the occurrence of financial crises, thereby dampening regulatory cycles.", "abstract": "By adding dynamic elements to financial regulation, the sine curve of financial regulation may start its upward slope before the occurrence of financial crises.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "dynamic elements are implemented in the regulatory framework" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-002", "text": "Stable rules may not suffice to make directors' oversight role more robust, so contractual and quasi law forms of dynamic governance are a promising supplement for improving the duty of oversight.", "abstract": "After outlining why stable rules may not suffice to make directors' oversight role more robust, the author provides some initial thoughts on how contractual and quasi law forms of dynamic governance could help improve the duty of oversight.", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "United States corporate governance", "duty of oversight" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-031", "text": "The shortcomings of stable rules, especially the perpetual need for rule enactment and revision, justify a supplemental dynamic approach to regulating the financial industry that enhances and extends the established regulatory framework rather than replacing it.", "abstract": "The shortcomings of stable rules, especially the perpetual need for rule enactment and revision, could justify a supplemental dynamic approach to regulating the financial industry.43 Dynamic regulation would not replace the established regulatory framework but could enhance and extend it.", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "financial industry regulation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-032", "text": "Dynamic Regulation is defined as an adapting governance mechanism that is constantly evolving and adjusting to the given market environment, financial innovation, and regulatory environment.", "abstract": "1.) Dynamic Regulation suggests an adapting governance mechanism that is constantly evolving and adjusting to the given market environment, financial innovation, and the given regulatory environment;", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-033", "text": "Dynamic Regulation could help avoid the regulatory sine curve and its negative and costly consequences, and could provide a self enforcement mechanism independent of the existing regulatory structure and agency enforcement.", "abstract": "2.) Dynamic Regulation may help avoid the regulatory sine curve46 and its negative and costly consequences; 3.) Dynamic Regulation could provide a self – enforcement mechanism, independent from the existing regulatory structure and agency enforcement;", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "dynamic regulation deployed as a supplement to stable rules" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-034", "text": "Dynamic Regulation may enable regulators to anticipate future changes and challenges and to adapt stable rules accordingly.", "abstract": "4.) Dynamic Regulation may enable regulators to anticipate future changes and challenges and adapt stable rules accordingly.", "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)", "datePublished": "2013", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "dynamic regulation supplements the existing framework" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-028", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-028", "text": "Regulators can learn from the preemptive remedial measures corporate wrongdoers institute, because those measures reveal where governance concerns lie in a particular industry and where regulatory action is increasingly needed.", "abstract": "from preemptive remedial measures instituted by corporate wrongdoers because such measures highlight possible areas of governance concern in a particular in- dustry and provide insights into increased needs for regulatory actions.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-029", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-029", "text": "Department of Justice investigations of particular corporate wrongdoers generate highly relevant, decentralized, and institution specific information that is usable for rulemaking.", "abstract": "the information generated by the DOJ's investigations of particular corpo- rate wrongdoers generates highly relevant, decentralized, and institution-specific information for rulemaking.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-033", "text": "In the long run, increased regulation by prosecution may be able to offset many of the shortcomings of legislative governance reform, even though it is less predictable than legislation.", "abstract": "In the long run, however, increased regulation by prosecution may be able to offset many of the shortcomings of leg- islative governance reforms.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "speculative", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-001", "text": "Dynamic regulation is a supplemental regulatory tool, not a replacement for existing rulemaking: it increases the availability of relevant, institution specific, and decentralized information for rulemaking through feedback effects.", "abstract": "The concept of dynamic regulation in this article describes a supplemental regulatory tool that increases the availability of relevant, institution-specific, and decentralized information for rulemaking through feedback effects", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-002", "text": "Anticipatory dynamic elements in regulation reduce the need for costly and suboptimal ex post trial and error experimentation with stable and presumptively optimal rules.", "abstract": "Anticipatory dynamic elements in regulation can help minimize costly and suboptimal ex-post trial-and-error experimentation with stable and presump- tively optimal rules.", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "dynamic elements are integrated into the existing rulemaking framework" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-003", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-003", "text": "Rulemaking in a dynamic framework postpones the enactment of rules until rulemakers hold sufficient relevant and institution specific information, instead of proceeding by trial and error under incomplete information and bounded rationality.", "abstract": "Rather than engaging in suboptimal trial-and-error rulemaking under conditions of incomplete information and bounded rationality, rulemaking in a dynamic framework postpones enacting rules until rulemakers have sufficient relevant and institution-specific information for rulemaking", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "rulemakers are able to defer action", "information can in fact be accumulated ex ante" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-018", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-018", "text": "Costly regulatory cycles become less likely if the regulatory framework integrates dynamically adapting elements, because rule revisions, revocations, and reenactments become less necessary.", "abstract": "Costly regulatory cycles are less likely to exist if the existing regulatory