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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2447306-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2447306-039",
   "text": "The measured effect of Form PF data reporting on the private fund industry is milder than the pre-adoption debate predicted.",
   "abstract": "The findings of this study suggest that the overall effect of Form PF data reporting requirements on the private fund industry may be less severe than widely expected.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
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   "is_failure_mode": false,
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2447306-044",
   "text": "The study's cost findings are bounded to the short run: the data cannot establish what it will cost the private fund industry to keep completing and filing Form PF annually or quarterly over time.",
   "abstract": "The data does not identify the long-term costs for the private fund industry of having to complete and file Form PF on an annual or quarterly basis.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306",
   "datePublished": "2014",
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "text": "Coding of all publicly available non and deferred prosecution agreements executed between 1993 and 2013 shows that 97.41 percent of them, or 264 of 271 agreements, contained relevant corporate governance changes.",
   "abstract": "we show that 97.41 percent [N=264] of the public N/DPAs from 1993–2013 con- tained relevant corporate governance changes.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570",
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-013",
   "text": "In 63.47 percent of the coded non and deferred prosecution agreements the agreement itself referenced preemptive remedial measures the corporation had instituted before the agreement was executed.",
   "abstract": "We found that 63.47 percent of the N/DPAs in the sample contained references to preemptive remedial measures instituted before the execution of the N/DPA.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570",
   "datePublished": "2014",
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   "text": "Waiver of rights provisions are the most prevalent governance term in the sample, appearing in 96 percent of agreements, followed by cooperation with the government at 91 percent and improved compliance programs at 75 percent.",
   "abstract": "Ninety-six percent of the sample con- tained waivers-of -rights provisions, 91 percent cooperation with the government provisions, and 75 percent improved compliance programs.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570",
   "datePublished": "2014",
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   "text": "The less prevalent categories of governance change mandated by non and deferred prosecution agreements are increased monitoring at 46 percent of the sample, board changes at 38 percent, business changes at 30 percent, and senior management changes at 30 percent.",
   "abstract": "include increased monitoring re- quirements (46 percent of the sample), N/DPA mandated board changes (38 per- cent of the sample), business changes (30 percent of the sample), and changes in senior management (30 percent of the sample).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570",
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   "text": "Cooperation requirements appear in 91.10 percent of the sampled agreements, and within that category document production requirements, meaning the identification, assembly, organization, and production of relevant documentation for the Department of Justice, appear in 79.70 percent of agreements.",
   "abstract": "We find that 91.10 percent of the N/DPAs in the sample contained provisions relating to cooperation requirements. Further, 79.70 percent of N/DPAs in our sample contained cooperation requirements pertaining to \"Documents.\"",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570",
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   "text": "Although 45 percent of sampled agreements required improved communication and training, only 11 percent required the entity to create the position of chief compliance officer, so the most structural compliance remedy is the rarest.",
   "abstract": "Only 11 percent of the N/DPAs in our sample required the creation of a chief compliance officer.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570",
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   "text": "The trend in attorney client privilege waivers reversed after 2008: agreements requiring no privilege waiver increased steadily from 2008, and provisions requiring an attorney client privilege waiver disappeared completely by 2009.",
   "abstract": "While the number of N/DPAs that did not require an attorney-client privilege waiver increased steadily starting in 2008, N/DPA provisions that did require an attorney-client privilege waiver disappeared completely by 2009.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570",
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   "text": "Because 63.47 percent of the sampled agreements were executed even after the corporation had already instituted preemptive remedial measures, the current quantity, quality, comprehensiveness, and effectiveness of those preemptive measures may be insufficient to prevent an agreement.",
   "abstract": "execution of N/DPAs after the institution of pre- emptive remedial measures (63.47 percent of the N/DPAs in the sample), the current quantity, quality, comprehensiveness, and effectiveness of preemptive remedial measures may be insufficient.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570",
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-040",
   "text": "Corporate governance provisions in non and deferred prosecution agreements increased significantly over the decade to 2013, raising prosecutors' influence over corporate governance to unprecedented levels.",
   "abstract": "find that corporate governance provisions in N/DPAs significantly increased in the last decade, boosting prosecutors' influence over corporate governance to un- precedented levels.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
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    "based on all publicly available N/DPAs from 1993 to 2013"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811718-010",
   "text": "The intensity of due diligence mentioning relative to total Form ADV Part II brochure filings increased substantially, and the due diligence count exceeded the total number of ADV II filings for the first time in 2014.",
