# Formal model

`kaal:entity:formal-model`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `formal-model`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 1 works, 2018 to 2018.

**2018**

- [3125822-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-019) [empirical/argued] -- In the absolute worst case, with no safeguards at all, the price of corrupting the platform from within is a minimum of twice the total historical fees added to the system, and instituting any obvious protection raises that price steeply.
  > in the absolute worst- case scenario, the price to corrupt the system from within is a minimum of twice the total historical fees added to the system. If any obvious protections are instituted, the price to corrupt grows steeply.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822
- [3125822-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-021) [empirical/argued] -- Acquiring 51 percent of the tokens by paying fees and winning betting pools costs roughly six times the value of the entire quantity of sem tokens in a healthy expertise, even when the bench makes no effort at all to police the incoming fees.
  > a reasonable estimate for the price of this attack (even when the bench makes absolutely no effort to police this action) is 6 times the value of the entire quantity of sem tokens in existence in the expertise, when the expertise is healthy, i.e., earning fees.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822
- [3125822-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-022) [condition/argued] -- If good faith experts counter invest at least as fast as the malicious group, that is at a constant fraction c greater than or equal to one of the malicious investment, the malicious group can never gain more than 50 percent of the power.
  > assume the good-faith experts invest some constant fraction c of the malicious groups' investment ∆x at each time. If c ≥ 1then the malicious group will never gain more than 50% power.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/formal-model.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.