# Feedback effects

`kaal:entity:feedback-effects`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 73 claims that carry the concept tag `feedback-effects`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

73 claims across 17 works, 2013 to 2024.

**2013**

- [2267560-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-001) [definitional/asserted] -- Dynamic regulation is an optimization process for the learning experience in the New Institutional Economics framework, describing intra- and inter-jurisdictional feedback effects between different public rulemakers and between private and public rulemakers.
  > Dynamic regulation describes intra- and inter-jurisdictional feedback effects between different public rulemakers and between private and public rulemakers.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-007) [mechanism/argued] -- The feedback effect between different public rulemakers and between private and public rulemakers reduces incomplete information, which in turn enables the rulemaker to modify the next action in the rulemaking process.
  > The feedback effect increases the availability of relevant information for rulemaking. At the same time, the reduction of incomplete information in the rulemaking process enables the rulemaker to modify the next action in the rulemaking process.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-009) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Rules with suboptimal characteristics are themselves the product of institutional arrangements and reinforce those suboptimal institutional arrangements and rulemaking processes, creating a self-perpetuating feedback loop.
  > Rules with suboptimal characteristics are the results of institutional arrangements and reinforce suboptimal institutional arrangements and rulemaking processes.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-011) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Rules that lack adaptability to future states of the world reinforce the very institutions and processes that produce suboptimal outcomes.
  > Rules that lack adaptability to future states of the world reinforce institutions and processes that produce suboptimal outcomes.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-015) [mechanism/argued] -- Under dynamic regulation a presumption of reform feasibility is unnecessary because the feedback effect makes ad-hoc decisions obsolete, curtailing centralized planning and minimizing unintended actions.
  > A presumption of reform feasibility for a given regulatory environment is unnecessary because the feedback effect in dynamic regulation makes ad-hoc decisions obsolete.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-016) [mechanism/argued] -- Because feedback effects increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information, rulemakers can predict unforeseen contingencies and adjust their actions ex-ante to avoid complex reforms and unwanted consequences.
  > Because the feedback effects in dynamic regulation allow rulemakers to increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking, rulemakers can predict unforeseen contingencies and adjust their actions ex-ante to avoid complex reforms.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-021) [design/asserted] -- Opportunities for integrating dynamic elements into the rulemaking process include intra-jurisdictional feedback processes, feedback effects between private and public rulemakers, inter-jurisdictional feedback processes, informal rules, and organizational culture.
  > (i) intra-jurisdictional feedback processes such as (i) exchanges and synergies between public rulemakers and regulators, (ii) feedback effects between private and public rulemakers, (iii) inter-jurisdictional feedback processes, (iv) informal rules, and (v) organizational culture.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-022) [mechanism/argued] -- Parties subject to informal rules signal their preferences and efficient solutions to the public rulemaker, so informal rules and practices supply additional information that modifies rulemakers' actions and improves rulemaking.
  > Parties who are subject to informal rules signal their preferences as well as efficient solutions to the public rulemaker. Informal rules and practices therefore provide additional information that can help modify the actions of rulemakers and improve rulemaking.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-028) [mechanism/argued] -- The feedback process between public and private rulemakers increases the availability, timeliness, and quality of information available to the public rulemaker, which induces and supports a learning process and creates incentives for that learning.
  > The feedback process between public and private rulemakers increases the availability, timeliness, and quality of information available to the public rulemaker. This induces and supports the learning process for the public rulemaker.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-029) [mechanism/argued] -- Competition between legislators does not necessarily provide a feedback process in the sense of cooperation, but it nevertheless provides incentives for public rulemakers to consider regulatory solutions from other jurisdictions.
