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 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/german-corporate-law",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:german-corporate-law",
 "name": "German corporate law",
 "termCode": "german-corporate-law",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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   "value": [
    "2010",
    "2011"
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 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-015",
   "text": "German corporate law's historical focus on conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders leaves it poorly equipped to address managerial abuse of power, including excessive risk taking by managers.",
   "abstract": "Ar- guably, a legal system that focuses on the interaction of controlling and minority shareholders is not as well equipped to deal with mana- gerial abuse of power, including excessive risk taking by managers.",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "systems where ownership is concentrated and the central conflict is shareholder against shareholder"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-024",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-024",
   "text": "Under the German business judgment rule's benefit of the corporation element, management cannot be acting for the corporation's benefit when its actions threaten the corporation's existence and economic survival.",
   "abstract": "management does not act for the benefit of the corporation if its actions threaten the existence and economic survival of the corporation",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "German business judgment rule, second element"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-026",
   "text": "Under the German hazard decision doctrine, no manager acts reasonably, whether a bank officer or a board member, if the risks taken on the corporation's behalf would destroy the corporation should they be realized.",
   "abstract": "no manager, regardless of whether the manager is a bank officer or board member, acts reasonably if he or she takes on risks on behalf of the corporation that, if realized, will result in the demise of the cor- 130 poration",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "German business judgment rule as elaborated in the ARAG decision of the Bundesgerichtshof",
    "risk must be such that its realization ends the corporation"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-031",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1908473-031",
   "text": "German corporate law permits increases in voting rights only in very limited circumstances, such as grandfathered multiple voting shares, so the proposed voting rights increase would require statutory reform in Germany.",
   "abstract": "German corporate law allows an increase in voting rights only in very limited circumstances, such as grandfathering provisions for shares with multiple voting rights that were created before the enactment of the Corporations Act",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473",
   "datePublished": "2011",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Höchststimmrechte were banned for listed German corporations in 1998",
    "France and the United Kingdom by contrast permit multiple votes per share"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "4 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'german-corporate-law'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}