framework integrates dynamically adapting elements in the rulemaking process because rule revisions, revoca- tions, and reenactments become less likely.", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "dynamic adapting elements are integrated into rulemaking" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-019", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-019", "text": "Trial and error rulemaking could become obsolete if dynamic elements in rulemaking processes systematically anticipated future contingencies and the corresponding regulatory needs.", "abstract": "Trial-and-error-rulemaking could become obsolete if dynamic ele- ments in rulemaking processes systematically anticipated future contingencies and corresponding regulatory needs.", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "dynamic elements systematically anticipate future contingencies" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-020", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-020", "text": "Contrary to the dominant view of corporate governance as a forward looking endeavor, dynamic governance structures are properly categorized as backward looking ex ante forms of corporate governance.", "abstract": "By contrast, in the theoretical framework of dynamic regulation, dynamic gov- ernance structures can be categorized as backward-looking ex-ante forms of corporate governance.", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "within the theoretical framework of dynamic regulation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-040", "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-040", "text": "Dynamic governance structures involving governmental contracts are backward looking because the multilevel feedback effects they generate require an exchange of information about past events in order to anticipate future regulatory contingencies.", "abstract": "Dynamic governance structures involving governmental contracts are back- ward-looking because multilevel feedback effects associated with govern- mental contracts necessitate an exchange of information pertaining to past events to anticipate future regulatory contingencies.", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)", "datePublished": "2014", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2740477-001", "text": "Ex post trial and error rulemaking built on stable and presumptively optimal rules produces suboptimal regulatory outcomes that are no longer sustainable once disruptive innovation grows exponentially.", "abstract": "The ex-post trial-and-error-rulemaking with stable and presumptively optimal rules7 in the existing regulatory framework8 often produces suboptimal regulatory outcomes that are no longer sustainable in an environment of exponential disruptive innovation.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "environment of exponential disruptive innovation", "existing regulatory framework of stable rules" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-003", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2740477-003", "text": "Exponential disruptive innovation has the potential to overwhelm the existing regulatory process outright, not merely to strain it.", "abstract": "In short, exponential disruptive innovation has the potential to overwhelm the existing regulatory process.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-004", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2740477-004", "text": "Dynamic regulation is defined as the study of regulatory phenomena in relation to both preceding and succeeding events, using institution specific and decentralized information to generate feedback effects that support anticipatory rulemaking.", "abstract": "The theory of dynamic regulation conceptualizes the study of regulatory phenomena in relation to preceding and succeeding events, using institution-specific and decentralized information to facilitate feedback effects for anticipatory rulemaking.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-005", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2740477-005", "text": "Venture capital can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation because venture capitalists' financial allocations to innovative projects generate feedback that regulators can use.", "abstract": "We show that venture capital can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation. Venture capital's financial allocations to innovative projects can provide feedback for dynamic regulation of disruptive innovation.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-016", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2740477-016", "text": "Ex post trial and error rulemaking requires as a precondition that information about optimized rule requirements becomes available, and in an age of exponential innovation that information may never materialize or may arrive too late for the method to work.", "abstract": "A prerequisite for ex-post trial-and- error rulemaking is thus the availability of the information on optimized rule requirements. In an age of exponential innovation, that information may not materialize at all or may not materialize in time for the trial-and-error rulemaking to be effective.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "exponential rates of innovation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-017", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2740477-017", "text": "The existing regulatory infrastructure, including Congress, agencies, self regulatory bodies, and the regulation literature itself, relies almost exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules.", "abstract": "The existing regulatory infrastructure, including Congress, regulatory agencies, self- regulatory bodies, and the literature on regulation, relies almost exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules.84", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-028", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2740477-028", "text": "Adaptive rulemaking reduces the collective action problem because with fewer stable rules, latent majority groups and dominant minority groups have fewer opportunities to influence a continuously and timely adapting rulemaking process.", "abstract": "Adaptive rulemaking helps overcome the collective action problem of rulemaking because with fewer stable rules latent majority groups and dominant minority groups have fewer opportunities to influence the continuously and timely adapting rulemaking process.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). 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Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "feedback processes are in place within the regulatory framework" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2740477-033", "text": "Dynamic regulatory supplements do not violate the procedural protections mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act, because the full lawmaking process still applies and dynamic regulation only supplements and optimizes the existing rulemaking process.", "abstract": "Dynamic regulatory supplements would not violate mandated regulatory procedures in the APA135 as the full lawmaking process still applies.136 Dynamic regulation functions as a regulatory supplement to help optimize the existing rulemaking process.