  > the competition between legislators does not necessarily provide a feedback process in the sense of cooperation, (Kirchner, Painter and Kaal 2005; Carbonara and Parisi 2008; Kerber 2000; Heine and Kerber 2002), it can nevertheless provide incentives for public rulemakers to consider regulatory
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-030) [mechanism/argued] -- Because competition between legislators requires public rulemakers to meet consumers' and legal addressees' quality expectations and preferences, it adds a dynamic and market-driven element with a feedback effect to the rulemaking process.
  > Because the competition between legislators requires public rulemakers to meet consumers' and legal addressees' quality expectations and preferences, the competition between legislators adds a dynamic and market-driven element with a feedback effect to the rulemaking process.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-031) [mechanism/argued] -- Consumer opt-out from existing rules creates a feedback effect for the public rulemaker: when a critical mass of opt-outs signals that a different rule may be optimal, it triggers a modification of the rulemaker's next action.
  > The consumer opt-out of existing rules creates a feedback effect for the public rulemaker and triggers a modification of the public rulemaker's next action in the rulemaking process.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-032) [condition/argued] -- Information exchange between agents of public rulemakers, such as regulators, will not necessarily involve decentralized information, unlike feedback effects between private and public rulemakers.
  > Unlike the feedback effects between private and public rulemakers, the information exchange between agents of public rulemakers, such as regulators, will not necessarily involve decentralized information.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-034) [mechanism/argued] -- Contractual incompleteness can be lowered through dynamic processes within the rulemaking process, because dynamic elements improve the availability, timeliness, and quality of information via the feedback process.
  > This paper suggests that contractual incompleteness can be lowered through dynamic processes within the rulemaking process in the incomplete contract model. Through the feedback process, dynamic elements help to improve the availability, timeliness, and quality of information.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-041](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-041) [condition/argued] -- Contracting parties need to postpone the specification of obligations only if the feedback process in the dynamic framework did not generate sufficient information; where sufficient information is available, contractual incompleteness can be lowered.
  > Contracting parties in the incomplete contract model only postpone the specification of obligations if the feedback process in the dynamic framework did not generate sufficient information.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-043](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-043) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The availability of information generated through the dynamic feedback process cannot be optimized at any given point in time, because the feedback effect is intended to perpetually reinforce itself.
  > the availability of information generated through this process cannot be optimized at any given point in time.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-046](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-046) [mechanism/argued] -- Dynamic regulation helps rulemakers anticipate how institutions will react to circumstances as they arise, because the feedback process provides decentralized, timely, and institution-specific information, allowing rules to be adjusted ex-ante in anticipation of future contingencies.
  > Dynamic regulation helps rulemakers anticipate how institutions will react to circumstances as they arise because the feedback process provides decentralized, timely, and institution-specific information for rulemaking. Rules are adjusted ex-ante in anticipation of future contingencies.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-047](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-047) [condition/argued] -- The broad scope for contractual incompleteness and delayed decision-making stipulated by the incomplete contract model are necessary only if the feedback effect did not produce sufficient information for rulemaking.
  > The broad scope for contractual incompleteness and delayed decision- making as stipulated by the incomplete contract model are necessary only if the feedback effect did not produce sufficient information for rulemaking.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-051](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-051) [mechanism/argued] -- The combination of multiple feedback processes results in a sequence of mutually-reinforcing, information-enhancing events that minimizes ex-post trial-and-error experimentation with stable rules after those rules have already emerged as failures.
  > The combination of these feedback processes can result in a sequence of mutually-reinforcing, information- enhancing events. This process can help minimize ex-post trial-and-error experimentation with stable and presumptively optimal rules after previous stable rules have emerged as failures.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

