# Fee compression

`kaal:entity:fee-compression`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `fee-compression`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 2 works, 2016 to 2017.

**2016**

- [2739479-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-007) [mechanism/evidenced] -- As the private fund investor profile shifts toward institutional investors, fees fall; institutional investors made up 65 percent of hedge fund AUM in 2015 compared with roughly 20 percent a decade earlier.
  > As the investor profile for private funds shifts toward institutional investors, fees fall. Institutional investors constituted 65% of hedge fund AUM in 2015, compared to just 20% a decade ago.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479
- [2739479-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-008) [mechanism/argued] -- Underperformance combined with the influx of institutional money means that pension funds, endowments and other institutions, which now outnumber wealthy individuals as private fund investors, hold more bargaining power over fees.
  > of underperformance in the private fund industry, combined with the rush of new investors into alternative investments—pension funds, endowments, and other institutions now outnumber rich individuals as private fund investors— means that those investors have more bargaining power regarding fees.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479

**2017**

- [2998033-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998033-027) [empirical/evidenced] -- Private fund management fees have compressed materially: the historical two percent of commitments has shifted in recent years to roughly 1.0 percent for new managers and 1.5 to 1.8 percent for established managers with an adequate track record.
  > However, the historical fee of 2% of commitments through the reinvestment period, then 2% on the cost basis for the investments/value of fund has shifted in recent years closer to 1.0% for new managers and 1.5-1.8% for established managers with an adequate track record.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/fee-compression.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.