# Empirical evidence

`kaal:entity:empirical-evidence`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 27 claims that carry the concept tag `empirical-evidence`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

27 claims across 17 works, 2004 to 2026.

**2004**

- [617681-043](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-043) [empirical/evidenced] -- Empirically, at least 48 companies with German names carrying the GmbH designation were formed as private limited companies under U.K. law in the ten months after the Inspire Art decision, indicating that charter migration accelerated after the ruling.
  > In the ten months after the Inspire Art decision, at least 48 such companies with German names and the designation GmbH in their names were formed as private limited companies under U.K. law.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

**2012**

- [1998455-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-023) [empirical/evidenced] -- Coupon rates between seven and nine and a half percent attracted sufficient investor interest in European contingent capital securities to establish what appears to be a sustainable market in those securities.
  > CCS coupon rates between 7% and 9.5% attracted sufficient investor interest and seem to have established a sustainable market in these securities.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

**2014**

- [2389416-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-002) [empirical/evidenced] -- Contrary to the hedge fund industry's claim that increased supervision and disclosure would harm profitability, the authors find statistical evidence that the Dodd-Frank Act requirements had a positive effect on hedge fund performance.
  > Contrary to the hedge fund industry's claims that increased supervision and disclosure would affect their profitability, we find statistical evidence of a positive effect of the requirements introduced by the Dodd- Frank Act on hedge fund performance.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416
- [2389416-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-007) [empirical/evidenced] -- Hedge fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act positively affects adviser returns in March 2012, but the effect does not persist in the months after the registration effective date.
  > We find evidence that hedge fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act positively affects hedge fund adviser returns in March 2012, but this effect is not persistent in the subsequent months after the registration effective date for hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416
- [2470008-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-003) [empirical/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Prior studies and anecdotal evidence indicate that the data collection mandated by Form PF could itself create problems for the FSOC when it evaluates hedge fund systemic risk.
  > Several observations from previous studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that the mandated data collection in Form PF could create issues for FSOC in evaluating the systemic risk of hedge funds.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008
- [2470008-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-029) [empirical/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- More than forty percent of respondents in a prior study disagreed with the definitions or instructions in Form PF.
  > Over forty percent of respondents in a prior study suggested that they disagreed with definitions or instructions in Form PF.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-024) [empirical/evidenced] -- Over 97 percent of the non and deferred prosecution agreements executed in the United States between 1993 and 2013 contained governance changes, including required business changes in 30 percent and board and senior management changes in 38 percent.
  > Over 97% of the N/DPAs executed in the United States between 1993 and 2013 contained governance changes, including required business changes (30%), board and senior management changes (38%
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-026) [empirical/evidenced] -- More than 60 percent of the non and deferred prosecution agreements executed between 1993 and 2013 were preceded by preemptive remedial measures instituted by the corporate wrongdoer.
  > Over 60% of N/DPAs executed between 1993 and 2013 instituted preemptive remedial measures prior to the execution of the N/DPA82.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-034) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Preemptive remedial measures have a low success rate, as evidenced by the fact that more than 60 percent of deferred and non prosecution agreements executed between 1993 and 2013 refer to preemptive remedial measures that preceded them.
  > The low success rate of preemptive re- medial measures, evidenced by the fact that over 60% of D/NPA executed between 1993 and 2013 refer to preemptive remedial measures103
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

**2016**

- [2714974-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-009) [empirical/evidenced] -- Contrary to the hedge fund industry's own predictions, the industry has absorbed Form PF quickly and the impact of the Dodd-Frank registration and disclosure rules has proven much less intense than the industry initially anticipated.
  > The hedge fund industry seems to be adjusting well to the registration and disclosure requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act, and the impact of the registration and disclosure rules appears to be much less intense than the hedge fund industry initially anticipated.
  Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974
- [2714974-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-010) [empirical/evidenced] -- The majority of hedge fund advisers spent less than $10,000 preparing their initial Form PF data reporting to the SEC, and subsequent annual filings cost about half of that initial amount.
  > The majority of hedge fund advisers incurred less than $10,000 to prepare their initial data reporting to the SEC, with the cost of subsequent annual Form PF filings at about half the initial cost (Kaal 2014).
  Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974
- [2714974-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-012) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The most pressing problem with Form PF identified by the majority of SEC registered hedge fund advisers is not the volume of data but the ambiguity of the data reporting requirements themselves.
  > The majority of SEC-registered hedge fund advisers identified the ambiguity of Form PF data reporting requirements as the most pressing issue (Kaal 2016b).
  Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974
- [2714974-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-039) [empirical/evidenced] -- The overall effects of enhanced hedge fund regulation are not as immense as industry representatives predicted, but there is evidence that the enhanced Dodd-Frank Act rules do increase compliance costs for the industry.
  > While the overall effects of enhanced hedge fund regulation are not as immense as hedge fund industry representatives had predicted, some evidence exists that enhanced rules under the Dodd-Frank Act increase the cost of compliance for the industry.
  Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974
- [2715083-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-009) [empirical/evidenced] -- Unconstrained mutual funds differ from traditional fixed income mutual funds not only in trading strategy, using futures, short sales, and derivatives, but also in turnover and fee structure, which more closely resemble those of hedge funds.
  > the author found not only significant growth in these funds by launches, but also provided evidence pertaining to the extent to which unconstrained mutual funds differ in trading strategy from traditional mutual funds – unconstrained mutual funds use futures, short sales, and derivatives.
  Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083
- [2808132-050](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-050) [empirical/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Companies that received venture capital investments have outrun and continue to outrun regulation and regulatory efforts, and they drive innovation trends in the United States and abroad.
  > This paper adds to increasing evidence that companies that received VC investments have─and continue to─outrun regulation and regulatory efforts. Companies that received VC investments drive innovation trends in the United States and abroad.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132
- [2816408-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-003) [empirical/evidenced] -- Using self-reported Morningstar earnings data for 3,424 US private fund advisers covering 2010 to 2015 in multiple regression discontinuity designs with robustness checks, private fund adviser registration and disclosure under the Dodd-Frank Act had no significant effect on private fund adviser returns.
  > Based on the evidence in multiple RD designs including robustness checks, we conclude that private fund adviser registration and disclosure under the Dodd-Frank Act had no significant effect on private fund adviser returns.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408
- [2816408-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-015) [empirical/asserted] -- Beyond the authors' own prior work, there is no other empirical evidence on the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private fund industry.
  > We are not aware of any other empirical evidence on the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private fund industry.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408