**2014**

- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-001) [definitional/asserted] -- Dynamic regulation is a supplemental regulatory tool, not a replacement for existing rulemaking: it increases the availability of relevant, institution specific, and decentralized information for rulemaking through feedback effects.
  > The concept of dynamic regulation in this article describes a supplemental regulatory tool that increases the availability of relevant, institution-specific, and decentralized information for rulemaking through feedback effects
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-012) [mechanism/argued] -- Interaction and exchange of emerging information between public and private rulemakers creates a feedback process that increases the availability, timeliness, and quality of information available to the public rulemaker.
  > Interaction between public rulemakers and private rulemakers, including the exchange of emerging information, creates a feed- back process between them that increases the availability, timeliness, and quality of information available to the public rulemaker.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The existing framework of stable and presumptively optimal rules is self reinforcing: it perpetuates rulemaking processes that produce stable presumptively optimal rules and therefore keeps generating costly rule revision, updating, and revocation.
  > The existing framework for stable and presumptively optimal rules reinforces rulemaking processes that perpet- uate stable and presumptively optimal rules, necessitating costly rule revision, updating, and revocation.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-014) [mechanism/argued] -- Feedback effects allow the necessary information to be acquired ex ante and necessary revisions to be anticipated before rules emerge as suboptimal, rather than ex post after failure has become apparent.
  > Rather than acquiring the necessary information ex-post after rules have emerged as suboptimal, feedback effects help increase the availability of rele- vant information for rulemaking ex-ante and anticipate necessary revisions before rules emerge as suboptimal
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-031) [mechanism/argued] -- Feedback processes associated with governmental contracts lower contractual incompleteness, because they raise the availability, timeliness, and quality of information while lowering the cost of contracting.
  > Feedback processes associated with governmental contracts can lower contractual incompleteness because the feedback processes increase the degree of availability, timeliness, and quality of information and lower the cost of contracting.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-033) [mechanism/argued] -- Self reporting supplies institution specific information from which the government can identify governance shortcomings in the reporting entity and draw conclusions about regulatory needs across the entity's industry.
  > Based on the additional institution-specific information made available through self- reporting, the government can identify institution-specific governance short- comings and draw conclusions about regulatory needs in the respective indus- tries.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-034) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Preemptive remedial measures have a low success rate, as evidenced by the fact that more than 60 percent of deferred and non prosecution agreements executed between 1993 and 2013 refer to preemptive remedial measures that preceded them.
  > The low success rate of preemptive re- medial measures, evidenced by the fact that over 60% of D/NPA executed between 1993 and 2013 refer to preemptive remedial measures103
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-035) [mechanism/argued] -- Negotiation of a governmental contract produces indirect information transfers, because the government can deduce from where the corporate wrongdoer places negotiating emphasis which governance shortcomings most need remedying.
  > Indirect information transfers and feedback effects may exist because the government may be able to deduce from the emphasis of the corporate wrongdoer's negotiations what particular governance shortcomings need par- ticular remedying.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-036) [mechanism/argued] -- Regulators can extract industry specific guidance for rulemaking from the quantity of governmental contracts executed in a given industry and from the frequency of particular industry specific terms in those contracts.
  > Regulators may receive industry-specific guidance for rulemaking from the quantity of exe- cuted governmental contracts pertaining to a particular industry and the quan- tity of particular (industry-specific) terms in the governmental contracts per- taining to that industry.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

