# Fund structure

`kaal:entity:fund-structure`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 7 claims that carry the concept tag `fund-structure`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

7 claims across 6 works, 2012 to 2021.

**2012**

- [2150377-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-021) [empirical/evidenced] -- Structural and portfolio level responses to registration were rare: only a minority of respondents severed an advising relationship, changed a fund's legal structure, liquidated positions, changed investment styles, changed portfolio structure, or closed funds to new investors.
  > A minority of respondents: (1) severed an advising relationship, (2) changed funds' (legal) structure, (3) liquidated positions, (4) changed investment styles, (5) changed portfolio structure, or (6) closed funds to new investors.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377

**2016**

- [2732915-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-020) [empirical/evidenced] -- Private fund advisers in the sample did not terminate existing employment relationships, and only few severed advising relationships, changed fund legal structure, liquidated positions, changed investment styles or portfolio structure, or closed funds to new investors.
  > Private fund advisers in the sample did not terminate existing employment relationships. Few respondents severed an advising relationship, changed funds' (legal) structure, liquidated positions, changed investment styles, changed portfolio structure, or closed funds to new investors.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915
- [2739479-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-022) [empirical/evidenced] -- Although rare in absolute terms, structural responses grew: at least part of the industry is increasingly changing the legal structure of its funds and closing funds to new investors in response to the post-2012 regulatory changes.
  > Most notably, the comparative data in Figure 4 suggest that at least a part of the industry is increasingly changing the legal structure of their fund(s) and closing funds to new investors in response to the regulatory changes
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479
- [2739479-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-033) [mechanism/argued] -- Although Dodd-Frank compliance costs fall primarily on the investment adviser rather than the fund, advisers have increasingly built fund structures that pass most of those compliance expenses through to their reporting funds.
  > Although Dodd-Frank Act compliance costs predominantly affect the investment advisers of private funds rather than the funds themselves, investment advisers have increasingly created fund struc- tures that allow them to pass most of their compliance expenses through to their reporting funds.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479

**2019**

- [3405660-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-018) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The complex trading, investing and corporate structures of active international hedge funds are a major constraint on effective prudential supervision.
  > One of the major constraining factors that constricts effective prudential supervision of hedge funds is the complex trading-, investing- and corporate structure of active international hedge funds.
  Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660
- [3409548-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3409548-011) [empirical/asserted] -- Blockchain adoption by private investment funds followed a staged path: minimal use from 2000 to 2012, then experimentation through separate new fund entities beginning in 2012, and from 2015 the creation of blockchain substructures inside existing funds.
  > They began to experiment with the technology by setting up separate and new fund entities that utilized the technology in various forms. In 2015, however, existing funds also started to create substructures that utilized blockchain technology.
  Kaal, Financial Technology and Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3409548

**2021**

- [3949098-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-012) [design/argued] -- Because reputation staking carries no ex post capital commitment, the removal of capital makes capital calls and other liquidity limiting measures less relevant for DAOIC members.
  > The removal of capital through RNFT staking also makes capital calls and other liquidity-limiting measures less relevant. There are no ex post capital commitments associated with an RNFT staking participation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/fund-structure.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.