**2017**

- [2922176-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-016) [empirical/evidenced] -- Ten of the thirteen S&P 500 companies with above-average revenue growth over the 2012 to 2016 period had never paid a dividend and had never engaged in share buybacks.
  > Figure 2 shows that ten out of the thirteen S&P 500 with an above-average revenue growth have never paid any dividends to their shareholders and were never engaged in share buyback activities.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176
- [2922176-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-022) [empirical/evidenced] -- Only seven percent of the 250 leading companies on the Forbes Global 2000 list have a CEO who is personally active and connected on Twitter.
  > Global 2000 list79 shows that only seven percent have a CEO who is personally active and connected on Twitter.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176
- [2922176-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-032) [empirical/evidenced] -- Forty-five percent of directors at the thirteen S&P 500 companies with above-average revenue growth over the last five years are feedback providers who make board decisions more data-driven.
  > Almost half of the board of directors (45%) in the thirteen S&P 500 companies that showed an above average revenue growth over the last five years are "feedback providers" who make board decisions more data-driven.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176
- [2959730-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-003) [empirical/evidenced] -- Using a hand coded dataset of 98 private investment fund advisers that use blockchain technology in their strategy or internal operations, the article shows that advisers using the new technology are able to charge overall lower fees.
  > Using a dataset of private investment fund advisers that utilize blockchain technology in their investment strategy or internal operations (N=[98]), this article shows that the fund advisers who use the new technology are able to charge overall lower fees.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730

**2019**

- [3396522-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-004) [empirical/evidenced] -- Tether's growth in market capitalization, its stability around one dollar, and investors' use of it as a temporary safe haven provide some empirical support for the proposition that stable cryptocurrencies can create market stability.
  > The rise of an early stable cryptocurrency design, Tether, in terms of its total market capitalization,169 its stability around $1 value, and investors' uses of Tether as a temporary safe haven, provide some support for stable cryptocurrencies' ability to create market stability.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522
- [3405401-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405401-014) [empirical/evidenced] -- Trust barometers such as the Edelman report show a radical depreciation of trust in centralized institutions between 2017 and 2018.
  > Trust barometers, such as the Edelman report, assessing the level of trust in centralized institutions suggests radical depreciation in trust between the years 2017 and 2018.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405401

**2021**

- [3782216-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782216-012) [empirical/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Member default on premia is a major inefficiency in chit funds, with estimates that a large share of subscribers have defaulted at least once recently and a substantial share have defaulted after winning an auction.
  > It's been estimated that Td% of chit fund sub- scribers have defaulted at least once recently and 9e% have defaulted after winning an auction.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782216

**2024**

- [4900878-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900878-039) [predictive/speculative] -- An operating token ecosystem such as VOW can function as empirical evidence for quantum economics, since a working decentralized system that manages complex economic phenomena supports the validity and utility of the abstract framework it instantiates.
  > The practical success of the VOW ecosystem can serve as empirical evidence supporting the validity and utility of quantum economics, fostering greater acceptance and adoption of quantum principles in economic theory and practice.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and Tokenomics (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900878

**2025**

- [5541658-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5541658-031) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Experimental studies suggest risks such as bias amplification from judicial AI, but there is little empirical data on how those risks actually manifest in operational courtrooms, which leaves practical integration guidelines undeveloped.
  > While experimental studies suggest risks like bias amplification, there is little empirical data on how these risks manifest in operational judicial settings.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Morgan A. Gray, The Evolving Role of Artificial Intelligence in Law (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5541658

**2026**

- [6421319-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6421319-029) [empirical/evidenced] -- Algorithmic pricing raises margins in concentrated markets: margins increased 28 percent in local duopoly retail gasoline markets in Germany when both firms adopted algorithmic pricing software.
  > Assad and colleagues have documented that margins increased 28% in local duopoly retail gasoline markets in Germany when both firms adopted algorithmic pricing software.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/empirical-evidence.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.