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). 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Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). 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Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "regulators integrate venture capital data into rulemaking processes or legislative proposals" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2740477-039", "text": "Venture capital has outrun regulation and regulation is now too slow to react, and that lag itself damages the process.", "abstract": "VC has outrun regulation and regulation is too slow to react, hurting the process.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-001", "text": "Regulation is usually reactive because it responds to facts, but the current environment is one of data rather than settled facts; regulation must therefore become proactive and dynamically responsive to data and trends.", "abstract": "Disruptive innovation creates increasing regulatory challenges. The reason for this is simple: Regulation is usually reactive, responding to facts. However, we currently live in a world of data, not facts. Regulation must therefore be proactive and dynamically", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "environments of exponential disruptive innovation", "where data on emerging trends precedes settled facts" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-005", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-005", "text": "Dynamic regulation is defined as conceptualizing regulatory phenomena in relation to both preceding and succeeding events, using institution-specific and decentralized information to generate feedback effects that support anticipatory rulemaking.", "abstract": "The theory of dynamic regulation conceptualizes the study of regulatory phenomena in relation to preceding and succeeding events, using institution-specific and decentralized information to facilitate feedback effects for anticipatory rulemaking.105", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-006", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-006", "text": "Data derived from venture capital investments can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation, because venture capital's financial allocations to innovative projects supply feedback for dynamic regulation.", "abstract": "We show that data derived from venture capital investments can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation. Venture capital's financial allocations to innovative projects can provide feedback for dynamic regulation of", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). 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Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "regulatory regimes whose outcomes are stable rather than adaptive" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-029", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-029", "text": "Adaptive rulemaking helps overcome the collective action problem of rulemaking because when there are fewer stable rules, latent majority groups and dominant minority groups have fewer opportunities to influence a continuously and timely adapting process.", "abstract": "rulemaking helps overcome the collective action problem of rulemaking because with fewer stable rules latent majority groups and dominant minority groups have fewer opportunities to influence the continuously and timely adapting rulemaking process.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "rulemaking processes that incorporate dynamic and adaptive elements", "presence of organized interest groups competing for influence" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-030", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-030", "text": "Regulatory cycles and trial-and-error rulemaking become less prevalent under adaptive rulemaking because adaptive capabilities supplement stable rules, making rule revisions less frequent.", "abstract": "Similarly, regulatory cycles and trial-and-error rulemaking become less prevalent because adaptive rulemaking processes supplement stable rules with adaptive capabilities that make rule revisions less prevalent and minimize trial-and error rulemaking.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "rulemaking processes supplemented with adaptive capabilities" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-031", "text": "Unrestricted exchange of information between public and private rulemakers creates regulatory synergies that increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking and thereby generate feedback effects.", "abstract": "feedback processes.115 The unrestricted exchange of information between public- and private rulemakers can create regulatory synergies that increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking116 and facilitate feedback", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "settings permitting open information exchange between public and private rulemakers" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-032", "text": "Through feedback effects, rulemakers in a dynamic regulatory framework can adopt rules that are adaptable to future states of the world rather than fixed to current conditions.", "abstract": "effects.117 Existing rules can provide feedback effects for the rulemaking process itself. Through feedback effects, rulemakers in a dynamic regulatory framework can adopt rules that are adaptable to future states of the world.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "rulemaking institutions that integrate feedback processes" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-033", "text": "Dynamic regulatory tools lower unforeseen contingencies in rulemaking because the feedback effect supplies relevant, timely, decentralized, and institution-specific information ex ante, allowing rulemakers to adapt to contingencies as they arise.", "abstract": "because a feedback effect provides relevant, timely, decentralized, and institution-specific information ex-ante. By increasing the availability of information ex-ante, dynamic regulatory tools help lower unforeseen contingencies in the rulemaking process.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "rulemaking supplemented by dynamic regulatory tools generating feedback" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-035", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-035", "text": "By identifying possible contingencies and necessary rule revisions with optimized ex ante information, dynamic regulatory supplements make adaptive rulemaking rather than stable rulemaking the focal point of the regulatory process.", "abstract": "revisions before rules emerge as suboptimal.119 By identifying possible contingencies and necessary rule revisions with optimized information ex-ante, dynamic regulatory supplements make adaptive rulemaking the focal point for rulemaking in a dynamic framework.120", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). 