# Forking

`kaal:entity:forking`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `forking`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 4 works, 2019 to 2025.

**2019**

- [3441904-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-005) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Forking a chain is an insufficient governance mechanism, and even attempts to create socially optimal chain forking rules cannot suffice as a substitute for evolutionary blockchain governance protocols.
  > Existing blockchain governance still mainly consist of forking a given chain. Even attempts to create socially optimal chain forking rules cannot suffice.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

**2021**

- [3782214-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-008) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Fundamental rule changes in a large decentralized organization are typically demanded when a large minority is treated unfairly, which means the advantaged majority has no incentive to make the change; the resulting deadlock leaves revolution or a network split as the only route to foundational change.
  > When a large decentralized organization needs a fundamental rule change, it of- ten happens because a large minority subgroup is being treated unfairly. That typically means the majority is advantaged by the rules and are therefore not incentivized to change the rules.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214
- [3808859-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-020) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The absence of a centralized authority makes open source projects prone to separation movements, because rival developer cliques form their own belief systems about the direction of development with no authority to resolve the dispute.
  > Because no centralized authority decides the direction of development, open source projects are more prone to cliques of developers that develop their own belief system regarding certain aspects of the development process.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859

**2025**

- [5887242-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5887242-037) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Every large-scale legal order eventually accumulates dead-letter provisions, contradictory clauses and rules premised on obsolete technology; national codes require heroic political effort to prune, and private codes either never update or fork into competing versions.
  > Every large-scale legal order eventually accumulates dead-letter provisions, contradictory clauses, and legacy rules premised on obsolete technology. National codes require heroic political efforts to prune. Private codes either never update or fork into competing versions.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The UDLC DAO Operationalizing a Continuously Evolving Universal Digital Law Codex Through Weighted (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5887242

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/forking.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.