# Eu law

`kaal:entity:eu-law`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 7 claims that carry the concept tag `eu-law`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

7 claims across 2 works, 2004 to 2012.

**2004**

- [617681-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-001) [design/argued] -- Bundling substantive corporate law together with adjudication, the arrangement that succeeded in Delaware, is likely to cause difficulties in Europe; Member States are most likely to succeed in post Centros and Inspire Art regulatory competition if they unbundle the corporate law product.
  > This bundling of statutory law and adjudication might, however, cause difficulties in Europe. We suggest that Member States are most likely to succeed in the regulatory competition following Centros and Inspire Art if they unbundle the corporate law product
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-004) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Even if the ECJ has embraced the incorporation theory, Member States can still frustrate Type B regulatory competition through tax law, capital market law, listing requirements and other mechanisms, so the seat theory may retain de facto dominance.
  > tax law,16 capital market law17 and listing requirements18 or other mechanisms to frustrate Type B regulatory competition after ECJ's rulings in Centros and Inspire Art, the seat theory may continue its de facto dominance.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Conducting judicial proceedings through interpreters is cumbersome and confusing and creates a perceived bias in favor of litigants and lawyers fluent in the language of the proceedings, which is a barrier to exporting adjudication.
  > Conducting judicial proceedings through interpreters, however, is cumbersome and confusing, and also creates a perceived bias in favor of litigants and lawyers who are fluent in the language of the proceedings.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-024) [mechanism/argued] -- If statutes are unbundled from adjudication the judicial bias problem largely disappears, because statutes are at least facially neutral and discriminatory statutes would violate the EU treaty.
  > If on the other hand, statutes are unbundled from adjudication, this problem largely disappears because statutes are at least facially neutral
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-034) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- None of the Delaware based solutions, whether importing bundled or unbundled Delaware law, is likely to be viable for Europe.
  > For all of the above mentioned reasons, it is likely that none of the "Delaware based" solutions, whether involving bundled or unbundled Delaware law, is viable for Europe.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

**2012**

- [2061166-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-020) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The German Banking Act requirement that a bridge bank have its head office inside Germany is of highly questionable compatibility with European Union law, specifically the principle of free movement of capital under Article 63 TFEU.
  > It is highly questionable whether this requirement conforms to the Law of the European Union, namely the principal of free movement of capital, TFEU, art. 63.
  Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166
- [2061166-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-026) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Enacting the proposed German Corporation Act amendments that would give contingent capital securities a statutory basis would require substantial changes across other areas of German law, and is unlikely to be achieved unless European Union law requires it and the standards are internationally recognized.
  > Implementing the amendments would require substantial changes in other areas of German law.519 This may not be easily achieved unless required under European Union law and internationally recognized.
  Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/eu-law.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.