# Enforcement trends

`kaal:entity:enforcement-trends`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `enforcement-trends`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 2 works, 2013 to 2014.

**2013**

- [2273857-063](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-063) [empirical/evidenced] -- Almost 300 deferred prosecution agreements have been executed since 2003, whereas before 2003 they were rarely used.
  > Almost 300 DPAs have been executed since 2003. Before 2003, DPAs were rarely used.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

**2014**

- [2486570-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-012) [mechanism/evidenced] -- The sharp proliferation of non and deferred prosecution agreements after 2002 is explained by a cluster of events: the collapse of Enron, the dismantling of Arthur Andersen, the creation of the Corporate Fraud Task Force, and the Thompson Memorandum.
  > The proliferation of N/DPAs after 2002 can be explained by a num- ber of factors, including the collapse of Enron, the dismantling of Arthur Ander- sen, the establishment of the Corporate Fraud Task Force, and the Thompson Memorandum.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [2486570-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-040) [empirical/evidenced] -- Corporate governance provisions in non and deferred prosecution agreements increased significantly over the decade to 2013, raising prosecutors' influence over corporate governance to unprecedented levels.
  > find that corporate governance provisions in N/DPAs significantly increased in the last decade, boosting prosecutors' influence over corporate governance to un- precedented levels.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/enforcement-trends.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.