   "abstract": "The intensity of IDD mentioning relative to total SEC Form ADV II brochure filings has increased substantially; the due diligence count exceeded the total ADV II filings for the first time in 2014.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811718-011",
   "text": "Form ADV Part II filings jumped from 3,024 in 2010 to 21,685 in 2011, and that jump was accompanied by a corresponding increase both in the number of filings mentioning investor due diligence and in the due diligence counts within those filings.",
   "abstract": "After 2010, a noticeable increase in filings—from 3,024 filings in 2010 to 21,685 filings in 2011—is accompanied by a corresponding increase in filings mentioning IDD and an increase in the due diligence counts in such filings.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
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   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811718-012",
   "text": "Although overall Form ADV Part II filings fell between 2012 and 2013, due diligence counts fell only marginally, from 20,828 to 20,031, and filings mentioning due diligence fell from 7,862 to 7,198, less than proportionally to the drop in total filings.",
   "abstract": "While the overall filings between 2012 and 2013 depreciated, the ratio of due diligence counts is only marginally affected (depreciating from 20,828 to 20,031) and filings that mention due diligence decreased (depreciating from 7,862 to 7,198) in relation to the overall filing depreciation.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "SEC Form ADV Part II brochure filings",
    "2012 to 2013"
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811718-015",
   "text": "Legal decisions involving private fund due diligence increased substantially after 2005 and especially after 2008, and the broad, narrow, and hand selected case categories all increased consistently with a slight lapse in 2014.",
   "abstract": "Figure 3 shows that the legal decisions involving private fund due diligence have substantially increased since 2005, but especially since 2008. Cases involving IDD in the broad, narrow, and selected case categories all consistently increased overall, with a slight lapse in 2014.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Westlaw case law searches",
    "1995 to 2015"
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811718-036",
   "text": "Madoff related cases following the discovery of the Ponzi scheme in 2008 only partially explain the significant increase in the prevalence and importance of private fund investor due diligence after 2009.",
   "abstract": "Madoff-related cases in the aftermath of the discovery of the Madoff Ponzi scheme in 2008 only partially explain the significant increase in the prevalence and importance of private fund IDD after 2009.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "post 2009 litigation and disclosure record"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998033-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998033-036",
   "text": "Private fund adoption of blockchain began in 2012, coinciding with the broader public debate over blockchain solutions, and took the form of managers setting up separate new fund entities that used the technology.",
   "abstract": "In 2012, coinciding with the more public debate of blockchain based solutions, private investment fund managers started to get involved in the technology by setting up separate and new fund entities that utilized the technology in various forms.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "based on the study's time series of fund inception versus blockchain use inception dates"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998033-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998033-037",
   "text": "In the study's dataset the clear majority of private investment funds using blockchain technology are engaged in venture capital rather than hedge fund or private equity strategies.",
   "abstract": "Figure 3 shows that the clear majority of private investment funds in the dataset is engaged in venture capital.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "based on the type of fund coding for n=105 funds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "aafb1be3c25cd33da477d759df9ca2f856f0a8fe133d6396da2e75d0af573dbd",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998033-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998033-038",
   "text": "The predominant uses of blockchain technology in the private investment fund industry originate in holding crypto assets of various kinds, which indicates that the technology plays its primary role in front office and investment functions rather than in back office administration.",
   "abstract": "Figures 7 and 8 suggest that the private investment funds industry's predominant uses of blockchain technology originate in holding crypto assets of different kinds. This would suggest that blockchain technology plays a primary role in front office and investment functions.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "based on word cluster coding of fund marketing materials for n=74 funds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "aafb1be3c25cd33da477d759df9ca2f856f0a8fe133d6396da2e75d0af573dbd",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998033-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998033-039",
   "text": "The third most important use of blockchain by private investment funds is support for fund growth, which is consistent with anecdotal evidence that returns attainable through crypto investments have no match in traditional finance.",
   "abstract": "The third most important category of private investment fund use of blockchain technology pertains to its support for the growth of the fund. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that the crypto returns attainable through crypto investments have no match in traditional finance.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "based on word cluster coding of fund marketing materials; the return comparison is characterized as anecdotal"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "aafb1be3c25cd33da477d759df9ca2f856f0a8fe133d6396da2e75d0af573dbd",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-019",
   "text": "The tokens in the sample of the top 100 cryptocurrencies were launched between January 2009 and March 2018, with the greatest number of top 100 coins launched in a single month occurring in November 2017.",
