# Fund size

`kaal:entity:fund-size`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 12 claims that carry the concept tag `fund-size`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

12 claims across 4 works, 2012 to 2017.

**2012**

- [2150377-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-025) [empirical/evidenced] -- The regulatory regime does not drive fund sizing for most advisers: 82.02% of respondents would not take the current regulatory regime into account in determining the assets under management size of their funds.
  > Of those who responded, 82.02% would not have taken the current regulatory regime into account in determining the AUM size of their funds.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377
- [2150377-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-026) [mechanism/evidenced] -- Among the minority of advisers who do factor regulation into fund sizing, the pressure runs in both directions: about 25% would go smaller to avoid regulatory hassle while about 50% would grow or need a certain size to cover the increased expenses.
  > A significant number (25%) would go smaller to avoid the regulatory hassle. A larger percentage (50%) expressed either increasing current AUM size to cover expenses or mentioned the need for a certain size in order to account for the increase in expenses.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377
- [2150377-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-027) [empirical/evidenced] -- The Form PF quarterly reporting threshold of $1.5 billion in assets under management is not a binding sizing constraint for most advisers: 80.46% would not take it into account in determining fund size, while 19.54% would.
  > Of those who responded, 80.46% would not take the Form PF threshold for quarterly reporting of $1.5 billion AUM into account in determining the appropriate size of AUM for the fund(s) they manage, whereas 19.54% would take it into account.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377
- [2150377-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-028) [mechanism/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Where the Form PF quarterly reporting threshold does influence behavior, it distorts fund size downward: a majority of the advisers who take the threshold into account plan to stay under $1.5 billion in assets under management, and some would close funds to new investors to do so.
  > A majority of those respondents who would take it into account plan to stay under the Form PF threshold for quarterly reporting of $1.5 billion AUM.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377

**2014**

- [2389416-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-017) [empirical/evidenced] -- In the period close to and following the registration effective date, fund size has a positive relationship with fund performance, with positive beta coefficients in March through May and July 2012.
  > In the period close to and following the registration effective date for hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act, the size of funds seems to have a positive relationship with the fund performance.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416

**2016**

- [2816408-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-021) [empirical/evidenced] -- In simple linear regressions of monthly returns on log AUM across December 2011 to December 2012, fund size does not appear to matter for fund returns because only a few coefficients are statistically significant and those remain close to zero.
  > We conclude that size of the funds in our sample does not appear to matter for fund returns as only a few coefficients are statistically significant but are still close to zero.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408
- [2816408-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-022) [empirical/evidenced] -- Fund size shows a negative relationship with performance in the months before the March 2012 registration effective date and a positive relationship afterward, with beta coefficients negative in January to March 2012 and July 2012 and positive in April and May 2012.
  > Examining the beta coefficients, we notice that in the period January - March 2012 and July 2012, beta coefficients are negative, while immediately after the registration effective date, e.g. April-May 2012 the beta coefficient is positive.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408
- [2816408-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-026) [empirical/evidenced] -- Smaller funds outperform larger funds in eight of twelve months in 2012, but performance varies strongly across the subsamples with no clearly dominant group on average.
  > Figure 1 shows that smaller funds outperform larger funds in the sample in eight of twelve months in 2012. There is a strong variability in the performance of the subsamples, with on average no clear dominant group.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408

**2017**

- [3002908-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3002908-020) [mechanism/argued] -- By optimizing internal processes through blockchain technology, smaller investment fund managers gain unprecedented opportunities to compete with more established managers in markets previously dominated by larger players.
  > By optimizing their internal processes via blockchain technology, smaller investment fund managers gain unprecedented opportunities to compete with more established fund managers in markets that were previously dominated by larger players.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002908
- [3002908-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3002908-024) [condition/argued] -- Larger fund managers will adopt blockchain only once the long term benefits exceed implementation cost, and because that cost is much larger for them than for the smaller managers now experimenting, the threshold is higher for larger managers.
  > If and when the long-term benefits of using the technologies exceed the implementation cost, which are much larger for larger managers than for the smaller managers who are currently experimenting with such technologies, larger managers are incentivized to start the innovation process as well.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002908
- [3002908-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3002908-026) [empirical/evidenced] -- The size distribution of blockchain using funds differs sharply across regions: in the United States most such funds hold between one and fifty million dollars in AUM, while in Europe funds with more than two hundred million dollars in AUM are the majority.
  > majority of the private funds have AUM varying in a range comprised between $1 to #50 million AUM with only 2 funds whose AUM are between $101-150 AUM and above to $ 200 million AUM, in Europe the situation is rather different: private funds with an AUM higher than $200 million are the majority
  Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002908
- [3002908-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3002908-029) [mechanism/argued] -- A competing explanation for the transatlantic size gap is compositional: American blockchain funds are mostly newly created ad hoc vehicles focused exclusively on blockchain, while European ones are more established and older financial institutions.
  > American private investment funds investing in blockchain are mostly newly and ad hoc created investment vehicles, focused exclusively on blockchain. Whereas the vast majority of European private funds are more established and older financial
  Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002908

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/fund-size.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.