# German banks

`kaal:entity:german-banks`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `german-banks`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 1 works, 2010 to 2010.

**2010**

- [1558614-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-001) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- German banks' exposure to CDO risk ran through credit enhancement and liquidity guarantees given to off balance sheet conduits, and because that exposure was often kept out of their accounting the inherent risk only surfaced once the CDO market collapsed.
  > was often hidden and not included in their accounting. The in- herent risk of the guarantees to the banks, however, became appar- 10 ent when the market for CDOs collapsed.
  Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614
- [1558614-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-002) [mechanism/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The German ABCP conduit model, which financed long term American mortgage loans with short term paper and pocketed the spread, was profitable only for as long as new buyers for the short term paper could be found, so the model collapsed the moment institutional buyers withdrew.
  > A signifi- cant downside of this business model, however, was liquidity and re- sale risk—profiting through the spread only worked while the con- duit (i.e. Rhineland Funding) found buyers for the ABCP it issued
  Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614
- [1558614-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-003) [empirical/argued] -- Contesting the view that the 2008 crisis was an American problem inflicted on foreign victims, the authors argue that non U.S. institutions such as German banks were willing participants in the risk taking, even where they did not fully understand the risks they assumed.
  > The experience of German banks with CDOs, however, revealed that some of the non- U.S. victims were willing participants in the risk, even if they did not always fully understand the risks.
  Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614
- [1558614-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-008) [predictive/argued] -- Because German banks absorbed both the 2008 credit crisis and the 2010 sovereign debt crisis while American banks faced only the first, German regulators and bankers are likely to impose stricter substantive risk management rules than countries that faced only one of those shocks.
  > German banks, like Ameri- can banks, have been exposed to the 2008 credit crisis, and unlike their American rivals, German banks also face a second threat in their exposure to the 2010 sovereign debt crisis
  Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/german-banks.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.