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 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
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 "identifier": "kaal:entity:german-law",
 "name": "German law",
 "termCode": "german-law",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
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 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-011",
   "text": "Germany has taken a much stricter approach than the United States to cases involving a breach of the duty of oversight, even though the German business judgment rule formally requires a showing of the same elements as the American one.",
   "abstract": "For instance, Germany has taken a much stricter approach to cases involving a breach of the duty of oversight.",
   "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "comparison of German and Delaware corporate law"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-012",
   "text": "Under German law, directors' business decisions lose the protection of the business judgment rule where the business risk taken was inappropriately excessive, a standard German courts announced in ARAG/Garmenbeck.",
   "abstract": "explained that if the \"business risk was inappropriately excessive,\" directors' business decisions are not protected under the 23 German business judgment rule.",
   "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "German stock corporation law",
    "Section 93 AktG business judgment rule"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-013",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-013",
   "text": "German commentators, whose expertise German courts rely on heavily, concluded after the financial crisis that managers do not act reasonably under the German business judgment rule if the risks they take on behalf of the corporation result in the demise of the corporation.",
   "abstract": "German commentators (contrary to their counterparts in the United States, German courts rely heavily on the expertise of commentators) concluded that managers do not act reasonably in terms of the German business judgment rule if risks",
   "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Germany",
    "post financial crisis evaluation of liability rules"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-014",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-014",
   "text": "The German ARAG/Garmenbeck holding is diametrically opposed to In re Citigroup, where the Delaware Chancery Court declared that directors' incorrect evaluation of business risk did not violate the duty of oversight.",
   "abstract": "This holding is diametrically opposed to the holding in In re Citigroup where the Delaware Chancery Court declared that directors' incorrect evaluation of business risk did not violate directors' duty of oversight.",
   "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "comparison of German and Delaware case law on business risk"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-015",
   "text": "The German Federal Court of Justice held in Mannesmann that directors breached their fiduciary duty by awarding a bonus of roughly seventeen million dollars to a chief executive whose tenure had substantially increased shareholder value, whereas Delaware courts imposed no liability for the far larger Ovitz payout in Disney.",
   "abstract": "decision in Mannesmann28 determined that the directors of the German Mannesmann AG breached their fiduciary duty to the company by awarding a bonus of approximately $17 million to the Mannesmann CEO whose tenure at Mannesmann resulted in a substantial increase of shareholder value.",
   "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "executive compensation decisions",
    "German versus Delaware adjudication"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-017",
   "text": "Despite the limits of the comparison, had In re Citigroup and Disney been decided in Germany the allocation of liability would have been different, because German courts are generally more willing than Delaware courts to second-guess directors' decisions.",
   "abstract": "it seems difficult to escape the conclusion that had the two American cases, In re Citigroup and Disney, been decided in Germany, the liability allocation would have been different. German courts generally seem more willing to second-guess directors' decisions than Delaware courts.",
   "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "cases involving extreme facts at the cusp of culpable conduct"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "6 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'german-law'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}