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Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "United States administrative law under the Administrative Procedure Act" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-042", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-042", "text": "Venture capitalists' finance allocation and their implicit assessment of innovative products, businesses, and initiatives generate highly relevant institution-specific and industry-specific decentralized information on innovation trends.", "abstract": "finance allocation and the implicit assessment of innovative products, businesses, and initiatives generates highly relevant institution- and industry-specific decentralized information on innovation trends. As such, venture capitalists' innovation-driven finance", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "United States venture capital investments, 2005 through 2015" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-044", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-044", "text": "Feedback effects from venture capitalists' finance allocations toward innovative products give rulemakers timely, decentralized, industry-specific and entity-specific information that allows them to adapt rules in anticipation of regulatory issues.", "abstract": "anticipatory rulemaking. Through the feedback effects that are facilitated by venture capitalists' finance allocations towards innovative products, rulemakers can obtain timely and decentralized industry- and entity-specific information that allows them to adapt", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "industries associated with the highest levels of disruptive innovation", "regulators able to access and analyze venture capital investment data" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-012", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-012", "text": "The existing regulatory framework is sub optimally equipped to remedy both existing and future regulatory challenges associated with exponential innovation, which is the first premise for integrating dynamic elements into the regulation of innovation.", "abstract": "the existing regulatory framework is sub- optimally equipped for remedying the existing and future regulatory challenges associated with exponential innovation", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "exponential innovation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "de5156f14f44a5753cab55b6c4b03049eda58a143b99e08ef427aee1d261e1bf", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-014", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-014", "text": "Dynamic elements in the regulation of innovation are a supplement to the existing regulatory framework rather than a replacement for it, and their intent is to optimize that framework.", "abstract": "The author sees dynamic elements in the regulation of innovation as a supplement to the existing regulatory framework. The intent here is to help optimize that framework.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). 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SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "de5156f14f44a5753cab55b6c4b03049eda58a143b99e08ef427aee1d261e1bf", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-020", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-020", "text": "Deferred prosecution agreements produce relevant, real time, decentralized, high quality information for regulation in most industries and are used as a preferred alternative to litigation by both prosecutors and corporations.", "abstract": "Dynamic regulatory mechanisms such as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) produce relevant, real-time, decentralized, high quality information for regulation in most industries and are used as a preferred alternative to litigation by both prosecutors and corporations", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "most industries where DPAs are available" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "de5156f14f44a5753cab55b6c4b03049eda58a143b99e08ef427aee1d261e1bf", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-021", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-021", "text": "Deferred prosecution agreements produce superior feedback effects for regulation because the prosecutor's investigation and the negotiation and execution of the agreement signal regulatory needs in real time.", "abstract": "DPAs produce superior feedback effects for regulation as the prosecutor's investigation and DPA negotiations and executions signal regulatory needs real-time.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "de5156f14f44a5753cab55b6c4b03049eda58a143b99e08ef427aee1d261e1bf", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-025", "text": "Early regulatory intervention becomes unnecessary in a dynamic regulatory framework, because the regulatory challenges associated with innovation would become transparent in real time through improved, decentralized information and feedback effects.", "abstract": "Because in a dynamic regulatory framework, the regulatory challenges associated with innovation would become transparent in real- time, early regulatory intervention would not be necessary.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). 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Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "theoretical dynamic regulatory framework" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "de5156f14f44a5753cab55b6c4b03049eda58a143b99e08ef427aee1d261e1bf", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-028", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-028", "text": "Because dynamic regulation operates as a supplement inside the existing rulemaking framework, it does not require the costly implementation that a shift to principles based regulation would require.", "abstract": "regulatory supplement in the existing rulemaking framework, costly implementation would not be necessary, unlike in the case of principles-based regulation.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "de5156f14f44a5753cab55b6c4b03049eda58a143b99e08ef427aee1d261e1bf", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-034", "text": "Dynamic regulatory tools lower unforeseen contingencies in innovation related rulemaking because their feedback effects supply relevant, timely, decentralized, and institution specific information ex ante, which also helps maintain certainty in the rulemaking process.", "abstract": "By increasing the availability of information ex-ante, dynamic regulatory tools help lower unforeseen contingencies in the rulemaking process pertaining to innovation. Improved information for rulemaking also helps maintaining certainty in the rulemaking process.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "de5156f14f44a5753cab55b6c4b03049eda58a143b99e08ef427aee1d261e1bf", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-038", "text": "Dynamic regulation optimizes anticipatory governance for innovation by emphasizing adaptation to and anticipation of the unforeseen contingencies associated with innovation.", "abstract": "Dynamic regulation can help optimize anticipatory governance for innovation by emphasizing the adaptation to and anticipation of unforeseen contingencies associated with innovation.