# Ethereum `kaal:entity:ethereum` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 26 claims that carry the concept tag `ethereum`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 26 claims across 18 works, 2017 to 2024. **2017** - [2939127-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2939127-030) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Fundamental flaws in the DAO's code let hackers move one third of its total funds to a subsidiary account, and that hack together with further technological limitations destroyed the DAO initiative. > Alas, things went terribly wrong with the DAO. Fundamental flaws in the DAO code enabled hackers to transfer one-third of the total funds to a subsidiary account.92 This hack in combination with additional technological limitations brought down the DAO initiative. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939127 - [2939127-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2939127-037) [condition/argued] -- Advising on blockchain contracts requires that law students and lawyers become familiar with the technology and learn at least basic coding as it pertains to Ethereum smart contracts. > In order to advise on blockchain contracts, law students and lawyers have to become familiar with the technology and learn at least basic coding as it pertains to Ethereum smart contracts. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939127 - [2959730-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-040) [empirical/evidenced] -- Running a private fund adviser portfolio on the blockchain costs only protocol determined core usage fees, modular commissions set by module developers amounting to a fraction of a cent or a fraction of trade volume per usage, and Ethereum infrastructure costs. > The usage fees are determined by the protocol, and the modular fees are set by the module developers and are a fraction of a cent or a fraction of the trade volume for each usage. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730 - [3067615-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-004) [mechanism/evidenced] -- Because Ethereum's decentralized platform incorporating smart contracts lets developers build applications directly on its blockchain, the majority of developers chose to write smart contracts on the Ethereum Virtual Machine rather than create their own blockchain technology, giving ICOs a uniform protocol. > Given these advantages, the majority of developers opted for writing smart contracts on the Ethereum Virtual Machine rather than creating their own blockchain Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615 - [3071378-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3071378-012) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The DAO failed because its code had not yet been perfected: hackers took a third of the DAO tokens and transferred them to another account, and that hack together with other technological limitations led to the demise of the DAO. > Unfortunately, the code had not yet been perfected and hackers were able to take a third of the DAO tokens and transfer them into another account. This hack and other technological limitations, led to the demise of the DAO.58 Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071378 **2018** - [3125822-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-024) [design/asserted] -- The platform becomes fully autonomous almost immediately after deployment, because once the Ethereum DApp is posted its authors have no more control over the evolution of the expertise tags than any other Ethereum user. > The platform achieves full autonomy almost immediately. Once the Ethereum DApp is posted to the blockchain, its authors have no more control over the evolution of the expertise tags in its forum than any other Ethereum user. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822 - [3128900-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3128900-015) [definitional/asserted] -- Semada is stipulated as an autonomous, decentralized, open source protocol on the Ethereum blockchain that enables domain specific reputation verification for human task crowdsourcing. > Semada is an autonomous, decentralized, open-source protocol29 that enables domain specific reputation verification for human task crowdsourcing, built on the ETHEREUM blockchain. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900 - [3128900-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3128900-031) [design/asserted] -- The payment design allows secure off chain payments without gas consumption, with settlement transferred onto the Ethereum blockchain at a later date, which the author claims is superior to the payment channel approach used by decentralized competitors. > It allows for secure off chain payments without using gas before transferring those payments on the ETHEREUM blockchain at a later date. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900 - [3227933-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227933-030) [empirical/evidenced] -- The DAO showed that a corporate-type organization can operate with no physical address, no directors, no managers and no employees, with its governance structure built entirely from software, code and smart contracts running on Ethereum. > Indeed, the DAO didn't have any directors, managers or employees. The governance structure was built with software, code and smart contracts that ran on the public decentralized blockchain platform, Ethereum. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why 'Blockchain' Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227933 - [3249860-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-020) [mechanism/asserted] -- Much of the stability in month over month coin launching from mid-2013 onward is attributable to the launching of the Ethereum platform. > Much of this stability can be attributed to the launching of the Ethereum platform in late 2011. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 - [3249860-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-022) [empirical/evidenced] -- Fifty-six of the top 100 tokens are implemented at the protocol level of a blockchain, thirty-five follow the ERC-20 Token Standard, six are implemented in a crypto economic protocol on top of a blockchain, and two are application level dapp tokens. > Fifty-six tokens have a technical core that is implemented on the protocol level of a blockchain (blockchain native). Thirty-five tokens have a technical core that follows the ERC-20 Token Standard. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 **2019** - [3373393-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-029) [empirical/evidenced] -- The first DAO had no physical address, no jurisdiction able to claim control over it, no directors, managers, or employees, so all the core control mechanisms typically employed by principals in agency relationships were entirely removed. > Indeed, it had no directors, managers or employees. In essence, all the core control mechanisms typically employed by principals in agency relationships were entirely removed in the DAO. