{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/finality",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:finality",
 "name": "Finality",
 "termCode": "finality",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/finality.md",
 "sha256": "c314c2e619f7d6087cf6ced22f783c04274a6e9268ab052e7544ebe733b85177",
 "additionalProperty": [
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 4
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 1
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2018",
    "2018"
   ]
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3125827-008",
   "text": "Given that Byzantine faults are inevitable in a distributed system, the known impossibility results force any consensus protocol to hedge: it can promise only a probability of finality and security, and that probability is inversely proportional to liveness and speed.",
   "abstract": "Given the inevitable possibility of Byzantine faults in a distributed system, such results require any protocol to hedge, promising only a probability of finality and security inversely proportional to liveness and speed.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "asynchronous distributed networks",
    "presence of Byzantine faults"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3125827-026",
   "text": "Forcing validation pools to close in finite time, which practical demand for swift resolution requires, opens the possibility of network partition and of a lack of genuine consensus, and therefore of forks. Complete finality would require unbounded validation time.",
   "abstract": "By forcing validation pools to end in finite time, we open the possibility of network partition and lack of genuine consensus which opens the possibility of forks,",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "validation windows bounded to seconds for practical liveness"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-030",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3125827-030",
   "text": "A 67% active validator requirement would improve finality but is excluded from the initial SPoS implementation because, by the CAP theorem, it limits the availability of the system and arbitrarily punishes randomly selected producers when the network is partitioned.",
   "abstract": "More importantly, due to the CAP theorem33, it limits the availability of the system, which is why it is not included in the initial implementation.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "network partitions occur",
    "consensus recognizes only blocks validated by a supermajority of active validators"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-034",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3125827-034",
   "text": "Finality in SPoS is measurable because forking away from a given block would cost the community all sem tokens created on the chain after it, and that quantity equals half of all fees sent since the block was produced.",
   "abstract": "the sem that members gain from policing block production is equal to half of all fees sent since the production of the block. In order to fork a chain from that particular block, the community will lose all sem tokens created subsequently",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "sem minted in proportion to fees on every validated block"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "4 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'finality'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}