# Gaming `kaal:entity:gaming` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 13 claims that carry the concept tag `gaming`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 13 claims across 9 works, 2019 to 2026. **2019** - [3441904-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-018) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Participants must be incentivized to improve their own utility while simultaneously benefiting the institution over the long run; without that duality of incentivization, rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents will attempt to game the governance design. > Without that duality of incentivization, rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents will attempt to game the governance design. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904 - [3441904-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-035) [design/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Static complex sets of DAO rules inevitably produce corruptive opportunistic gaming and arbitrage behavior, so effective DAO governance designs should be focused on dynamic elements. > With static complex sets of DAO rules comes inevitable corruptive opportunistic gaming and arbitrage behavior. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904 **2020** - [3652481-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-019) [condition/argued] -- Overcoming attempts by rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game a DAO's governance design requires a duality of incentives, in which actors improve their own utility while their actions simultaneously benefit the whole institution over the long run. > Human nature and any effective machine derivates of human engagements in institutional form require a duality of incentives in order to overcome attempts of rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game the governance design of a given DAO. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481 - [3652481-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-026) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Stable and presumptively optimal static or constitutional rules for DAO governance typically enable gaming and arbitrage opportunities, because rational opportunistic parties will circumvent complex static rules to increase their share of power and profit. > Stable and presumptively optimal static and/or constitutional rules for DAO governance therefore typically enable gaming and arbitrage opportunities. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481 **2021** - [3782198-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-006) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Centralized platforms are locked into an arms race in which developers infer the rules of the ranking algorithm and exploit them, forcing the owner to keep the algorithm opaque and under constant revision. > The Google search engine algorithm is constantly be- ing improved, because website developers infer the rules of the algorithm and exploit its properties to raise their site Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198 - [3782210-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-018) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Distributing salary equitably, for example equally to all members, is self-defeating: the obvious gaming strategy becomes creating multiple accounts and distributing one's work between them, which is why the salary must be reputation-weighted. > If salary is distributed more equitably, say equally to all members, then the obvious strategy for gaming the system is to create multiple accounts and distribute your work between the accounts. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210 - [3782214-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-039) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because major social media platforms are privately and centrally owned, their governance processes and reputation distribution algorithms are necessarily opaque, since their users' incentives are not aligned to police reputation against gaming. > Since Stack Overflow and Reddit and Facebook and Twitter and all the other successful social media sites are privately, centrally owned, their governance processes—their algorithms for distributing reputation—are necessarily opaque. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214 - [3782217-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-012) [design/argued] -- The protocols governing how a particular oracle question is answered should be set by the subject matter experts themselves rather than by a static centralized hierarchy, because the experts know best how their own system can be gamed and how to prevent that gaming to protect their hard earned reputation. > Giving the experts, them- selves, control of their own organization is better than relying on a static centralized hierarchy. The experts know best how to game their own system, and how to prevent gaming to protect their hard-earned reputation. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217 - [3782217-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-025) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Popularity based ranking cannot substitute for editorial control, because people end up relying on unconscious algorithms to determine what is authoritative and the Folk Theorems establish that such algorithms can always be gamed. > People rely on unconscious algorithms which use popularity to determine what is authoritative content. But the lessons of the Folk Theorems again arise, to remind us that such algorithms can always be gamed. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217 - [3782220-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782220-021) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Transcendental values must remain transcendental, because once formalized too rigorously they become more manipulable: a clearly specified definition becomes a focal point for competition instead of a unifying principle. > they need to remain transcendental. Once they are formalized too rigorously, they become more manipulable. For example, once the definition of ne- cessity versus non-essential is specified clearly, it becomes a focal point for competi- tion, instead of a unifying principle Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Transcendental Unifying Values for Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782220 - [3799320-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-025) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- In any open and democratic system, naturally opportunistic rational parties will attempt to circumvent and game the applicable complex static rules to increase their share of power and profit. > In any open and democratic system, naturally opportunistic rational parties will attempt to circumvent and game the sets of applicable complex static rules to increase their share of power and profit within the system. Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320 **2026** - [6269518-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6269518-005) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- No static citation protocol can eliminate all arbitrage opportunities for sufficiently patient and powerful actors, a conclusion the author draws from Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, the Folk Theorems of repeated games, and incomplete contract theory. > Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, the Folk Theorems of repeated game theory, and the theory of incomplete contracts all counsel that no static citation protocol can eliminate all arbitrage opportunities for sufficiently patient and powerful actors.6 Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518 - [6269518-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6269518-031) [condition/argued] -- An evolutionary approach to citation standards is essential because the precise parameters of citation accuracy cannot be specified ex ante: what counts as adequate citation varies across expertise domains, evolves as domain knowledge accumulates, and must adapt as agents develop novel gaming strategies. > the precise parameters of citation accuracy cannot be specified ex ante.28 What constitutes "adequate" citation will vary across expertise domains, will evolve as domain knowledge accumulates, and will need to adapt as agents develop novel gaming strategies. Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/gaming.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.