   "abstract": "This stable growth of new coins occurred with the greatest number of the top 100 coins by month launched in November of 2017.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "N=100 dataset",
    "launch date measured by ICO start date or first trade date"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-020",
   "text": "Much of the stability in month over month coin launching from mid-2013 onward is attributable to the launching of the Ethereum platform.",
   "abstract": "Much of this stability can be attributed to the launching of the Ethereum platform in late 2011.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "top 100 tokens by market capitalization"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-021",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-021",
   "text": "Of the top 100 tokens, fifty-six held an ICO and thirty-eight did not.",
   "abstract": "Of the top 100 tokens, fifty-six tokens held an ICO and thirty-eight tokens did not.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "n=94 for the ICO figure; six ICO holders are excluded from the figure"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-022",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-022",
   "text": "Fifty-six of the top 100 tokens are implemented at the protocol level of a blockchain, thirty-five follow the ERC-20 Token Standard, six are implemented in a crypto economic protocol on top of a blockchain, and two are application level dapp tokens.",
   "abstract": "Fifty-six tokens have a technical core that is implemented on the protocol level of a blockchain (blockchain native). Thirty-five tokens have a technical core that follows the ERC-20 Token Standard.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "N=100 dataset as of the May 6, 2018 cutoff"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-023",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-023",
   "text": "Among the top 100 tokens, currency and utility models are the most common, USDT is the only purely Stablecoin token, Steem and Maker are both Stablecoin and utility, and only four tokens are asset-backed.",
   "abstract": "Of the top 100 tokens, currency and utility tokens were seen most commonly. USDT was the only purely Stablecoin token; two tokens (Steem and Maker) were characterized as both Stablecoin and utility. Bytom, DigiByte, Syscoin, and Salt are asset-backed.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "N=100 dataset"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-026",
   "text": "Thirty-two of the top 100 tokens have inherent value, for example as a currency, and thirty-two derive their underlying value from giving holders permission to use a digital service.",
   "abstract": "Thirty-two tokens have inherent value, for example as a currency. The underlying value of thirty-two tokens is that they give token holders permission to use a digital service.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "N=100 dataset"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-028",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-028",
   "text": "Seventy-two of the top 100 tokens cap the number of tokens that will ever be issued, a deflationary model of token issuance.",
   "abstract": "Seventy-two tokens in the dataset capped the number of tokens that will ever be issued by the respective token issuer, otherwise known as a deflationary model of token issuance.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "N=100 dataset"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-030",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-030",
   "text": "The remaining twenty-eight tokens in the dataset use inflationary models that operate similarly to fiat currency, contemplating no maximum issuance and a continuing minting process that gives the issuer more flexibility.",
   "abstract": "The other twenty-eight tokens in the dataset are using an inflationary token model in various sub-settings. Tokens that utilize an inflationary model often attempt to operate similar to a fiat currency.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "N=100 dataset"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-033",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-033",
   "text": "Sixty-six of the top 100 tokens are user facing, letting ecosystem participants handle the token directly, while thirty-four are layered and operate underneath another token, platform, or chain.",
   "abstract": "Sixty-six tokens allow ecosystem participants to handle the token directly. Thirty-four tokens operate underneath another token, platform, chain, etc.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "N=100 dataset"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-035",
   "text": "Sixty of the top 100 tokens allow or intend inter-system functionality, while thirty-two are fundamentally restricted to use within a given ecosystem.",
   "abstract": "Sixty tokens allow or intend inter-system functionality, while thirty-two tokens are fundamentally restricted for use in a given ecosystem.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "N=100 dataset"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-038",
   "text": "Proof of Work remains the most popular consensus protocol type among the top 100 tokens, and the Other category alone comprises thirty-four tokens.",
   "abstract": "Figure 9a shows that the \"Other\" consensus protocol type, made up of thirty-four tokens.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "N=100 dataset; consensus time series n=97"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-039",
   "text": "Attempts to increase throughput and scale in consensus protocols concentrate on proof of stake, and the data are consistent with anecdotal evidence that proof of stake may be the most dominant attempt at scaling.",
   "abstract": "Attempts to increase throughput and scale for consensus protocols often focus on proof of stake attempts. The data is consistent with anecdotal evidence that suggests that proof of stake may be the most dominant attempt at scaling.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "top 100 tokens by market capitalization"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-042",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-042",
   "text": "Tokens launched before 2015 were overwhelmingly developed on a hardfork governance mechanism or a combination of hardfork and one other governance type.",
