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  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3402701-007",
   "text": "Good governance principles are crucial to every aspect of a long-term stable currency because markets inevitably change and because the Folk Theorems of game theory pose a fundamental obstacle to any fixed protocol.",
   "abstract": "Most importantly, good governance principles are crucial for every aspect of instituting any long-term stable currency due to inevitable changes in the market and the fundamental obstacle represented by the Folk Theorems of game theory",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "condition",
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   "scope_conditions": [
    "long-term stable currency designs"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3402701-011",
   "text": "The Folk Theorems of game theory imply that no matter how complicated a stable coin protocol becomes, a powerful and patient player has strategies to subvert the system and profit at the expense of the group.",
   "abstract": "No matter how complicated the protocols become for creating a stable coin, there are strategies that a powerful and patient player can use to subvert the system to profit at the expense of the group",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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   "is_failure_mode": true,
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "text": "Because no fixed rule set can resist a patient adversary, any stable coin scheme requires a nimble and responsive governance process whose rules can always be adjusted to changing market conditions.",
   "abstract": "This means a nimble and responsive governance process is required for any such stable coin scheme, because the rules must always be ready to be adjusted to respond to the changing conditions of the market",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701",
   "datePublished": "2019",
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   "text": "The Folk Theorems of game theory prove that no protocol, however complex or well engineered, can eliminate corruption, understood as behavior that profits a minority at the greater expense of the majority.",
   "abstract": "Finally, we repeat the idea that the Folk Theorems of game theory prove that it is impossible to create protocols, no matter how complex or well- engineered, which can eliminate corruption",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701",
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   "text": "Because the Folk Theorems make governance protocols permanently provisional, long-term stability requires that the group be organized around a transcendental value, a goal meaningful and commonly held that cannot be captured by any logical rule set.",
   "abstract": "Therefore, for long-term stability, a group must be organized around a transcendental value that guides the members' behavior",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701",
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   "text": "For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation stakes there is a way to subvert the rules for individual profit at the expense of the group, a result the author attributes to the Folk Theorems of game theory.",
   "abstract": "For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation (stakes), there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782192-017",
   "text": "The Folk Theorems of game theory prove that any rules that can be formally set down can be subverted: strategies always exist that follow the rules and still allow a minority player to profit at the expense of the majority.",
   "abstract": "The Folk Theorems of Game Theory (explained in Chapter ^) prove the point that any rules that can be formally set down can be subverted. Strategies al- ways exist which follow the rules and yet allow a minority player to profit at the ex- pense of the majority.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
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   "scope_conditions": [
    "any formally specified rule set analyzed as a repeated game"
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   "text": "No set of written rules can be made complete: the Folk Theorems demonstrate that however rules are written, strategies exist that follow those rules yet profit the individual at the expense of the group, so a perfect secular constitution is impossible.",
   "abstract": "The Folk theories demonstrate that how- ever the rules are written, strategies exist which follow the rules, yet profit the indi- vidual at the expense of the group.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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   "is_failure_mode": true,
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    "any static, formally specified set of rules governing a group"
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   "text": "It is impossible to set up formal rules that keep a group behaving cooperatively in the long run, even if those rules are policed perfectly; the spirit of the law matters more than the letter of the law.",
   "abstract": "It is impossible to set up formal rules for a group to keep them behaving in a cooper- ative manner in the long run, even if the rules are policed perfectly.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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    "long run repeated interaction",
    "even under perfect enforcement"
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782203-017",
   "text": "However rules are formalized in a realistic setting, there exist strategies that follow the rules yet subvert the intentions of the framers, so legal strategies will always be available that profit an individual adversary at the expense of the group.",
   "abstract": "This leads to the intuition that however rules are formalized in a realistic situation, there are strategies which follow the rules, but still subvert the intentions of the fram- ers. There are legal strategies that profit the individual adversary at the expense of the group.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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    "realistic repeated games",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782203-039",