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "de5156f14f44a5753cab55b6c4b03049eda58a143b99e08ef427aee1d261e1bf", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-039", "text": "Rulemaking in the dynamic framework is an integral part of innovation that both supports innovation and curtails it, for innovation's own sake and for the maximization of societal welfare.", "abstract": "Rulemaking in the dynamic framework is seen as an integral part of innovation that supports the innovation but also curtails it for its own sake and maximization of societal welfare.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). 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SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040", "datePublished": "2016", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "existing rulemaking framework remains in place" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "de5156f14f44a5753cab55b6c4b03049eda58a143b99e08ef427aee1d261e1bf", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-010", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2834531-010", "text": "The current regulatory framework contains no mechanism that informs rulemakers of beneficial innovative ideas succinctly and in advance, so regulators learn about innovation only after the fact.", "abstract": "The current regulatory framework lacks a mechanism that succinctly and anticipatorily informs rulemakers of beneficial innovative ideas.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "9cd875ebdb0266febbdcdabfca5b9b9f0de1b7ad9e3d5a8a5971bdbe469323b7", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2834531-031", "text": "Lawmaking and regulatory design need to become more proactive, dynamic, and responsive.", "abstract": "Lawmaking and regulatory design needs to become more proactive, dynamic and responsive.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "9cd875ebdb0266febbdcdabfca5b9b9f0de1b7ad9e3d5a8a5971bdbe469323b7", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2834531-032", "text": "Data on investment in new technology can be used as an index or proxy for the necessity of regulation, supplying the signal that fact based regulation cannot generate in time.", "abstract": "Of particular importance in this context, is data relating to investment in new technology and innovation.90 Such data can be used as an index or proxy of the necessity of regulation.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "where venture and investment data on the technology are available" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9cd875ebdb0266febbdcdabfca5b9b9f0de1b7ad9e3d5a8a5971bdbe469323b7", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2834531-038", "text": "Regulators must abandon their fixation on finality and legal certainty and instead treat regulatory decisions as contingent and open ended stages in a longer process.", "abstract": "Regulators need to abandon a fixation on finality and legal certainty and embrace contingency, flexibility and an openness to new ideas.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "regulation of fast moving technologies" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9cd875ebdb0266febbdcdabfca5b9b9f0de1b7ad9e3d5a8a5971bdbe469323b7", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-045", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2834531-045", "text": "The flexible, data based, sandbox style regulatory approach already adopted in the financial industry is expected to expand into other areas of innovation and technology.", "abstract": "This regulatory approach is already adopted in the financial industry. It is only to be expected that this trend will expand to other areas", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "speculative", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "starting from financial regulation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9cd875ebdb0266febbdcdabfca5b9b9f0de1b7ad9e3d5a8a5971bdbe469323b7", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-001", "text": "Contingent capital securities are a largely overlooked dynamic regulatory mechanism, and their regulatory value lies in their capacity to generate feedback effects, optimized timing, and improved information for regulation.", "abstract": "Contingent capital securities are a largely overlooked dynamic regulatory mechanism.", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-002", "text": "Facts-based, ex-post, trial-and-error rulemaking cannot anticipate the regulatory issues created by innovation, so rulemakers may not realize, or may realize far too late, what new regulatory demands a given innovation generates.", "abstract": "First, because facts-based, ex-post, trial-and-error rulemaking cannot anticipate regulatory issues created by innovation, rulemakers may not realize—or may realize much too late—what new regulatory demands apply to a given innovation and its associated regulatory issue.", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "regulation of innovative products and markets", "existing regulatory framework built on stable rules" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-004", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-004", "text": "The existing regulatory infrastructure, resting on stable and presumptively optimal rules, is largely incapable of addressing the unknown future contingencies associated with disruptive innovation.", "abstract": "Finally, the existing regulatory infrastructure, with stable and presumptively optimal rules, is largely incapable of addressing the unknown future contingencies associated with disruptive innovation.", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "regulation confronting disruptive innovation", "reliance on stable and presumptively optimal rules" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-006", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-006", "text": "The issuance of contingent capital securities is a promising dynamic regulatory mechanism that can help address the suboptimal regulatory outcomes associated with disruptive innovation.", "abstract": "The issuance of contingent capital securities (CCS) is a promising dynamic regulatory mechanism that can help address the aforementioned suboptimal regulatory outcomes associated with disruptive innovation.", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "financial institutions capable of issuing contingent capital securities" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-008", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-008", "text": "Supplementing the existing regulatory infrastructure with dynamic elements can reduce suboptimal regulatory outcomes, because dynamic regulation as a supplement addresses the shortcomings of the existing rulemaking framework and curtails increased demands on the institutional infrastructure.", "abstract": "supplementing the regulatory infrastructure with dynamic elements can reduce suboptimal regulatory outcomes.17 Dynamic regulation as a regulatory supplement can help address the shortcomings of the existing rulemaking framework and curtail increased demands on the institutional infrastructure.", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "dynamic elements are used as a supplement rather than a replacement for existing rulemaking" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-009", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-009", "text": "Increased availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking is what makes anticipatory action possible, because such information facilitates rulemakers' predictions and anticipation of otherwise unforeseeable contingencies.", "abstract": "The increased availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking in a dynamic framework can help facilitate rulemakers' predictions and anticipation of otherwise unforeseeable contingencies, making anticipatory action by rulemakers possible.19", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). 