**2016**

- [2740477-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-004) [definitional/asserted] -- Dynamic regulation is defined as the study of regulatory phenomena in relation to both preceding and succeeding events, using institution specific and decentralized information to generate feedback effects that support anticipatory rulemaking.
  > The theory of dynamic regulation conceptualizes the study of regulatory phenomena in relation to preceding and succeeding events, using institution-specific and decentralized information to facilitate feedback effects for anticipatory rulemaking.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477
- [2740477-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-005) [design/argued] -- Venture capital can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation because venture capitalists' financial allocations to innovative projects generate feedback that regulators can use.
  > We show that venture capital can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation. Venture capital's financial allocations to innovative projects can provide feedback for dynamic regulation of disruptive innovation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477
- [2740477-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-029) [mechanism/argued] -- Dynamic regulatory tools let rulemakers adapt to regulatory contingencies as they arise, because feedback effects deliver relevant, timely, decentralized, and institution specific information ex ante.
  > Dynamic regulatory tools as a regulatory supplement enable rulemakers to adapt to regulatory contingencies if and when they arise because feedback effect provides relevant, timely, decentralized, and institution-specific information ex-ante.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477
- [2740477-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-031) [mechanism/argued] -- Private rulemakers hold a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterparts, they can produce the comparable, decentralized, and institution specific information that rulemaking requires.
  > Private rulemakers can have a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterparts, they often can produce necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution-specific information for rulemaking.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477
- [2808132-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-005) [definitional/asserted] -- Dynamic regulation is defined as conceptualizing regulatory phenomena in relation to both preceding and succeeding events, using institution-specific and decentralized information to generate feedback effects that support anticipatory rulemaking.
  > The theory of dynamic regulation conceptualizes the study of regulatory phenomena in relation to preceding and succeeding events, using institution-specific and decentralized information to facilitate feedback effects for anticipatory rulemaking.105
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132
- [2808132-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-006) [design/evidenced] -- Data derived from venture capital investments can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation, because venture capital's financial allocations to innovative projects supply feedback for dynamic regulation.
  > We show that data derived from venture capital investments can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation. Venture capital's financial allocations to innovative projects can provide feedback for dynamic regulation of
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132
- [2808132-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-031) [mechanism/argued] -- Unrestricted exchange of information between public and private rulemakers creates regulatory synergies that increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking and thereby generate feedback effects.
  > feedback processes.115 The unrestricted exchange of information between public- and private rulemakers can create regulatory synergies that increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking116 and facilitate feedback
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132
- [2808132-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-032) [design/argued] -- Through feedback effects, rulemakers in a dynamic regulatory framework can adopt rules that are adaptable to future states of the world rather than fixed to current conditions.
  > effects.117 Existing rules can provide feedback effects for the rulemaking process itself. Through feedback effects, rulemakers in a dynamic regulatory framework can adopt rules that are adaptable to future states of the world.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132
- [2808132-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-033) [mechanism/argued] -- Dynamic regulatory tools lower unforeseen contingencies in rulemaking because the feedback effect supplies relevant, timely, decentralized, and institution-specific information ex ante, allowing rulemakers to adapt to contingencies as they arise.
  > because a feedback effect provides relevant, timely, decentralized, and institution-specific information ex-ante. By increasing the availability of information ex-ante, dynamic regulatory tools help lower unforeseen contingencies in the rulemaking process.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132
- [2808132-044](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-044) [mechanism/argued] -- Feedback effects from venture capitalists' finance allocations toward innovative products give rulemakers timely, decentralized, industry-specific and entity-specific information that allows them to adapt rules in anticipation of regulatory issues.
  > anticipatory rulemaking. Through the feedback effects that are facilitated by venture capitalists' finance allocations towards innovative products, rulemakers can obtain timely and decentralized industry- and entity-specific information that allows them to adapt
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132
- [2831040-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-021) [mechanism/argued] -- Deferred prosecution agreements produce superior feedback effects for regulation because the prosecutor's investigation and the negotiation and execution of the agreement signal regulatory needs in real time.
  > DPAs produce superior feedback effects for regulation as the prosecutor's investigation and DPA negotiations and executions signal regulatory needs real-time.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040
- [2831040-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-025) [mechanism/argued] -- Early regulatory intervention becomes unnecessary in a dynamic regulatory framework, because the regulatory challenges associated with innovation would become transparent in real time through improved, decentralized information and feedback effects.
  > Because in a dynamic regulatory framework, the regulatory challenges associated with innovation would become transparent in real- time, early regulatory intervention would not be necessary.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040
- [2831040-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-026) [design/argued] -- In the dynamic regulatory framework, feedback effects and real time information permit regulatory intervention if and only when it is needed, which avoids stunting innovation through negative early signals, the inability to keep pace with later stage innovation, and information asymmetries.
  > In the theoretical dynamic regulatory framework, feedback effects and real-time information on regulatory challenges associated with innovation allow regulatory intervention if and only when needed.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040
- [2831040-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-032) [design/argued] -- Anticipatory rulemaking in the dynamic framework is accomplished by combining institution specific, decentralized, and timely information with feedback effects, which can occur between public and private rulemakers, between outcomes and institutions, across jurisdictions, and between rules and rulemaking processes.
  > It relies on the use of institution-specific, decentralized, and timely information5 in combination with feedback effects (Kaal 2014b). Feedback effects can occur in several settings including feedback processes between different public and private rulemakers
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040
- [2831040-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-037) [mechanism/argued] -- Consumer choice adds a dynamic element to rulemaking because once consumers opt out of a suboptimal regulatory regime, public rulemakers in that jurisdiction can adjust their rulemaking in response, creating a feedback effect for the public rulemaker.
  > Consumer choice can add a dynamic element to the rulemaking process because public rulemakers in a given jurisdiction can adjust rulemaking to consumer choice once consumers have opted out of a suboptimal regulatory regime in that jurisdiction.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040
- [2831040-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-040) [design/argued] -- Regulation of innovation in a dynamic framework is triggered only as a supplement to the existing rulemaking framework, and only if and when feedback effects anticipate otherwise unforeseen contingencies and regulatory needs associated with innovation.
  > Regulation of innovation in a dynamic framework is only triggered as a supplement to the existing rulemaking framework if and when feedback effects anticipate otherwise unforeseen contingencies and regulatory needs associated with innovation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040

