# Financial crises `kaal:entity:financial-crises` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 8 claims that carry the concept tag `financial-crises`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 8 claims across 2 works, 2013 to 2014. **2013** - [2273857-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-003) [predictive/argued] -- Dynamic regulation could dampen the volatility of both the cosine curve describing common elements of financial crises and the regulatory sine curve, by creating an anticipatory rather than reactive regulatory response. > Dynamic regulation could help dampen the degree of volatility of both the cosine curve and the regulatory sine curve by creating an anticipatory regulatory response to financial crises. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-004) [empirical/evidenced] -- Financial regulation is characteristically enacted only in the aftermath of financial crises rather than in advance of them. > Financial regulation is usually enacted in the aftermath of financial crises. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-011) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Rules established in reaction to financial crises inevitably fail to soften, curtail, or preempt the effects of financial crises, because reactive rules are tailored to the economic and regulatory issues existing at the time of enactment and ignore possible future contingencies. > Rules established in reaction to financial crises also inevitably fail to soften, curtail, or preempt the effects of financial crises because reactive rules are mostly tailored to the economic and regulatory issues at the time of their enactment and often ignore possible future contingencies. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-015) [condition/argued] -- Financial rulemaking is most needed ex-ante before financial crises, not ex-post after crises have already imposed steep costs on the economy, markets, and financial institutions and have distorted the rulemaking process itself. > Financial rulemaking is most needed ex-ante before financial crises, not ex-post after crises created steep costs on the economy, impacted markets and financial institutions, and affected the rulemaking process. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-024) [definitional/evidenced] -- Bank crises share four core common elements: an exogenous shock, a favorable response to that shock, the dissipation of favorable conditions, and a systemic rise in bank failures. > The common characteristics include the following core elements: (i) an exogenous shock, (ii) a favorable response to the exogenous shock, (iii) favorable conditions dissipate, and (iv) a systemic rise in bank failures. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-039) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- In the current regulatory environment the relationship between the regulatory sine curve and the common elements of banking and financial crises is suboptimal, because regulatory activity only begins its ascent once bank failures are already increasing. > In the current regulatory environment a suboptimal relationship exists between the regulatory sine curve and the common elements of banking and financial crises. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-040) [predictive/argued] -- Future financial crises may be inevitable, because globalization, financial innovation, ethical challenges, suboptimal institutional designs, and the bounded rationality of decision makers create conditions that produce crises. > Future financial crises may be inevitable. Factors such as globalization, financial innovation, ethical challenges, suboptimal institutional designs, and the bounded rationality of decision makers may create conditions that result in future crises. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 **2014** - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-009) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Experimentation with different rules under the current framework of stable rulemaking carries substantial costs of rule revision and enactment, and there is evidence that this framework does not protect against systemic shocks and financial crises. > The costs of rule revision, rule enactment, and exper- imentation in the current framework of stable rulemaking are substantial, especially because there is some evidence25 that the existing rulemaking framework does not protect against systemic shocks and financial crises. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/financial-crises.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.