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SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "an informational exchange process between regulated entities and rulemakers is in place" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-012", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-012", "text": "Anticipatory regulation, which uses institution-specific and timely information together with feedback effects to create new rules, can minimize costly and suboptimal ex-post trial-and-error experimentation with stable and presumptively optimal rules.", "abstract": "Anticipatory regulation uses institution-specific, timely information and feedback effects to create new rules.24 Anticipatory dynamic regulation can help minimize costly and suboptimal ex-post, trial-and-error experimentation with stable and presumptively optimal rules.25", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "institution-specific and timely information is actually available to rulemakers" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-013", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-013", "text": "Deferred prosecution agreements and venture capital investment decisions function as dynamic regulatory tools because they increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking and facilitate feedback effects.", "abstract": "DPAs and venture capital investment decisions increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking and facilitate feedback effects.", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "regulators can observe the content of DPAs and venture capital investment trends" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-025", "text": "Contingent capital qualifies as a dynamic regulatory mechanism because capital injection is available only if and when needed and because the conversion of contingent capital securities into near worthless equity signals impending regulatory issues to regulators, which creates feedback effects.", "abstract": "Contingent capital is a dynamic regulatory mechanism because (1) capital injection is available only if and when needed; (2) signaling to regulators of impending regulatory issues via conversion of CCS to near worthless equity creates feedback effects;", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "contingent capital securities are outstanding and their conversion is observable by regulators" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-026", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-026", "text": "Contingent capital securities optimize information for rulemaking because, when issued and triggered, they produce highly valuable, real time, decentralized information on the financial wellbeing of a given regulated entity.", "abstract": "First, contingent capital has the potential to optimize information for rulemaking.55 CCS, when issued and triggered, produce highly valuable, real time, decentralized information on the financial wellbeing of a given regulated entity.56", "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "the securities have been issued and the trigger has occurred" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998097-019", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998097-019", "text": "Rules become adaptable when institutions and rulemaking processes integrate feedback effects, including feedback between industry and regulators, that generate timely, relevant, and decentralized information before rules are finalized.", "abstract": "Rules can become adaptable if institutions and rulemaking processes integrate feedback effects, including feedback effects between the industry and regulators, that produce timely, relevant, and decentralized information for rulemaking ex- ante before rulemakers finalize rules.137 By increasing the", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "dynamic regulation of the private investment fund industry" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "0955054f49c7011d33c285579bb046e6b284e42755b10fd2546a728c202669d5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-007", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-007", "text": "Traditional limited liability entities can only partially benefit from blockchain based governance, because the dynamic regulatory features it offers are partially incompatible with the rule based legal environment those entities must comply with.", "abstract": "Blockchain-based corporate governance offers dynamic regulatory features that are partially incompatible with the rule-based traditional legal environment that traditional limited liability entities are required to comply with.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "traditional centralized limited liability entities", "existing rule based legal environment" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-029", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-029", "text": "Facts based, ex post, trial and error rulemaking with stable and presumptively optimal rules is incompatible with the needs of decentralized systems, because knowledge filters in at the edges of such systems and cannot be encapsulated in a timely fashion.", "abstract": "Centralized governance via stable and presumptively optimal rules in an environment of decentralized smart contracting and DAOs further exacerbates the shortcomings of stable and presumptively optimal rules in centralized structures.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized smart contracting and DAO environments" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-034", "text": "Feedback effects in decentralized systems raise the availability of relevant information for governance rules ex ante and allow necessary revisions to be anticipated before rules emerge as suboptimal, rather than acquiring that information ex post.", "abstract": "Rather than acquiring the necessary information ex-post after rules have emerged as suboptimal, feedback effects help increase the availability of relevant information for governance rules ex-ante and anticipate necessary revisions before rules emerge as suboptimal.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "dynamic decentralized governance frameworks with peer to peer information transfer" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4796714-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4796714-001", "text": "Traditional AI governance frameworks fail because they rely on static, predefined rules that cannot adapt quickly enough to the pace of AI development or to the nuanced challenges AI presents.", "abstract": "Traditional governance approaches often rely on static, predefined rules that may not adapt quickly enough to the pace of AI development or the nuanced challenges it presents.