# Expertise `kaal:entity:expertise` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 8 claims that carry the concept tag `expertise`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 8 claims across 7 works, 2009 to 2021. **2009** - [1428387-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-012) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- There is an adverse selection problem in independent valuation: an administrator who actually had the knowledge and understanding of complex instruments required for the task would probably be incentivized to use that expertise in a more profitable setting instead. > Had the administrator the required knowledge and understanding of the complexities, he or she would probably be incentivized to use that experience and understanding in a more profitable setting. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387 **2017** - [2834531-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-021) [empirical/evidenced] -- The delegation of technology policy to politicians advised by experts rested on public trust that has since eroded: consistent empirical evidence shows that trust in both government and experts has declined in recent years. > Although the public once had a relatively high degree of trust in both the political process and the scientific/expert method, consistent empirical evidence demonstrates that both trust in government and experts has declined in recent years. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531 **2018** - [3128900-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3128900-022) [predictive/speculative] -- Validation experts could evolve from humans into smart contracts, which would allow validation itself to become automated. > For instance, experts could evolve from humans to smart contracts in order to allow for the automation of validation. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900 **2021** - [3782210-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-020) [condition/argued] -- Reputation tokens must have their power limited to their proper domain: for each different expertise there must be a separate type of non-interchangeable reputation token, so that a token carries power only within the DAO whose members hold that specific skill. > Reputation tokens need to have power limited to their proper domain, meaning that for each different expertise, there is a separate type of non-interchangeable reputa- tion token. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210 - [3782210-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-033) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- One-person-one-vote governance fails on technical questions because half the members have less than average expertise yet equal power, which incentivizes experts to gain power by catering to less expert prejudices instead of pursuing the most effective decisions. > Under a one-person-one-vote system, half of the mem- bers have less than average expertise, but equal power. This incentivizes experts to gain power by catering to less expert prejudices instead of following the most effective decisions. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210 - [3782217-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-030) [predictive/argued] -- Tracking and aggregating reputations across DAOs can build a more accurate picture of a person's expertise and experiential gaps than traditional educational institutions provide, which would quickly reveal meaningless certification and licensure programs as worthless. > Tracking and aggregating our reputations in various DAOs can build a more accurate picture of our expertise and experiential gaps than our tra- ditional educational institutions have. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217 - [3949098-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-016) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Without access to a network of core expertise, early stage investments in the digital asset industry are rarely successful. > Without access to a network of core expertise, early-stage investments in the digital asset industry are rarely successful Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 - [3981021-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-037) [mechanism/argued] -- Community audits enable enhanced efficiency of coordination because voting associates, with their highly specialized philanthropic skillsets, are ideally positioned to identify other experts in philanthropy. > governance structure of the CHARITYxDAO enables enhanced efficiency of coordination because the VAs in the CHARITYxDAO, with their unique and highly specialized skillsets in the context of philanthropy, are ideally positioned to identify other experts in philanthropy. Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/expertise.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.