# Enforcement costs `kaal:entity:enforcement-costs` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 2 claims that carry the concept tag `enforcement-costs`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 2 claims across 2 works, 2019 to 2019. **2019** - [3373393-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-010) [mechanism/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Residual loss arises because the cost of enforcing suboptimal contracts between principals and agents always exceeds the benefits of performing the contractual obligations. > Residual loss arises because the cost of enforcing suboptimal contracts between principals and agents always exceed the benefits of performing the contractual obligations. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393 - [3405660-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-002) [mechanism/argued] -- Moral hazard in hedge fund lending persists even when the lender is fully informed, because high enforcement costs can make prevention too costly for the lender. > Moral hazard can also occur because high enforcement costs might make it too costly for the lenders to hedge funds to prevent moral hazard even when the lender is fully informed about the hedge fund's activities. Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/enforcement-costs.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.