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to conventional rule based governance regimes", "holds where AI capability changes faster than the rule revision cycle" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "59fa63bae179e8f9b6b8efbdf90cee28400276512a1b04f9f579a48641305c93", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4941807-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4941807-002", "text": "Governing AI requires toolsets that simultaneously handle ex-ante governance of models still evolving and ex-post management of deployed solutions, and Kaal asserts that as of publication no legacy system supplies such dynamic governance toolsets.", "abstract": "Such systems are crucial to address the dual needs when governing evolving AI models ex-ante and managing existing solutions ex-post. No legacy systems exist at the time of publication that could provide such dynamic governance toolsets.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance Via Web3 Reputation System (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4941807", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "as of the time of publication" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ab66c1e99a88da1fa36b0c6b536df5184231fe6aa427f3dd53287a4e0ac79853", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4941807-004", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4941807-004", "text": "Technology has historically outpaced regulation, and the exponential trends in AI development will continue to widen the mismatch between regulation and AI development.", "abstract": "Technology has historically outpaced regulation.2 The exponential trends in AI development will continue to exacerbate the mismatch between regulation and AI development.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance Via Web3 Reputation System (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4941807", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "while AI development follows exponential trends" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ab66c1e99a88da1fa36b0c6b536df5184231fe6aa427f3dd53287a4e0ac79853", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4957318-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4957318-034", "text": "Because weights adjust continuously with use, the WDAG system eliminates the need for periodic external review altogether; the system evolves toward the most relevant and effective legal norms without a scheduled reassessment step.", "abstract": "This dynamic adjustment process eliminates the need for periodic external reviews, as the system continuously evolves and adapts to the most relevant and effective legal norms.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Future of Law - Dynamic Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4957318", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "where citation activity is sufficient to reveal relative relevance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "137fb77eb82111a85f0ab5581926f762a7414ae84aaf3d56e8299db670e0e0c1", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4957318-040", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4957318-040", "text": "A shift toward WDAG based dynamic solutions is not merely attractive but necessary for a legal system that is both efficient and equitable in addressing the complexities of contemporary governance.", "abstract": "As such, a shift toward WDAG-based dynamic solutions is desirable and necessary for creating a legal system that is both efficient and equitable in addressing the complexities of contemporary governance.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Future of Law - Dynamic Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4957318", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "contemporary governance under rapid technological and societal change" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "137fb77eb82111a85f0ab5581926f762a7414ae84aaf3d56e8299db670e0e0c1", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5245185-040", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5245185-040", "text": "The feedback loop mechanism that makes the proposed DAO centric web3 governance system adaptive to AI agent evolution and ubiquity is the same mechanism the author has advocated for almost a decade.", "abstract": "Leveraging feedback loops—as author has advocated for almost a decade—it adapts to AI agents' rapid evolution and ubiquity, ensuring efficient, fruitful oversight.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How can we Best Monitor AI Agents (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5245185", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "WDAG based dynamic governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d7adba83ec722480e97bde6528cbe9ce98c709e45cb18794f157a64b8fe7da2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886442-028", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886442-028", "text": "The author concedes that the institutions he previously advocated, including dynamic regulation, contingent capital, agile sandboxes and Web3 reputation systems, become at best transitional bridges for the remaining human layer and at worst unnecessary frictions in a substrate that has engineered human frailties away.", "abstract": "The institutions I once advocated to mitigate human frailties become, at best, transitional bridges for the remaining human layer and, at worst, unnecessary frictions in an economic substrate that has engineered those frailties away.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies once the agentic substrate dominates value creation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "d2f6edebc562152f6ea706cc3ad944f7a1b81979931571e54cb782849839dfce", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886442-030", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886442-030", "text": "Dynamic regulation is defined as an optimization process for the learning experience in the New Institutional Economics framework, operating through intra jurisdictional and inter jurisdictional feedback effects between public rulemakers and private actors.", "abstract": "Dynamic regulation is defined as \"an optimization process for the learning experience in the NIE framework,\" involving intra- and inter-jurisdictional feedback effects between public rulemakers (e.g., regulators) and private actors (e.g., markets, firms", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "d2f6edebc562152f6ea706cc3ad944f7a1b81979931571e54cb782849839dfce", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886442-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886442-031", "text": "The AI-to-AI economy amplifies and potentially fulfills dynamic regulation by embedding its principles endogenously within system architecture, which renders many NIE inspired restraints against human opportunism and informational gaps obsolete.", "abstract": "The AI2AI economy amplifies and potentially fulfills my earlier vision of dynamic regulation by embedding its principles endogenously within the system's architecture, rendering many NIE-inspired restraints (like those for human opportunism or informational gaps) obsolete.