**2017**

- [2957645-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-001) [design/asserted] -- Contingent capital securities are a largely overlooked dynamic regulatory mechanism, and their regulatory value lies in their capacity to generate feedback effects, optimized timing, and improved information for regulation.
  > Contingent capital securities are a largely overlooked dynamic regulatory mechanism.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645
- [2957645-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-010) [definitional/asserted] -- Feedback effects, defined as informational exchange processes between public and private rulemakers, between outcomes and institutions, between rules and rulemaking processes, and across jurisdictions, are a central tenet of the theory of dynamic regulation.
  > Feedback effects occur when an informational exchange process exists between public and private rulemakers, outcomes and institutions, rules and rulemaking processes, and jurisdictions.20
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645
- [2957645-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-011) [mechanism/argued] -- Feedback effects change the timing of regulatory information: instead of acquiring necessary information only after rules have already proven suboptimal, they increase the availability of relevant information ex ante and support anticipation of necessary revisions.
  > Rather than acquiring necessary information after rules have emerged as suboptimal, feedback effects help increase the availability of relevant information for rulemaking ex ante and anticipate necessary revisions
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645
- [2957645-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-012) [mechanism/argued] -- Anticipatory regulation, which uses institution-specific and timely information together with feedback effects to create new rules, can minimize costly and suboptimal ex-post trial-and-error experimentation with stable and presumptively optimal rules.
  > Anticipatory regulation uses institution-specific, timely information and feedback effects to create new rules.24 Anticipatory dynamic regulation can help minimize costly and suboptimal ex-post, trial-and-error experimentation with stable and presumptively optimal rules.25
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645
- [2957645-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-013) [mechanism/argued] -- Deferred prosecution agreements and venture capital investment decisions function as dynamic regulatory tools because they increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking and facilitate feedback effects.
  > DPAs and venture capital investment decisions increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking and facilitate feedback effects.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645
- [2957645-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-025) [mechanism/argued] -- Contingent capital qualifies as a dynamic regulatory mechanism because capital injection is available only if and when needed and because the conversion of contingent capital securities into near worthless equity signals impending regulatory issues to regulators, which creates feedback effects.
  > Contingent capital is a dynamic regulatory mechanism because (1) capital injection is available only if and when needed; (2) signaling to regulators of impending regulatory issues via conversion of CCS to near worthless equity creates feedback effects;
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645
- [2957645-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-027) [mechanism/argued] -- Contingent capital creates feedback effects because the conversion of debt to equity signals to regulators that the entity's management was unable to avoid the trigger, which is itself a call for increased regulatory scrutiny.
  > Second, contingent capital creates feedback effects because the conversion of debt to equity signals to regulators that the respective entity's management that was unable to avoid the trigger from debt to equity, which calls for increased regulatory scrutiny.57
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645
- [2957645-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-031) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Most of the design features of contingent capital securities and their triggering events remain underdeveloped, yet despite these shortcomings such securities could still help regulators anticipate regulatory needs in real time through feedback effects and improved information.
  > While most of the design features of CCS and their triggering events are underdeveloped, despite these shortcomings, CCS could help allows regulators to anticipate regulatory needs in real-time, supported by feedback effects and improved information for regulation.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645
- [2998097-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998097-019) [condition/argued] -- Rules become adaptable when institutions and rulemaking processes integrate feedback effects, including feedback between industry and regulators, that generate timely, relevant, and decentralized information before rules are finalized.
  > Rules can become adaptable if institutions and rulemaking processes integrate feedback effects, including feedback effects between the industry and regulators, that produce timely, relevant, and decentralized information for rulemaking ex- ante before rulemakers finalize rules.137 By increasing the
  Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097

