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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-016",
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   "text": "Because feedback effects increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information, rulemakers can predict unforeseen contingencies and adjust their actions ex-ante to avoid complex reforms and unwanted consequences.",
   "abstract": "Because the feedback effects in dynamic regulation allow rulemakers to increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking, rulemakers can predict unforeseen contingencies and adjust their actions ex-ante to avoid complex reforms.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
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   "text": "Because dynamic regulation supplies information ex-ante via a feedback process before rules are finalized, certainty for involved parties is not affected ex-post after rules become effective, so contractual incompleteness is lowered while certainty in rulemaking is maintained.",
   "abstract": "Because the information is provided ex-ante via a feedback process, the certainty for all involved parties is not affected ex-post after rules became effective.",
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   "text": "Feedback effects allow the necessary information to be acquired ex ante and necessary revisions to be anticipated before rules emerge as suboptimal, rather than ex post after failure has become apparent.",
   "abstract": "Rather than acquiring the necessary information ex-post after rules have emerged as suboptimal, feedback effects help increase the availability of rele- vant information for rulemaking ex-ante and anticipate necessary revisions before rules emerge as suboptimal",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
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   "text": "The trial and error approach to rulemaking structurally prevents rulemakers from obtaining relevant information ex ante, before rules are enacted.",
   "abstract": "The trial-and-error approach53 to rulemaking does not allow rulemakers to attain relevant information for rule- making ex-ante, before rules are enacted.",
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   "datePublished": "2014",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-029",
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   "text": "Dynamic regulatory tools let rulemakers adapt to regulatory contingencies as they arise, because feedback effects deliver relevant, timely, decentralized, and institution specific information ex ante.",
   "abstract": "Dynamic regulatory tools as a regulatory supplement enable rulemakers to adapt to regulatory contingencies if and when they arise because feedback effect provides relevant, timely, decentralized, and institution-specific information ex-ante.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477",
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   "text": "By identifying possible contingencies and necessary rule revisions from venture capital investment data ex ante, before disruptive innovation creates problems, regulators could anticipate regulatory needs instead of reacting to them.",
   "abstract": "By identifying possible contingencies and necessary rule revisions with optimized information from VC investments ex-ante, before disruptive innovation creates problems, regulators could anticipate regulatory needs.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477",
   "datePublished": "2016",
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   "text": "Dynamic regulatory tools lower unforeseen contingencies in rulemaking because the feedback effect supplies relevant, timely, decentralized, and institution-specific information ex ante, allowing rulemakers to adapt to contingencies as they arise.",
   "abstract": "because a feedback effect provides relevant, timely, decentralized, and institution-specific information ex-ante. By increasing the availability of information ex-ante, dynamic regulatory tools help lower unforeseen contingencies in the rulemaking process.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
   "datePublished": "2016",
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   "text": "By identifying possible contingencies and necessary rule revisions with optimized ex ante information, dynamic regulatory supplements make adaptive rulemaking rather than stable rulemaking the focal point of the regulatory process.",
   "abstract": "revisions before rules emerge as suboptimal.119 By identifying possible contingencies and necessary rule revisions with optimized information ex-ante, dynamic regulatory supplements make adaptive rulemaking the focal point for rulemaking in a dynamic framework.120",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
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   "text": "Dynamic regulatory tools lower unforeseen contingencies in innovation related rulemaking because their feedback effects supply relevant, timely, decentralized, and institution specific information ex ante, which also helps maintain certainty in the rulemaking process.",
   "abstract": "By increasing the availability of information ex-ante, dynamic regulatory tools help lower unforeseen contingencies in the rulemaking process pertaining to innovation. Improved information for rulemaking also helps maintaining certainty in the rulemaking process.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040",
   "datePublished": "2016",
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   "text": "Feedback effects change the timing of regulatory information: instead of acquiring necessary information only after rules have already proven suboptimal, they increase the availability of relevant information ex ante and support anticipation of necessary revisions.",
   "abstract": "Rather than acquiring necessary information after rules have emerged as suboptimal, feedback effects help increase the availability of relevant information for rulemaking ex ante and anticipate necessary revisions",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645",
   "datePublished": "2017",
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 "description": "10 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'ex-ante-information'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}