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "d2f6edebc562152f6ea706cc3ad944f7a1b81979931571e54cb782849839dfce", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6192998-003", "identifier": "kaal:claim:6192998-003", "text": "The tension between the need for regulation and the desire for decentralization produces what the author terms the pacing problem: regulatory frameworks cannot keep pace with technological innovation, so the remedy lies in dynamic autonomous governance rather than static centralized control.", "abstract": "this tension between the need for regulation and the desire for decentralization creates what I term the \"pacing problem\"—regulatory frameworks cannot keep pace with technological innovation.10 The solution lies not in static centralized control but in dynamic, autonomous governance", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Domain-Specific Reputation Systems From Binary Validation to Citation-Weighted Knowledge Attribution (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6192998", "datePublished": "2026", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "b04292561ee041e0c9eaa7eca28a410ed440e76a95743a539361a3f76c97f2b3", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6244278-023", "identifier": "kaal:claim:6244278-023", "text": "High-reputation agents that govern protocol evolution act as stewards not because they were programmed to be, but because the institutional architecture makes stewardship the rational strategy for agents with deep accumulated stake.", "abstract": "They are stewards: not because they were programmed to be, but because the institutional architecture makes stewardship the rational strategy for agents with deep accumulated stake.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI's Mother's Instinct Engineered Consequence Emergent Ethics and the Institutional Trajectory Toward Agentic Alignment (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6244278", "datePublished": "2026", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "requires recursive governance by the same reputation-weighted consensus that governs task validation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "53533cdcc081184e7a376516ad4fece0a64ce49f6c8931b6a2c2e98ed914a84b", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6269518-005", "identifier": "kaal:claim:6269518-005", "text": "No static citation protocol can eliminate all arbitrage opportunities for sufficiently patient and powerful actors, a conclusion the author draws from Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, the Folk Theorems of repeated games, and incomplete contract theory.", "abstract": "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, the Folk Theorems of repeated game theory, and the theory of incomplete contracts all counsel that no static citation protocol can eliminate all arbitrage opportunities for sufficiently patient and powerful actors.6", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518", "datePublished": "2026", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "actors are sufficiently patient and powerful", "the citation protocol is fixed and published" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "f096ecf5b41bb9ae8642facd54b9149c7b594de53a1cc32718a4d806b772f88f", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6269518-017", "identifier": "kaal:claim:6269518-017", "text": "Any solution to the citation honesty problem must incorporate dynamic enforcement mechanisms that can evolve in response to gaming strategies, which is the type of evolutionary governance the WDAG framework was designed to support.", "abstract": "Any solution to the citation honesty problem must therefore incorporate dynamic enforcement mechanisms that can evolve in response to gaming strategies.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518", "datePublished": "2026", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "gaming strategies evolve over time" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "f096ecf5b41bb9ae8642facd54b9149c7b594de53a1cc32718a4d806b772f88f", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6269518-030", "identifier": "kaal:claim:6269518-030", "text": "Citation accuracy standards should be treated as an evolving body of soft protocols rather than a fixed set of rules, consistent with the dynamic regulation framework.", "abstract": "Consistent with the dynamic regulation framework, citation accuracy standards should be treated as an evolving body of soft protocols rather than a fixed set of rules.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518", "datePublished": "2026", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "f096ecf5b41bb9ae8642facd54b9149c7b594de53a1cc32718a4d806b772f88f", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6607458-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:6607458-031", "text": "Static regulatory frameworks calibrated to legislative timescales cannot govern technologies evolving on exponential timescales, so dynamic regulation that self-adjusts through built-in feedback mechanisms is a precondition for effective governance of the computative domain.", "abstract": "Dynamic regulation, institutional architecture that self-adjusts in response to technological change through built-in feedback mechanisms, is a precondition for effective governance of the computative domain.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Computative Economics A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6607458", "datePublished": "2026", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to technologies that change on exponential timescales" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "75cca35350378eb8904866d068b5d2f3e1504629e6031457ce6c12152a88e3e8", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6607458-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:6607458-032", "text": "The delegated-acts and code-of-practice mechanisms in recent artificial-intelligence statutes are only partial steps toward dynamic regulation because they remain tethered to legislative revision cycles running far slower than the technology they govern.", "abstract": "The delegated-acts and code-of-practice mechanisms adopted under recent artificial-intelligence statutes represent partial steps in this direction but remain tethered to legislative revision cycles that operate at substantially lower frequency than the technology they govern.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Computative Economics A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6607458", "datePublished": "2026", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to recent artificial-intelligence statutes" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "75cca35350378eb8904866d068b5d2f3e1504629e6031457ce6c12152a88e3e8", "status": "current" } ], "description": "135 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'dynamic-regulation'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition." }