{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/fungible-tokens",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:fungible-tokens",
 "name": "Fungible tokens",
 "termCode": "fungible-tokens",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/fungible-tokens.md",
 "sha256": "9b0d381f63e3f1f0ef03fa28cf11b5a263a5fab1914c2092f77fbc663f5383f6",
 "additionalProperty": [
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 7
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 5
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2020",
    "2023"
   ]
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3652481-010",
   "text": "A DAO focus on the value enhancement of fungible tokens can produce short termism and lead the organization to ignore ethical and governance issues.",
   "abstract": "Yet, the focus on the value enhancement of fungible tokens can lead to short termism and may ignore ethical and governance issues.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "fungible tokens are the dominant value metric"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "530b3a40c244aeca2eb4c53f4c9b4d6b2962bd6be9f92b4ebe17139c17f4c0e0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3799320-005",
   "text": "The focus on value enhancement of fungible tokens can drive short termism in DAOs and cause ethical and governance issues to be ignored.",
   "abstract": "Yet, the focus on the value enhancement of fungible tokens can lead to short- termism and may ignore ethical and governance issues.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "DAOs whose incentive design centers on fungible token value"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c3dff852f2d3f04718c829a24189309a7db4d92d84f6045d3d4f562d87c03e63",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-014",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3799320-014",
   "text": "When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of a DAO with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt that governance design for their own gain.",
   "abstract": "When fungible assets are used as the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal constituents and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt the governance design of the DAO for their own gain.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "fungible assets used as the dominant governance incentive",
    "actors who are identifiable"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c3dff852f2d3f04718c829a24189309a7db4d92d84f6045d3d4f562d87c03e63",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3981021-025",
   "text": "Voting associate salaries are paid in fungible tokens pro rata to each associate's non fungible reputation score at the point of payment, which creates second order economic effects and indirect economic incentives in the DAO.",
   "abstract": "In other words, the reputation salary is paid out in fungible tokens pro rata to reputation score of each VA at the point of payment. This design ensures second order economic effects and indirect economic incentives in the",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "CHARITYxDAO salary design"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-005",
   "text": "Governance by fungible tokens lets whales control a fundraiser DAO, which is antithetical to decentralized governance, and selling purchasable voting power via fungible tokens creates the risk of hostile takeover or looting.",
   "abstract": "Governance through fungible tokens in fundraiser DAOs allows whales to control the DAO, which is antithetical to the idea of DAOs overall and decentralized governance of DAOs specifically. More specifically, selling purchasable voting power via fungible tokens risks hostile takeovers or looting.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "governance rights attached to fungible, purchasable tokens"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-011",
   "text": "Insider rug pulls are not the only exploit path: a DAO can also be attacked from the outside whenever its governance grants voting power through fungible tokens.",
   "abstract": "But these inside rug pulls are not the only exploitative mechanism within DAOs. DAOs can also be exploited from the outside if the DAO's governance allows fungible voting power.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "governance voting power is denominated in fungible tokens"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-020",
   "text": "Fungible governance tokens expose a DAO to vote buying and other forms of manipulation.",
   "abstract": "However, fungible governance tokens also have some limitations and challenges, such as the potential for vote buying or other forms of manipulation.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715",
   "datePublished": "2023",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "fungible token based governance"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "7 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'fungible-tokens'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}