# German banking law `kaal:entity:german-banking-law` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 10 claims that carry the concept tag `german-banking-law`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 10 claims across 1 works, 2012 to 2012. **2012** - [2061166-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-011) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Before the 2010 reform, the German regulatory intervention regime for financial institutions contained no procedure that would have reliably permitted a bank to be operated as a going concern during the financial crisis. > In addition, the German regulatory intervention regime for financial institutions did not allow for any procedure that would have reliably permitted operating a bank as a going concern during the financial crisis. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2061166-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-012) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The German provision allowing appropriate compensation of shareholders whose rights are impaired can defeat the statute's own purpose, because time is of the essence in bank reorganization and the appointment of a court-appointed expert to value shareholder claims may significantly slow the procedure. > Time is of the essence in any bank reorganization and the appointment of an expert may significantly slow down the procedure, making it less effective. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2061166-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The German voluntary reorganization procedure has a structural gap: groups of financial institutions, financial holding groups and conglomerates cannot petition for protection under it, even though these are precisely the entities that qualify as systemically important and pose the highest risk to market stability on failure. > Unlike the involuntary reorganization procedure initiated by the Supervisory Authority under the German Banking Act,333 groups of financial institutions, financial holding groups, or conglomerates are not eligible to petition for protection under the voluntary reorganization procedure. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2061166-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because German law fixes no threshold conditions or determining factors for market reception or market confidence, the systemic relevance and contagion determinations that turn on those factors can never be made in a reliable and objective manner. > The German law does not stipulate any threshold conditions or determining factors for market reception or confidence. As a result, it will always be difficult to determine any of these factors in a reliable and objective manner. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2061166-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-015) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because the amendments to the German Banking Act sharply increase the supervisor's intervention powers, the prospect that any systemically important bank would voluntarily petition under the German stabilization or reorganization procedure is remote at best. > Furthermore, in context of these increased powers the likelihood that any systemically important bank may file a voluntary petition under the German stabilization or reorganization procedure seems remote at best. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2061166-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-016) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The supervisor's discretion to set a deadline for a recovery plan before issuing a transfer order is unlikely ever to be exercised in practice, because in a crisis time will be of the essence to prevent contagion. > Considering the turmoil of the financial crisis, it is doubtful that the Authority will ever have the privilege to exercise this discretion as time will be of the essence to prevent contagion. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2061166-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-017) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Requiring only that consideration be commensurate with the value of transferred assets invites frequent and significant disputes over valuation, a problem compounded when the consideration consists of shares in the bridge bank, whose own value must then also be assessed. > However, because the required consideration must only be commensurate with the value of the transferred assets,419 there may often be significant disagreements over the issue of valuation. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2061166-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-018) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The German bank levy is internally inconsistent because financial institutions without systemic relevance must contribute to the reorganization fund yet are ineligible to receive support payments from it. > The German levy system is problematic because financial institutions without systemic relevance are required to contribute to the fund, yet are not able to receive fund support payments. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2061166-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The German reorganization fund's maximum volume of 70 billion euros may not suffice in a financial crisis, and the availability of those funds and the time needed to raise them are an even greater concern than the ceiling itself. > Another point of contention is the size of the fund with a maximum volume of 70 billion euros.447 It is questionable if this amount will suffice during a financial crisis. The availability of these funds and the time it will take to raise them is of even greater concern. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2061166-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-020) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The German Banking Act requirement that a bridge bank have its head office inside Germany is of highly questionable compatibility with European Union law, specifically the principle of free movement of capital under Article 63 TFEU. > It is highly questionable whether this requirement conforms to the Law of the European Union, namely the principal of free movement of capital, TFEU, art. 63. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/german-banking-law.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.