# Fungible tokens

`kaal:entity:fungible-tokens`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 7 claims that carry the concept tag `fungible-tokens`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

7 claims across 5 works, 2020 to 2023.

**2020**

- [3652481-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-010) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A DAO focus on the value enhancement of fungible tokens can produce short termism and lead the organization to ignore ethical and governance issues.
  > Yet, the focus on the value enhancement of fungible tokens can lead to short termism and may ignore ethical and governance issues.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

**2021**

- [3799320-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-005) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The focus on value enhancement of fungible tokens can drive short termism in DAOs and cause ethical and governance issues to be ignored.
  > Yet, the focus on the value enhancement of fungible tokens can lead to short- termism and may ignore ethical and governance issues.
  Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320
- [3799320-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of a DAO with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt that governance design for their own gain.
  > When fungible assets are used as the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal constituents and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt the governance design of the DAO for their own gain.
  Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320
- [3981021-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-025) [design/asserted] -- Voting associate salaries are paid in fungible tokens pro rata to each associate's non fungible reputation score at the point of payment, which creates second order economic effects and indirect economic incentives in the DAO.
  > In other words, the reputation salary is paid out in fungible tokens pro rata to reputation score of each VA at the point of payment. This design ensures second order economic effects and indirect economic incentives in the
  Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021

**2022**

- [4067783-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-005) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Governance by fungible tokens lets whales control a fundraiser DAO, which is antithetical to decentralized governance, and selling purchasable voting power via fungible tokens creates the risk of hostile takeover or looting.
  > Governance through fungible tokens in fundraiser DAOs allows whales to control the DAO, which is antithetical to the idea of DAOs overall and decentralized governance of DAOs specifically. More specifically, selling purchasable voting power via fungible tokens risks hostile takeovers or looting.
  Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783
- [4067783-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-011) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Insider rug pulls are not the only exploit path: a DAO can also be attacked from the outside whenever its governance grants voting power through fungible tokens.
  > But these inside rug pulls are not the only exploitative mechanism within DAOs. DAOs can also be exploited from the outside if the DAO's governance allows fungible voting power.
  Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783

**2023**

- [4529715-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-020) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Fungible governance tokens expose a DAO to vote buying and other forms of manipulation.
  > However, fungible governance tokens also have some limitations and challenges, such as the potential for vote buying or other forms of manipulation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/fungible-tokens.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.