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393 - [3409548-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3409548-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The 2018 ICO boom exposed a core limitation of blockchain technology: ICOs sold investors decentralized infrastructure products on the assumption that a baseline infrastructure already existed, and that assumption proved false. > The limitations of blockchain technology became most apparent in the aftermath of the ICO boom of 2018. ICOs promised investors core decentralized infrastructure products that assumed a baseline infrastructure existed. This turned out to be false Kaal, Financial Technology and Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3409548 - [3409548-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3409548-021) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A fund constituted purely through smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain may have no domicile, foreign or domestic, which makes jurisdiction over blockchain transactions a genuine problem for the funds that use the technology. > Some private investment funds may exist through the combination of smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain.85 Such funds may not have a domicile either foreign or domestic. Kaal, Financial Technology and Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3409548 **2020** - [3606663-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-028) [empirical/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- DeFi's decentralization remains theoretical in one important respect: as of the early 2020s DeFi is still largely relegated to one dominant platform, with 87 percent of all publicly funded DeFi projects built on Ethereum. > At the beginning of the 2020s, DeFi is still largely relegated to the use of one dominant platform. 87% of all publicly funded DeFi projects have been built on Ethereum. Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663 - [3606663-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-037) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Read together with the network capacity failure that CryptoKitties caused on Ethereum in December 2017, the expected DeFi growth rates imply that the Ethereum network will continue to experience network shortages and throughput problems unless its infrastructure is upgraded to handle the expected transaction volume. > the expected growth rate illustrated in Figures [__] and [__] could mean that the Ethereum network will continue to experience network shortages and throughput issues unless the Ethereum infrastructure is upgraded to deal with the expected volume of transactions. Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663 **2021** - [3782192-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-036) [empirical/asserted] -- Bitcoin and Ethereum are worth hundreds of billions of dollars not because people are using them but almost entirely because of speculation on their future value, which is the expectation that people will use them to build decentralized autonomous organizations. > These networks are worth hundreds of billions of dollars, not because people are using them, but almost entirely because of speculation. People see the future value of these tools. Their future value is the dream that people will use them to build DAOs. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192 - [3782192-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-038) [condition/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Decentralized money and decentralized contracts have been built, but decentralized business will not work until roughly eight further decentralized institutions that people actually use in business are built. > Two important tools have been built, decentralized money (Bitcoin) and decentral- ized contracts (Ethereum). But it won't work until eight more decentralized institu- tions are built that people use to do business. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192 - [3782198-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-025) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Bitcoin and Ethereum have no formal binding governance framework declaring how consensus protocols may be changed in the future, which the authors identify as a deep flaw that weakens the networks and will lead to instability. > In Bitcoin and Ethereum, there is no formal binding governance framework de- claring how the protocols for consensus might be changed in the future. This is a deep flaw which weakens these networks and will lead to instability. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198 - [3782198-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-039) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Ethereum is Turing complete in theory but cannot practically match even a cheap smartphone, because everything stored on the blockchain must be stored redundantly on thousands of nodes forever, so decentralized smart contract computation is necessarily primitive compared with centralized Web 2.0 services. > However, Ethereum is not practically capable of mimicking the power of even the cheapest smartphone. The storage limit is currently extremely small, because anything stored in the blockchain needs to be stored redundantly on thousands of nodes for all time in the future. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198 - [3782201-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-021) [empirical/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Despite billions of dollars of investment, radically decentralized tools including bitcoin currency, Ethereum smart contracts, and the InterPlanetary File System have not pervaded the mainstream economy. > These radically decentralized tools have not pervaded the mainstream economy despite billions of dollars in investment. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201 - [3782203-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-026) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Marketing a consensus algorithm as correct by construction is false advertising, because such proofs establish resistance only to the attacks the theorists considered reasonable at the time, not to all possible attacks. > In the first place, this is simply false advertising. Most people don't understand that CBC doesn't mean it's mathematically proven to be perfectly resistant to all attacks; it's only resistant to the attacks the theorists consider reasonable at the time. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203 - [3782205-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-003) [empirical/asserted] -- Prototypes exist for only two of the eight required institutions, decentralized currency in Bitcoin and distributed computation for smart contracts in Ethereum, and most of the rest are still missing. > Engineers have managed to prototype two of the solutions: decentralized cur- rency (Bitcoin) and the distributed computing needed to make smart contracts (Ethereum). We're still missing most of them. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205 - [3782205-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-020) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Ethereum will not be efficient until it operates inside a robust decentralized economy, and it will not last at all unless its governance is fixed. > Like Bitcoin, it won't be efficient until it lives in a robust decentralized economy. It won't last unless its gov- ernance is fixed. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205 - [3782210-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-034) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Contemporary blockchains cannot support the proposed architecture because the technology is too slow and expensive to poll members on every transaction, and the messages required for all nodes to register all votes on every action multiply into an unmanageable number. > Voting is not efficient on contemporary blockchains. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210 **2024** - [4796714-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4796714-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Proof of Stake consensus centralizes control in proportion to the quantity of tokens held, so governance built on such chains is skewed in favor of the wealthy rather than distributed. > Similarly, Proof of Stake (PoS) consensus mechanisms, as implemented in Ethereum and other blockchains, centralize control based on the quantity of tokens held, potentially skewing governance in favor of the wealthy. Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/ethereum.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.