# Europe `kaal:entity:europe` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 10 claims that carry the concept tag `europe`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 10 claims across 4 works, 2010 to 2021. **2010** - [1664809-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1664809-020) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Section 7216 could have the opposite effect of forcefully exporting US law onto other jurisdictions including Europe, even though it would be preferable for other nations to decide for themselves whether to have a class action litigation system. > 7216 could have the opposite effect of forcefully exporting US law Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Law – Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for (2010). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664809 - [1664809-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1664809-027) [predictive/argued] -- If section 7216 extends US securities fraud provisions to non-US securities transactions, European financial intermediaries could become the dominant target for plaintiffs' attorneys. > intermediaries could become the dominant target for plaintiff's Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Law – Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for (2010). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664809 - [1664809-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1664809-030) [predictive/argued] -- If section 7216 is enacted, European plaintiffs and defendants will likely turn to the expertise of American law firms, which would further exacerbate the already difficult competitive situation of European law firms. > will likely turn to the expertise of American law firms. Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Law – Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for (2010). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664809 **2012** - [1998455-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-023) [empirical/evidenced] -- Coupon rates between seven and nine and a half percent attracted sufficient investor interest in European contingent capital securities to establish what appears to be a sustainable market in those securities. > CCS coupon rates between 7% and 9.5% attracted sufficient investor interest and seem to have established a sustainable market in these securities. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 - [2029983-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-005) [predictive/argued] -- Because Morrison limits U.S. securities law to transactions inside the United States, plaintiffs' attorneys are predicted to look increasingly to European countries and other venues in which to file securities class actions and similar suits. > As a result of the Morrison decision, limiting application of U.S. securities laws to transactions inside the United States, plaintiffs' attorneys may increasingly look to European coun- tries and other venues to file securities class actions and simi- lar suits. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-016) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts, which in turn depresses settlement amounts and damages awards. > Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-017) [mechanism/argued] -- The requirement that each plaintiff show individual reliance, followed in most jurisdictions outside the United States, is not merely a substantive difference: it undermines collective litigation because class procedures work only when plaintiffs share common questions of law and fact. > This difference in substantive law has an impact on procedural issues because class action lit- igation and collective procedures are easier if plaintiffs in the class share common questions of law and fact. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-018) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Despite signs of movement in that direction, there is as yet no genuine European substitute for the U.S. securities class action brought under the fraud-on-the-market theory. > There are some signs that European law could be moving in this direction, although thus far there is no genuine Europe- an substitute for the U.S. securities class action under the fraud-on-the-market theory. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-025) [empirical/argued] -- The Netherlands is already Europe's most attractive venue for collective settlements because it is the only European country that allows a collective settlement in mass litigation to bind all class members who do not opt out. > The Netherlands is already Europe's most attractive venue to facilitate such settlements because it is the only European country that allows a collective settlement in a mass litigation to be binding on all class members who do not opt-out of the Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 **2021** - [3782193-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-006) [mechanism/argued] -- Europe, unlike Imperial China, used the printing press to decentralize knowledge rather than to centralize power, and this different application of the same information technology produced a cultural transformation that undermined Europe's centralized powers. > Europe started its own printing presses a few centuries later. Instead of using the press to centralize power like the Chinese Empire did, Europe's use of the printing press greatly decentralized knowledge. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/europe.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.