   "text": "Because the Folk Theorems rule out a perfect reward system, the design goal for a DAO should be reduced to making it easier for members to help the group than to hurt it, with members themselves incentivized to police bad actors to protect their own profits.",
   "abstract": "From the Folk Theorems, we know we cannot set up a perfect system. The best we can hope for, is to design a system which makes it easier to help the group than to hurt it.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "leaderless DAOs with anonymous members",
    "no external enforcement available"
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-022",
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   "text": "Because eternally perfect protocols are impossible, as illustrated by Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Folk Theorems of Game Theory, the remedy is not a better static ruleset but a system that continually improves its protocols and smart contracts in reaction to market change.",
   "abstract": "The impossibility of creating eternally perfect protocols, as illustrated by Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Folk Theorems of Game Theory, is addressed by a sys- tem which continually improves protocols and smart contracts to react to changes in the market.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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   "is_failure_mode": false,
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    "governance systems that must adapt over time"
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   "status": "current"
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782214-025",
   "text": "No centralized platform such as Amazon or eBay has been able to create meaningful and secure online reputation, because central ownership and control prevent them from giving members the power and incentives needed to police their own reputation.",
   "abstract": "No centralized platform, such as Amazon or eBay, has been able to create mean- ingful and secure online reputation. Because they are centrally owned and controlled they cannot give members the power and incentives they need to police their own reputation,",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
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    "centrally owned and controlled platforms"
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782217-025",
   "text": "Popularity based ranking cannot substitute for editorial control, because people end up relying on unconscious algorithms to determine what is authoritative and the Folk Theorems establish that such algorithms can always be gamed.",
   "abstract": "People rely on unconscious algorithms which use popularity to determine what is authoritative content. But the lessons of the Folk Theorems again arise, to remind us that such algorithms can always be gamed.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "user generated content platforms without editorial control"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782220-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782220-004",
   "text": "Transcendental values are necessary for long-term stability because every formal, explicitly specified protocol is permanently exposed to strategies that subvert it, a result the authors draw from the Folk Theorems of game theory.",
   "abstract": "By the insights gleaned from the Folk Theo- rems of Game Theory, transcendental values are necessary to maintain long-term sta- bility in the face of ever-present strategies for subverting any formal, explicitly-speci- fied protocol.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Transcendental Unifying Values for Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782220",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
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    "long-term stability",
    "formally specified protocols"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782220-023",
   "text": "Beyond any Folk Theorem justification for stability, the ultimate reason not to impose a clear distinction between the individual and the social is that no such clear distinction exists in nature, and a network's values must reflect that vagueness.",
   "abstract": "Beyond any Folk Theorem justification for stability, the ulti- mate reason we should not impose a clear distinction between the two is that there is no clear distinction in nature.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Transcendental Unifying Values for Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782220",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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  },
  {
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782220-035",
   "text": "Unlike scientific laws, transcendental values cannot be stated formally and explicitly, so they must be authored by people in touch with transcendental beauty, true poets, who are nevertheless grounded in concrete understanding of the universe and its laws.",
   "abstract": "Transcendental values cannot be stated formally and explicitly, unlike scientific laws. People who are in touch with transcendental beauty, true poets, need to be the authors of our transcendental values.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Transcendental Unifying Values for Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782220",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "design",
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    "construction of unifying values for a network"
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6269518-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6269518-005",
   "text": "No static citation protocol can eliminate all arbitrage opportunities for sufficiently patient and powerful actors, a conclusion the author draws from Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, the Folk Theorems of repeated games, and incomplete contract theory.",
   "abstract": "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, the Folk Theorems of repeated game theory, and the theory of incomplete contracts all counsel that no static citation protocol can eliminate all arbitrage opportunities for sufficiently patient and powerful actors.6",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "actors are sufficiently patient and powerful",
    "the citation protocol is fixed and published"
   ],
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  }
 ],
 "description": "18 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'folk-theorems'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}