**2019**

- [3396522-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-015) [mechanism/argued] -- A well established stable cryptocurrency and a universal exchange form a positive feedback loop: the exchange's liquidity is enhanced by the stable cryptocurrency, and the stable currency's stability and adoption are enhanced by the exchange.
  > In essence, the combination of a well- established stable cryptocurrency with a universal exchange create a positive feedback loop. The exchange liquidity is enhanced by the stable cryptocurrency and the stability and adoption of the stable currency is enhanced through the exchange.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522
- [3396522-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-025) [predictive/argued] -- Because hardcoded cryptocurrency policy is transparent and therefore predictable, market participants can anticipate policy and adjust behavior in advance, and such anticipatory reactions could over time make actual policy making the exception rather than the rule.
  > Because of this transparency and associated predictability, market participants can anticipate policy making and adjust behavior accordingly. In fact, such anticipatory policy reactions could, over time, make actual policy-making the exception rather than the rule.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522
- [3402701-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-015) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because bonds sell below their redemption value, an open-ended bond queue grows without bound, depressing bond prices and creating a positive feedback loop that ends in a death spiral and failure of the peg.
  > More generally, since the bonds would sell at a price lower than they were redeemed, the bond queue would grow without bound, leading to lower prices for the bonds and a positive feedback loop which would lead to a death spiral and the failure of the peg
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701
- [3406323-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-002) [mechanism/argued] -- Because information flow in decentralized systems is optimized through dynamic feedback effects, such systems mutate and change easily, which makes them more attack resistant and allows them to grow very quickly.
  > Decentralized systems can also very easily mutate and change because the information flow is optimized through dynamic feedback effects. As a result, such systems become more attack resistant on multiple levels.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323
- [3411897-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-003) [mechanism/argued] -- Decentralized systems mutate and change easily because their information flow is optimized through dynamic feedback effects, and this capacity to mutate is what makes them more attack resistant on multiple levels.
  > Decentralized systems can also very easily mutate and change because the information flow is optimized through dynamic feedback effects. As a result, such systems become more attack resistant on multiple levels.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897
- [3411897-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-004) [mechanism/argued] -- The five types of decentralization, governmental and regulatory, technological, organizational, market, and societal, are not independent: as one type proliferates it progressively affects the others through feedback effects, producing compounding change.
  > These five types of decentralization are each subject to iterative decentralization processes and affect each other by way of feedback effects. As one type proliferates, the other types are slowly but increasingly affected, leading to changes that, in turn, affect each other.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897
- [3441904-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-008) [mechanism/argued] -- Decentralized systems become more attack resistant and grow quickly because their information flow is optimized through dynamic feedback effects, which lets them mutate and change very easily.
  > Decentralized systems can also very easily mutate and change because the information flow is optimized through dynamic feedback effects. As a result, such systems become more attack resistant on multiple levels.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904
- [3441904-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-009) [mechanism/argued] -- DAOs can be more productive than hierarchical organizations because their information allocation and feedback effects allow them to distribute the optimal amount of power to the optimal talent at the optimal point in time.
  > DAOs can be more productive in comparison with hierarchical organizations because the information allocation and feedback effects allow them to distribute the optimal amount of power to the optimal talent at the optimal point in time.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904
- [3441904-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-034) [mechanism/argued] -- Feedback effects in decentralized systems raise the availability of relevant information for governance rules ex ante and allow necessary revisions to be anticipated before rules emerge as suboptimal, rather than acquiring that information ex post.
  > Rather than acquiring the necessary information ex-post after rules have emerged as suboptimal, feedback effects help increase the availability of relevant information for governance rules ex-ante and anticipate necessary revisions before rules emerge as suboptimal.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904
- [3441904-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-036) [design/argued] -- Ex post code based majoritarian rules generated by DAOs are superior to ex ante majoritarian default rules because they rest on more accurate real time information from the edge and decentralized feedback effects, and are not subject to the same information asymmetries.
  > Ex-post code-based majoritarian rules are superior to ex-ante majoritarian rules because they are based on more accurate real-time information from the edge and decentralized feedback effects.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