   "abstract": "Tokens launched prior to 2015 were overwhelmingly developed on a hardfork or a combination of hardfork and one of the other governance types depicted.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "top 100 tokens, governance types coded as hard fork, soft fork with tokenholder voting, masternodes, or other"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-043",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-043",
   "text": "Outlier governance mechanisms rose sharply in the dataset: three per year in 2015 and 2016, then eighteen in 2017, and five in the first six months of 2018.",
   "abstract": "During 2015 and 2016, three outlier tokens were launched per year. These tokens were Tether, Factom, and Iota; DigixDAO, Gas, and Ark. During 2017, this figure jumped to eighteen tokens.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "governance types coded as other"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5254152-018",
   "text": "Across the sampled DAOs, no single industry consistently outperforms the others on total score, indicating a diverse rather than sector determined performance landscape.",
   "abstract": "The data indicates that no single industry consistently outperforms others, suggesting a diverse performance landscape for DAOs across different sectors.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "dataset of 50 DAOs",
    "total scores on a 0 to 60 range"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "bb2052d809a4615f0f3e2526ba6416293c40d00260149ba4fe6f38addf052796",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5254152-020",
   "text": "The average decentralization score across the sampled DAOs is 4.25, with a maximum of 9 and a minimum of 1, showing wide variability in how decentralized these organizations actually are.",
   "abstract": "The average decentralization score across all DAOs is 4.25, with the highest score being 9 and the lowest being 1.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "dataset of 50 DAOs",
    "decentralization scored on a 1 to 10 scale"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "bb2052d809a4615f0f3e2526ba6416293c40d00260149ba4fe6f38addf052796",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-021",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5254152-021",
   "text": "The average attack resistance score across the sampled DAOs is 3.65 on a scale of 0 to 10, the lowest of the measured attributes alongside regulatory compliance.",
   "abstract": "This graph shows the attack resistance scores of various DAOs, with scores ranging from 0 to 10. The average score is 3.65",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "dataset of 50 DAOs",
    "attack resistance scored on a 0 to 10 scale"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "bb2052d809a4615f0f3e2526ba6416293c40d00260149ba4fe6f38addf052796",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-022",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5254152-022",
   "text": "The average regulatory compliance score across the sampled DAOs is 3.22, ranging from 1 to 9, and the distribution shows that many DAOs struggle with regulatory compliance while only a few achieve higher scores.",
   "abstract": "The average score is 3.22, with the highest score being 9 and the lowest score being 1. The distribution of scores suggests that many DAOs struggle with regulatory compliance, with only a few achieving higher scores.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "dataset of 50 DAOs",
    "regulatory compliance scored on a 1 to 10 scale"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "bb2052d809a4615f0f3e2526ba6416293c40d00260149ba4fe6f38addf052796",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-023",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5254152-023",
   "text": "The average Work to Earn score across the sampled DAOs is 4.1, ranging from 1 to 9, indicating only moderate effectiveness of contributor reward mechanisms across the market.",
   "abstract": "The average score across all DAOs is 4.1, with the highest score being 9 and the lowest score being 1.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "dataset of 50 DAOs",
    "work to earn scored on a 1 to 10 scale"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "bb2052d809a4615f0f3e2526ba6416293c40d00260149ba4fe6f38addf052796",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-024",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5254152-024",
   "text": "The average organizational communication score across the sampled DAOs is 4.32, with a maximum of 10 and a minimum of 1, indicating only moderate communication effectiveness overall.",
   "abstract": "The average score is 4.32, indicating a moderate level of effectiveness in communication across these organizations. The highest score is 10, showing that some DAOs excel in this area, while the lowest score is 1",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "dataset of 50 DAOs",
    "organizational communication scored on a 1 to 10 scale"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "bb2052d809a4615f0f3e2526ba6416293c40d00260149ba4fe6f38addf052796",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5254152-025",
   "text": "The analysis reveals significant variability across all six attributes, decentralization, security, governance, regulatory compliance, work incentives, and communication effectiveness, reflecting the divergent developmental stages of DAOs.",
   "abstract": "The analysis of these attributes reveals significant variability in the decentralization, security, governance, regulatory compliance, work incentives, and communication effectiveness of DAOs.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "dataset of 50 DAOs scored on six attributes"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "bb2052d809a4615f0f3e2526ba6416293c40d00260149ba4fe6f38addf052796",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5254152-026",
   "text": "DeScience and Data Analysis DAOs generally score higher on overall performance metrics, whereas Investment DAOs and Art and Culture DAOs display idiosyncratic mixes of strengths and weaknesses.",
   "abstract": "For instance, DeScience and Data Analysis DAOs generally score higher in overall performance metrics, while Investment and Art and Culture DAOs exhibit unique profiles of strengths and weaknesses.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "dataset of 50 DAOs across market categories"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "bb2052d809a4615f0f3e2526ba6416293c40d00260149ba4fe6f38addf052796",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "42 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'empirical-findings'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}