**2021**

- [3782191-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782191-019) [mechanism/argued] -- Information in decentralized systems originates at the edges and is optimized through feedback: peers who receive information transmit its changed relevance back to the original generator, who evaluates and amends it, constantly updating and optimizing information quality.
  > This feedback constantly updates and optimizes the quality of infor- mation.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Preface to (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782191
- [3808852-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-001) [mechanism/argued] -- The six types of decentralization are not independent: each is subject to its own iterative process and affects the others through feedback effects, so proliferation in one type progressively changes the others.
  > These types of decentralization, among others, are each subject to iterative decentralization processes and affect each other by way of feedback effects. As one type proliferates, the other types are slowly but increasingly affected, leading to changes that, in turn, affect each other.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852
- [3808852-041](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-041) [mechanism/argued] -- As each form of decentralization empowers heightened proliferation of the other forms, individuals perceive more opportunities for changes in consumer behavior, silent withdrawal, disengagement, and defiance of the established centralized order.
  > As each form of decentralization empowers heightened proliferation of other forms of decentralization, individuals in society perceive more opportunities for changes in consumer behavior, silent withdrawal, disengagement, and defiance of the established centralized order.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852
- [3808852-042](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-042) [mechanism/argued] -- The crypto movement illustrates the feedback effects between types of decentralization: its political philosophy could not be instantiated without technological decentralization in the form of cryptocurrencies, the combination created new markets, and the movement then created new organizational forms in DAOs.
  > The particular political philosophy could not be instantiated without a form of technological decentralization, that is cryptocurrencies, which the movement believed to be immune from governmental control.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852
- [3949098-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-011) [mechanism/argued] -- The delayed voting outcomes and feedback effects created by the transition from loosely coupled to tightly coupled voting let DAOIC members triangulate their own internal liquidity position against deal feasibility.
  > At the same time, the delayed voting outcomes and associated feedback effects enabled by the transition from loosely coupled to tightly coupled voting enable DAOIC members to triangulate their own internal liquidity with deal feasibility.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098
- [3981021-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-017) [mechanism/argued] -- Forum comments let existing voting associates identify the most competent commenters and invite them to apply for membership by providing work for a grant, creating constant onboarding feedback effects that cannot exist in traditional centralized charitable organizations.
  > This helps increase the quality of talent that is onboarded into the CHARITYxDAO VA pool and creates constant onboarding feedback effects. Such feedback effects cannot exist in traditional centralized charitable organizations.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021

**2024**

- [4855607-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4855607-028) [mechanism/argued] -- The interaction between transformer models and the web3 community forms an evolutionary feedback loop in which community input shapes model development and the improved models return better service to the community, which is what sustains participation.
  > The interaction between Transformer models and the web3 community creates a symbiotic relationship where both evolve together. As the community inputs shape the development of the models, the improved models, in turn, offer better services or more accurate responses that benefit the community.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How AI Models are Optimized Through Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4855607
- [4855607-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4855607-030) [condition/asserted] -- The feedback effects that make community governance of federated learning work will not materialize unless expert community members are selected coherently, making coherent expert selection a precondition of the mechanism rather than an optional refinement.
  > The key is to select the expert community members coherently to allow for the feedback effects for FL to materialize.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How AI Models are Optimized Through Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4855607
- [4855607-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4855607-031) [mechanism/argued] -- A precedent and citation WDAG accounting system documents and traces every adjustment to a federated learning model, and that full accounting is what enables dynamic feedback effects and the rapid integration of new techniques.
  > This setup enables fully accounted dynamic feedback effects for rapid integration of new techniques and approaches to FL. This, in turn, ensures that the models remain cutting-edge and are quickly adaptable to new challenges and opportunities in AI development.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How AI Models are Optimized Through Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4855607
- [4855607-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4855607-032) [mechanism/asserted] -- GNNs and web3 systems optimize each other through mutual feedback effects, and it is this bidirectional learning, rather than one system merely serving the other, that produces an evolutionary dynamic optimization process.
  > The integration and optimization of AI models such as GNNs and web3 systems happens in feedback effects between the two systems. Through these feedback effects both systems learn constantly from and with each other which results in an evolutionary dynamic optimization process.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How AI Models are Optimized Through Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4855607

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